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Abstract
Dualism o-f the Mind and Brain: The Basis -for Janusian
Thought in Issues o-f Science and Religion
Alvin Benton Broderson
This thesis lays a -foundation -for the hypothesis that
the human mindset is characterized by a biased dualism which
radically distorts the way we perceive, know, and understand
reality. The presence o-f this biased dualism is evidenced,
in public discourse over the larger issues o-f our time, by
the implicit display o-f a kind of philosophical apartheid
which I have called "The Janusian Syndrome", and it appears
to have especially destructive consequences -for our thought
on issues o-f science and religion. This thesis explores the
biased nature o-f the basic dualism, which is hypothesized to
have a basis in the distinct processing modes o-f the brain
hemispheres. Later volumes o-f the larger study will present
empirical evidence -for the presence o-f the dualism in public
discourse about the origins issue and -for the wide scope o-f
its philosophical apartheid, and will argue the need -for a
uni-fied view o-f reality, knowledge and understanding, and
the knowing person.
Chapter 1 o-f this thesis reviews the discipline o-f
epi stemol ogy , the science o-f knowing. It reviews the ways in
which our language has developed an implicit assumption that
natural-spiritual reality is dichotomized, and that we
possess correspondingly dichotomized ways o-f knowing that
reality: sensory cognition by means o-f verbal and numerical
concepts, and intuitive cognition by means of visual or
pictorial concepts. When we give in to this assumed
dichotomy, we lose the cross-checks and balances needed to
develop certainty that our knowledge and beliefs about
reality are true.
Chapter 2 shows how the basic dichotomy induces us to
define both science and religion too narrowly, giving us a
science with no intuition, and a religion with no sense,
each in a realm dichotomized from the other. When so
dichotomized, they can give us only a distorted perspective
on reality, one having no internal coherence. The distortion
can only be healed by a wider interpretation in which
science and religion use both sensory and intuitive
cognition; so conceived, they become complementary windows
on the same world, and provide us with the focused cognition
of a triangulated perspective.
Chapter 3 moves from knowledge to the wider concept of
understanding, and how one's acceptance of a basic dichotomy
leads inexorably to two radically dichotomized channels of
understanding. The channel headed by the senses generates
verbal, numerical, and lawful concepts of reality and
manipulates these by analytical thought and deductive logic.
The channel headed by the intuition generates visual or
pictorial images or models which are manipulated by
synthetic thought and the powers of inductive logic and
pattern recognition. Each channel of the understanding
possesses a powerful triad of material, formal, and
directional logic. Between the two channels stands the
knowing self, striving to use its understanding to reflect
and reach complex judgements about reality. When he keeps
the two channels apart, he misses the inherent connectedness
of spi ri tual -mater i al reality, a perversion he can control
by an act of the will which insists on using both channels
in a harmonized manner.
Chapter 4 explores how the features of these two
channels of perception, knowledge, and understanding bear
striking similarities to the two radically different
processing modes of the left and right hemispheres of the
human brain. The left hemisphere makes decisions by
"thinking"; it works with sense perception, and decides by
analyzing concepts into details, organizing them into
clusters, and manipulating them by mathematical or deductive
logic. The right hemisphere makes decisions by "feeling"; it
works intuitively, and decides by discerning the being and
personal aspects of reality, interpreting their meaning by
the logic of induction and pattern recognition, and uses
creative imagination and systhesis to make holistic
decisions. One hemisphere generally dominates over the
other, causing us to be biased toward one channel's view of
reality, and to be blind to the other, radically affecting
our use of facts and their interpretation. Such striking
correspondences lead to the hypothesis that we may be
biologically predisposed to a dualism in our modes of
perception, knowledge, and understanding, and to a bias in
favor of the authority and reliability of one side of that
dualism; and that we can achieve a unified knowledge and
understanding of reality, and recognize its inherent unity,
only by willful efforts to harmonize the processes of both
hemispheres across the anatomical bridge of the Corpus
Cal 1 osum.
Chapter 5 describes the three basic kinds of
philosophical dualism: metaphysical, epi stemol ogi cal , and
ethical or religious; and it reviews the long history of
dualistic thought from the era of the ancient Chinese,
Zoroastrians, and Greeks, through the Gnostics, Manichaeans,
and Romans, to the medieval Nominalists, the scientists of
the Enlightenment, and the 18th century Deists. It concludes
by proposing the two-faced Roman god Janus, guardian of
bridges and gateways, as a fit metaphor for the "Janusian"
thinking which causes the knowing self to give in to its
"natural" tendency toward a dualistic view, thus stopping
all communication across the Corpus Call osum, rather than
exerting the effort necessary to open the bridge and thus
stimulate the harmony of communication needed for a united
vi ew.
Chapter 6 reviews the pervasive role of Immanuel Kant
in concreting all of the metaphysical, epi stemol ogi cal , and
ethi cal �rel i gi ous dualisms within the modern, scientific
mindset. More specifically, it examines how Kant inculcated
a powerful philosophical apartheid in modern thought,
denying reality, objective existence, connectedness, and
unity to man, nature, and the noumenal dimension, separating
it from the phenomenal dimension so it may not be known, and
thus undermining science's basis in a discursive unity of
the understanding, and forcing it to compound itself with
philosophy as a way of restoring meaning. A modern example
of Kantian thought may be found in Roger Sperry, whose work
with split brains won the Nobel prize, but who cannot see
the dualisms to which his own work points. Chapter 6
compares the dualisms of our understanding with those of our
philosophies and our brains, and Chapter 7 concludes the
thesis by syhthesizing these three kinds of dualism as a
basis for dichotomized realms of science and religion, and
the consequent philosophical apartheid which produces the
Janusian Syndrome.
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PREFACE
I bellwe I have discerned, a-fter long and care-ful
study, the presence within the American mindsst of a major
distortion in the way we think and believe when dealing with
the major issues o-f our time. This distortion is a kind o-f
biased dualism which radically in-fluences the way we
P*rceive, know, and understand reality, and which becomes
particularly insidious when we deal with issues in science
and religion. I call it "The Janusian Syndrome".
The work you are about to read is the -foundational
document -for a larger study o-f the Janusian Syndrome. It
deals with the basic nature o-f dualism, and the way it
dichotomizes our thought on issues o-f interest to science
and religion. Later volumes will review the empirical basis
and methodology -for the study, the manner in which the basic
dualism becomes philosophically biased, and the ways in
which the whole Janusian Syndrome in-fluences the public
mindset on a host o-f crucial issues. The larger study will
conclude with a volume which proposes a uni-fied or holistic
approach -for healing The Janusian Syndrome.
This pre-face sets the stage -for the present volume. It
seeks to introduce the phenomenon o-f dualism, which is the
major -focus o-f the present volume, and to help the reader
locate that phenomenon within the larger context o-f the
Janusian Syndrome.
A Personal Note
The concept o-f the Janusian Syndrome arose -from a long
period o-f study motivated by a desire to understand the
philosophical and theological milieu behind a local
"creation�evolution" controversy in which I was personally
involved. As that analysis proceeded, it became increasingly
clear to me that there was much more to this debate than a
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mere di -f -ference o-f opinion over the origin o-f man, life, and
the universe. There was a much deeper, though unstated
turmoil, involving the ways in which we see reality, the
means by which we claim to know and to understand that
reality, and the relative role and authority we grant to
fact and value, faith and reason, and to science and
religion.
Since I was so deeply and personally involved in the
origins-related case study which served as the basis for
the hypothesis I now advance, I -feel obligated at the outset
to acknowledge that my personal ways of seeing reality, of
knowing and understanding it, and of using faith and reason
in coping with such a big issue have their own influence
over the way I have come to analyze the views of others.
To reinforce that commitment, I have chosen to abandon
a strict adherence to writing in the third person, and to
openly use the first person in this preface, and in the
remainder of this work. This is no small concession for me.
As a published scientist and engineer, I have been
inculcated with the imperative of writing in the third
person, a technique intended to reflect an image of
"scientific objectivity".
I do not believe, however, that we can meaningfully
debate origins, or any of the other "big issues", in a
completely objective way. These are intensely personal
matters, and I believe, instead, that we ourselves are a
necessary component of the "facts" we are interpreting, and
so we bring to that interpretation our own philosophical
presuppositions and world view. If I am therefore to analyze
the way these factors influence the thinking of others, I
think I must be honest enough to make clear, by the way I
i^r-ite, that I bring my own world view to this task.
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The Empirical Basis for the Larger Study
I will present, in a later volume of the larger study,
a detailed treatment of the case study which provided the
empirical basis for my conclusions about the Janusian
Syndrome, and the methods I employed in its analysis. I want
readers of this first volume to know about it, however, for
it is important to understand the extent to which the whole
study has a basis in empirical data.
The empirical case study was assembled from the public
record of arguments advanced during the 1980-1981 period
when the topic of origins teaching in public education was
such a controversy in the Lexington, Kentucky area. I have
an abiding interest in that particular controversy because I
had a major hand, together with a group of some 20 others,
in raising the issue.
Following a great deal of study and preparation, we had
approached the Lexington�Fayette County School Board with a
proposal which would have required that all public school
classes treat the issue of origins from what we called a
"balanced perspective", requiring each teacher to include
the scientific, philosophical, and theological backgrounds
for both the creationist and evolutionist views. We were not
alone in that request because several other groups were at
that time mounting similar attempts throughout the nation.
While we were preparing the proposal, and the school
board was evaluating it, the issue was publicly debated
through articles, editorials, and letters to the editors of
regional newspapers; through radio and TV discussions and
talk shows; and through public presentations and debates. I
subsequently collected the written and verbal transcript
records of these public arguments and began a long period of
analysis to uncover the philosophical and theological views
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which underlay what was being treated on the sur-face as an
issue o-f "science versus religion". Some of the present
volume, and much of later volumes in the larger study, are
based upon that empirical record.
An Introduction to "Janusian" Thinking
I have defined the Janusian Syndrome as a collection of
factors, having spiritual, biological, and cultural roots,
which predispose a person to think dual isti cal ly about the
largest issues, and to be biased toward one side of the
dualism. Following is a highly summarized introduction to
the concept. I trust that this overview will help the reader
understand the context in which the present volume presents
its treatment of dualism.
1. Our thinking is influenced by our personalities,
which are shaped, in turn, by both cultural and biological
factors. One cultural influence is the fact that we are
steeped in a scientific culture which thinks dual istical ly
about the big issues. Biological factors include the fact
that our brains are split into left and right hemispheres,
each of which perceives and thinks about reality in
fundamentally different ways, and that in each person, one
hemisphere generally dominates to some degree over the
other. This hemispheric bias predisposes us to give our
affections to the dualistic philosophies of our scientific
culture.
Biologically speaking, therefore, we have split brains;
and philosophically speaking, we have divided minds.
Theologians might even add a third factor, a reason for the
split in both brain and mind: the doctrine that our reason
is congenital ly infected, and our whole personhood is
divided, because of the Fall.
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2. Such factors predispose us not only to perceive,
know, and understand reality in "split" ways, but also to be
biased in favor of one side of the split. It is as if a
little demon like the Roman god Janus (fr@Mi c^ihom I take the
name "Janusian") were within us, closirtig the bridge of
commerce between our brain hemispheres so as to keep facts,
reason, and science on one side of the bridge, never to
communicate with the values, faith, and religion on the
other side; and to so elevate the authority of the fact-
reason�science side that the other side is rendered
meaningless.
3. I see this Janusian predisposition as a basic
disease, but one which is characterized by m whole syndrome
of philosophical and theological symptoms. Some people are
predisposed in varying degrees toward the left brain
hemisphere, so that their view on big issues like origins is
shaped and informed by such "left-brained philosophies" as
positivism, empiricism, rationalism, and naturalism, and by
such "left-brained theologies" such as modernism, deism, and
a higher critical or "demythologized" view of Biblical
interpretation. Other people are predisposed in varying
degrees toward the right brain hemisphere, so that their
view is conditioned by such "right-brained philosophies" as
idealism, romanticism, and process thought, and such "right-
brained theologies" as 1 iberal�emotional pietism, mysticism,
theistic evolution, and a purely metaphorical view of
Biblical interpretation.
Janusian Thought on the Bio Issues
I discerned the existence of The Janusian Syndrome by
study of a controversy over the origins issue. But I do not
believe the Syndrome affects only thinking on origins; I
believe it affects our thinking on every one of the great
issues of out time.
Science and metaphvsio. Because we live in a
scientific age, and because so many scientists are intrigued
with such large issues as origins, we are apt to treat them
as if they were purely scientific issues. The larger study
affirms the view of many contemporary scholars that such
Qreat issues as origins are not scientific issues at all;
they are rather philosophical, if not metaphysical issues,
which scientists happen to have selected for study.
The importance of a correct perspective on this
situation can hardly be overstated for, by thinking of
philosophical or metaphysical issues as scientific ones, our
society has long tended to ignore or even cast aside any
contribution by the very disciplines which define the
i ssues.
The metaphysical nature of origins. The origins issue
provides us with a perfect case in point for two reasons:
first, because the issue itself is thought of in
intellectually Janusian terms (giving science the authority
to answer, but not religion); and second, because the issue
is treated in educational circles according to the tenets
of a politically Janusian philosophy (the "separation of
church and state").
Consider the situation. By any definition, origins is
a (generally) philosophical or (specifically) metaphysical
issue. This is, first of all, because metaphysics is, by
definition, the discipline which treats of the "big issues",
notably the origin and nature of man, the origin and nature
of life, the nature of truth and reality, and the origin and
nature of the universe. Secondly, this is because any
thought on such unprovable issues depends upon reasoning
which begins with fundamental axioms, premises,
presuppositions, and postulates which cannot themselves be
proven; since these come to us only by way of philosophy.
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any use o-f reasoning on the large issues necessarily
provides an entry point -for philosophy. Third, this is
because metaphysical issues necessarily convolve together
those things we have too often thought of as separate: fact
and interpretation, science and religion, reason and faith.
Thus what may be thought of as a purely "scientific" issue,
such as origins, is really a "mixed" issue. Unfortunately,
scientists are seldom trained in philosophy, and so they
seldom recognize the philosophy which is inherently
convolved with their "science".
Origins ties religion to metaphysics. Me know, also,
that metaphysics cannot be meaningfully severed from
theology or religion where the issue of origins is
concerned. The whole history of reflective thought is
pregnant with a strong belief in the possibility that the
universe was created by the fiat act of a God of awesome
power and love. This metaphysical possibility simply cannot
and will not be ignored. If for no other reason than the
weight of informed opinion, one must consider at least that
this metaphysical possibility is a valid one, deserving of
the most serious consideration.
Our windows on metaphysical issues. It is becoming
increasingly clear to philosophers that we can scarcely hope
to resolve such intensely metaphysical issues unless we
utilize all the intellectual tools at our disposal,
including science, religion, and philosophy. Moreover, since
each of these is a separate "window on the world", and is
thus limited to the view from a particular perspective, we
can never be sure we have perceived truth crisply and
accurately unless our view through all these windows in
coherent. In short, the clear resolution of metaphysical
issues, such as origins, requires a coherence of views
through all our windows on reality, and that can only be
achieved by considering all the windows so their respective
views may be compared and contrasted.
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The inadequacy of mcicncg for ��t�phvsic�l i�su�m.
by sven discussing ths origins issua in public school
�cienc* classrooms, our society wrongfully implies that this
quintessentially metaphysical issue is really an issue of
"I'+t -brained" science. The educator then compounds the
tragedy by asserting that no "right-brained" philosophical,
metaphysical, or theological insight into the issue is
permitted because this would "introduce religion" into a
"scientific issue", and that there are legal and
"scientific" reasons why science and religion ought to be
kept separate, with science in the classroom and religion in
the home and Church. Our educational system thus discusses
metaphysical issues is a manner which requires use of only
one window on reality, and which prohibits the comparison of
views we must have through other windows if we are to
achieve a coherent view of reality.
It is in this manner that Janusian thinking kec�ps our
society from properly addressing and resolving origins and
the other big issues of our time.
janusian thought on all large issues. Finally, I
believe that the results of the larger study will justify
the inference that the effects of the Janusian Syndrome are
not limited to the public controversy over origins. If, as I
believe, the Syndrome arises from wellsprings which are
spiritual, biological, and cultural in nature, and if it
radically influences our metaphysical understanding of man,
life, and nature, then such a syndrome may well shape the
views of this nation's primary policymakers on a spectrum of
issues which is far broader than the origin of man, life,
and the universe. This syndrome may well represent a
fundamental flaw in the fabric of our intellectual
constitution.
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The importance o-f a solution. Such a -fundamental -flaw
must necessarily exert a powerful yet hidden influence over
every debate which proceeds from some metaphysical premises
about man, life, and nature. This may well include every
substantive discussion in the halls of government, business,
and academia, whether the topic is ethics, science, defense
policy, education, technology, health and welfare, the
humanities, or the relation of religion to the state.
I believe our discussions of the major issues of our
time are being crippled by split brains, divided minds, and
fallen reason, and if this is so, then there can be no more
important issue than how we deal in public with the Janusian
Syndrome.
A Solution Envisioned
The ultimate goals of the larger study are to
recognize, and offer approaches toward healing, the Janusian
split in our society's intellectual treatment of the largest
issues it faces. I believe this will ultimately require
inclusion of at least the following characteristics.
The unity of whole-brain thinking. First of all, I am
convinced that the Janusian Syndrome can only be healed by a
united view of reality, and by methods for perceiving,
knowing, and understanding reality which are holistic,
synthetic, or "whole-brained".
Science is only conceived as left-brained, and religion
is only conceived as right-brained, from the narrowest of
perspectives. Science and religion, as I believe they were
"meant to be", are whole-brained. They may well emphasize
different modes of knowing; but properly conceived, they
each seek not only to ground their views in an analysis of
real, objective reality, but also to synthesize that view
into a more holistic interpretation in which facts and
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values, -faith and reason, and science and religion are
brought into a meaningful and coherent whole. The best
science and religion will seek to balance clear thinking
with honest believing.
I have accordingly attempted, in the larger study, to
be "whole-brained" in my treatment. On the one hand, I have
sought to ground my efforts in rigorous logical and critical
analysis of the empirical data base I have assembled (the
details to be presented in a later volume of the larger
study). On the other hand, I have sought also to openly
incorporate synthesis, interpretation, and speculation from
the arenas of psychology, physiology, philosophy, and
theology, and to openly identify my bases for preferring
certain of these interpretations. I recognize that this
approach may upset the strict positivists and empiricists
among my readers, but it is in strict agreement with the
synthetic approach I will later advance for healing the
Janusian Syndrome.
The tentative nature of provisional truth. Secondly, I
believe any proposed solution to the Janusian Syndrome, mine
included, will have the nature of provisional, and not
established truth. The disease I claim to have discerned,
and any cure which I or others may advance, will each
contain too much speculation and interpretation to be
constrained by a claim only appropriate for the narrow
empirical sciences. I do believe, however, that any solution
which ultimately claims to solve the problems raised by the
Syndrome must have the strong ring of truth about it, and I
believe the synthetic approach I will advance has that ring
of truth.
Healing is moved by pacific intent. Third, I believe
the Janusian Syndrome can ultimately be healed only by those
whose intent is perceived to be pacific and not polemic.
That I think is because the Janusian Syndrome, by its very
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nature, splits us into opposing camps vnhich are o-f ten more
interested in shouting at each other than in discerning and
solving the real basis -for their disagreement. Those Mho are
at war with each other are seldom inclined to respond to
polemics.
Any searching inquiry into the wellsprings o-f ultimate
truth may be accompanied by perceived threats to one's
dearest belie-fs. The search can there-fore be a wretching
one, and the true seeker may expect to bear many scars along
the way. I expect therefore that my treatment of this topic
may open not a few wounds in the psyche of the reader; it
has opened a few in my own. I mount no polemic, however,
except my strong opposition to the Janusian Syndrome and to
anyone who sees it as a healthy split which ought to be
maintained or even widened. My motive is to identify and
heal what I see as an intellectual disease. If I appear at
times to be hasty in applying salt to the wound, I trust my
pacific intent will be remembered.
An Overview of the Present Work
The present work lays the foundation for the larger
study of the Janusian Syndrome by examining the nature of
dualism in human thought and brain function.
Chapter 1 begins the study with a review of
epi stemol ogy , the science of knowing, and reviews the ways
in which we have split our knowledge into sensory and
intuitive modes. Chapter 2 then focuses upon science and
religion (or theology) as two specialized modes for gaining
sensory and intuitive knowledge, modes which have become
dichotomized in the popular mindset.
Chapter 3 surveys the whole concept of understanding,
and reviews the ways in which our culture has come to see us
using two dichotomized channels of understanding: a sensory
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channel which includes analytical thought and deductive
reasoning, and an intuitive channel which includes synthetic
thought and inductive reasoning. Then Chapter 4 revievis the
way in which our thinking is split by brains which are
divided into two hemispheres, each o-f which corresponds to
one channel o-f knowledge and understanding, and one o-f which
o-f ten dominates over the other.
Chapter 5 traces the history o-f dualistic philosophy
and reviews the ways in which modern philosophy dichotomizes
reality, and our knowledge about reality, into separate
realms which correspond to our split channels o-f knowing,
understanding, and brain -function. Then Chapter 6 focuses
upon the decisive influence of Immanuel Kant in convincing
most modern thinkers that this is both a permanent and
unbreachable dichotomy, and that science and religion
accordingly belong in separate realms.
Chapter 7 concludes this initial volume of the study by
taking an overview of dualism in the modern mindset, and
considering how it forms the basic undergirding for the
biased dualism which later work will develop into the
Janusian Syndrome.
xix
Chapter 1
THE SPLIT IN OUR KNOWLEDGE
When is an idea "true"? What do we mean when we say
that we "know" something is true, or that some idea we have
"really" exists. Are we claiming that we have real truth
about "reality" possessed within our minds, or only that we
possess a belie-f in which we are very certain because we
have strong reasons and have no doubts? Is it necessary that
something be "reasonable" in order -for us to be certain that
it is true? These are the questions o-f epi stemol ogy , the
science o-f knowing, and it is one o-f the most basic and
-fundamental divisions o-f philosophy.
I-f we are to deal e-ffectively with my assertion that
there is a perceived split in our view of reality, and in
our ways of knowing that reality, then we must begin our
study by considering the basic issues of epi stemol ogy. What
is reality? How does a person truly know, or come into
contact with reality? How many reliable modes of knowing
reality do we possess? Are they coherent? And how may we
reliably judge the assertion of someone, during a debate
over one of the great issues like origins, when he claims
that he "knows" something to be true, and that we cannot
doubt it?
These questions may seem, at first blush, to be a bit
esoteric. We will see, however, that they are at the very
foundation of the problems with which this entire study must
wrestle.
KNOWLEDGE AND PHILOSOPHY
Since the great issues with which society must deal are
enmeshed in philosophy, and since epi stemol ogy is a branch
of philosophy, we will do well to begin our review of
1
^i stemol ogy by surveying what the whole philosophical
enterprise is all about, so we may better see how
epistemology fits into its general scope and reach.
PhilosoDhv as a Search for Truth
Mords, and the definition of words, are among our most
fundamental tools for this or any similar study, so I will
often begin a section of analysis with a consideration of
basic definitions.
The definition of philosophy. Webster defines the term
"philosophy" as follows:
Phi losophv . The love of nisdom or knonledge .
A study o-f the processes govern ing thought and
conduct . Theory or invest i gat ion of the pr inciples
or lans that regulate the un iver se and under 1 ie
all knowledge and reality.
For a more "religious" view of philosophy, we might
turn to Dr. Arthur F- Holmes, the Chairman of the Department
of Philosophy at Wheaton College, who reminds us that it was
Pythagoras who first defined a philosopher as a lover of
wisdom. In his Greek tradition, therefore, philosophy has
tried to be a discipline of logically disciplined and self-
critical inquiry into wisdom, addressing primarily questions
which are basic to man's understanding of himself, his
world, and his God. For Holmes, philosophy seeks these goals
by an understanding of reality which is clear and
systematic. *�
For a more secular but no less authoritative view of
philosophy, we may turn to philosopher and historian Will
Durant. For Durant, philosophy is the "first trench in the
siege for truth". He likes to contrast it with science,
^Arthur F. Holmes, Philosophy: A Christian Perspective.
revised edition (Downers Grove, Illinois: Inter-Varsity
Press, 1975), 9-11.
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emphasizing for example that their goals are different.
Philosophy, he says, deals primarily with problems which are
not yet open to the methods of science, problems such as
good and evil, beauty and ugliness, order and freedom, and
J-i"^� *nd death. Durant further distinguishes philosophy from
science by looking at their respective methods. Philosophy,
he says, seeks a hypothetical interpretation of the universe
by using a process of synthetic interpretation. In other
words, philosophy seeks to relate the particular facts of
our experience to things in general, and to their meaning
and worth. In contrast to the scientist, who tries to take
apart the great "universe-watch", the philosopher tries to
put it together. While science gives us analytical
knowledge, says Durant, it is philosophy which gives us
synthetic wisdom.^
The scope of philosophv. As a discipline which seeks a
comprehensive and synthetic view of all reality, philosophy
must necessarily range rather widely over the entire compass
of human thought. The "big issues" with which it deals are
primarily those of truth, reality, knowledge, good, and
beauty. Philosophy is accordingly divided into several sub-
disciplines, each of which deals primarily with one of these
"big issues". By consulting a number of dictionaries and
standard texts of philosophy, one may discern the following
as the most commonly cited divisions within its scopei
1. Metaphysics. The philosophy of truth and
reality. The study of the existence, nature, and principles
of ultimate reality, including nature and material reality,
God and spiritual reality, and man and the human mind, and
of their relationships to each other. It has three
constituent disciplinesi
==Wi 1 1 Durant, The Story of Philosophy, 27th Printing,
1974 <New York: Pocket Books, Division of Simon and
Schuster, 1953), xxvi-xxvii.
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a. Ontology. The philosophy of reality. The
study of the nature of being, existence, and reality; the
examination of questions regarding what things actually
exist and what things do not exist in reality (Is the
material all there is, or is the spiritual also real?).
b. Cosmogony. The study of the origin,
generation, or creation of the universe, or the source,
acts, or processes from which it derives its existence (Did
the universe originate naturally or supranatural ly , at once
or by process?) .
c. Cosmo 1 ogy. The study of the general
structure and nature of the universe, including all of its
substance and regulative laws and principles (Is natural law
an imposed requirement or merely the custom which nature
follows? Does nature consist only of material substances or
are there also distinct vital or spiritual aspects?).
2. Epistemology. The philosophy of knowledge. The
study of knowledge, or the processes of knowing reality,
including the origins, validity, limits, methods, and
grounds of knowledge (Can man truly and reliably know
reality? How? Mhat is its basis and how can we be sure it is
valid? Can both science and theology provide us with truth
regarding origins, or man, or nature?).
3. Ethics. The philosophy of good. The study of
moral conduct, of the basis of moral values and of standards
for moral human judgment and behavior (Mhat is "good"? Is it
absolute or relative? How can we know?).
4. Aesthetics. The philosophy of beauty. The study
of the origin and nature of beauty, and of our sense of
aesthetic values (Mhat is beauty? Is it objective or
subjective? How do we judge or rank it?).
4
The philoaoDhical nature o-f orioinm ouotions. When we
ask the questions, "how did the universe originate?", and
"can science or theology explain that origin?", we are
asking philosophical questions. The -first question is a
matter o-f metaphysics, or more spec i-fi cal ly o-f cosmogony,
and the second question is a matter o-f epistemology.
Epi stemol oQv as a Branch o-f Philosophv
The concept o-f knowledge is deep and complex, and to
deal with it e-f -fecti vely , we must be -familiar with a whole
constellation of subsidiary concepts and with a variety of
considerations regarding their interrelation.
Concepts involved in knowledge. There are six primary
constituent concepts in the larger concept of knowledge.
These are (1) reality, (2) ideas about reality, <3) truth
about reality, (4) knowledge and belief about reality, (5)
certainty and doubt about our knowledge, and <6) the manner
in which we act based upon that knowledge or belief. We will
shortly begin our examination of knowledge by reviewing the
range of these six concepts.
General considerations. We must first deal with the
nature of reality, that is, with the whole universe of
whatever actually exists; but when we begin to do this, we
shortly find that we are not always certain that we know
what truly does and does not exist. This compels us to
recognize, first, that there is a distinction between true
reality, and our ideas about reality, and second, that our
ideas, themselves, can represent either objective portions
of reality, or merely mental constructions which we presume
to represent that reality. Only when we are able to deal
with such distinctions are we ready to tackle the nature of
truth.
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Truth maans bamically the correspondence between
reality and our idea o-f it. Having learned that there are
di-f-ferent kinds o-f ideas about reality, we must next be
prepared -for the -fact that there are di-f-ferent kinds o-f
truth and reality, and di-f-ferent dimensions within each. For
example, reality may have objective, subjective, and
personal dimensions; there-fore, truth about these dimensions
o-f reality must necessarily have corresponding dimensions.
Then, to make matters even more complicated, we must
understand that there is more than one kind o-f truth within
each dimension, -for truth may be abstract, concrete, or
personal in nature. See Figure 1.1.
Once we have a grasp o-f the various concepts o-f
reality, and o-f truth about reality, we can better
understand the distinctions involved when we speak o-f
knowledge and belie-f. To have knowledge o-f reality is to
have success-ful ly grasped and internalized truth about that
reality, and to be certain o-f that success; while to have a
belie-f about reality is to possess a conviction that we have
gained such knowledge, but without the certainty that it is
completely accurate truth.
These distinctions among the concepts o-f truth and
reality, in turn, compel us to recognize that there is more
than truth to deal with in the concept o-f knowledge. There
is, -first o-f all, the person who claims to know or believe
something about reality, and perhaps the additional person
who revealed or taught the knowledge to him; what
constituent role do these persons constitute in the
knowledge claimed? Secondly, there is the idea or thing
which a person may claim to know or believe; we must inquire
into the nature of this thing he claims to possess. Third,
there are the methods used by the person claiming to have
successfully apprehended or grasped the knowledge; we must
inquire whether the methods he employed provide sufficient
6
FIGURE I.I REALITY AS A COMPOSITE
OF TWO DIMENSIONS OR TWO KINDS OF
ATTRIBUTES.
*^*'"'^*nt -for his claim that he does in -fact possess true
knowledge rather than merely a strong belief.
We will find that we must become particularly
P^'eoccupied with the methods by which men apprehend, or
claim to apprehend, knowledge. The first method usually
claimed is that of cognition, by which we mean the
apprehension of knowledge by either the senses or the
intuition. A second method is logic, within which there are
three sets of distinctions: natural and acquired, inductive
and deductive, and formal and material. A third method is
personal experience. And some even make the (disputed) claim
that there is a fourth method, reliance upon inborn or
innate knowledge.
Because there are so many methods claimed for the
successful apprehension of true knowledge about reality, man
has found it practically useful to question whether many
truth claims actually represent knowledge of reality or
whether they might rather be merely a strongly held belief
or a product of the imagination. This practical need had
required us to deal with the issues of doubt and certainty
regarding knowledge and truth claims.
First of al 1 � **e must wrestle with various methods for
testing what we or others claim to know, by both practical
experience and formal "proofs". Secondly, we must deal with
methods for judging how successfully one has actually
apprehended real truth, by examining facts and both direct
and circumstantial evidence. Third, we find that, if we are
to convince others that we possess truth about reality, we
must be able to articulate adequate reasons for believing it
true. And fourth, we often find that we are unable to
prove a matter in such an irrefutable way that others
are
compelled to accept it, and in such circumstances we find it
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practically necesmary to merely a-f-firm that we believe �uch-
and-Buch is the truth. This compels us to -face that fact
that there are different degrees of certainty in truth
claims, and that we must learn to deal with a real measure
of uncertainty in most everything we know.
Finally, we must deal with the fact that we live
in an imperfect world in which is is generally not possible
to have complete certainty in our knowledge, or to cause
others to develop that certainty in our truth claims to
them. Me must therefore develop ways of acting in the real
world in the face of unccn^tainty. And we find that the
willingness to have faith, to take risks, and to make
commitments in the face of uncertainty is a necessary
attribute in anyone trying to live in the world as we have
it given to us.
Perhaps now it will be easier to see what a complex
subject knowledge can be, and why books on epistemology can
be quite long and even tedious. Me are now ready to consider
the basic concepts of knowledge in more detail.
TRUTH, KNOMLEDGE, AND REALITY
In the previous section, we briefly defined reality to
mean the whole universe of that which actually exists. Me
have experienced, however, the fact that there is often a
great deal of disagreement, in the great issues like
origins, regarding which things or ideas "really" exist and
which are simply the imaginations of an overly active mind.
Me therefore need to flesh out the bones of this problem.
Let us therefore consider, in more detail, what is
meant by the concepts of reality, ideas about reality,
truth, and knowledge.
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Real ity
One of the basic issues at stake here is whether there
e>*ists some reality "out there" which will go on existing,
whether or not we are alive to perceive it, or whether
instead the only reality is within our own minds. As the
philosophers phrase it, we must inquire whether we are
justified in asserting that certain aspects of the universe
exist "objectively", i.e., apart form our minds. A
different, but closely related question, is whether a
particular person's knowledge claim relates to something
which is "real" or merely imaginary.
We turn again to Webster for an initial place on which
to stand, and we find that, in its more philosophical sense,
"reality" is that which "actually, factually, or objectively
exists or happens, and is not merely an imagined
possibility". The key word here is perhaps "objectively",
which Webster defines (in this sense) to mean "independent
of the mind".
Philosopher Mortimer Adler makes the crux of the matter
clear. He argues that, unless there is some true reality out
there which we are trying to know, then all our language and
activity is a bit pointless:
"�the mind� atfirms the existence o-f a
reality that is independent o-f the mind and is
Mhat it is regardless o-f nhat we may think about
To illustrate the issue from the standpoint of the
origins issue which gave this study birth, we may point out
that those espousing a naturalistic evolutionary view of
origins begin with the premise that the natural universe is
^'Mortimer J. Adler, Six Great Ideas (New York: Collier
Books, Macmillan Publishing Co., 1981), 37.
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the sum total o-f reality and that nothing else exists (e.g.,
a supranatural dimension) except perhaps in the imaginations
�* certain minds. Creationists, by contrast (and others such
as some theistic evolutionists) begin with the premise that
there are both natural and supranatural dimensions to
reality, i.e., that they both exist independently o-f the
mind which claims to cognize them. The primary distinction
emphasized here is that between two di-f-ferent views o-f
real i ty.
Ideas o-f Realitv
Adler next makes a point which may appear di-f-ficult -for
some to accept, but he argues the point so cogently that it
is di-f-ficult to re-fute. His argument is important here
because it relates to the creationists' claim that there is
a supranatural dimension to reality which is independent o-f
the mind. Adler 's argument is that certain kinds of ideas
have "objective" existence.-*
For Adler, there are two kinds of ideas. The first kind
is the subjective kind, and this includes such things as
perceptions, sensations, images, memories, conceptions, and
notions. These are private ideas, which exist only in the
mind of the person having them. Thus, for example, if a
person were to claim that he can visualize an imaginary kind
of butterfly, we may properly classify this image as a
strictly private, subjective thing within his own mind, and
properly believe that no such butterfly exists in reality.
The second kind of idea is the objective idea. This is
a true "object of the mind", and could be a concept such as
truth or beauty which has objective existence. That is, two
or more people can discuss it, or have it in the focus of
their attention, and know what they mean when they discuss
-^Adler, 7-12.
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It. It really exists, apart from the mind, and is "public"
in that anyone can address it and conceive of it. While such
Ideas have "objective existence", however, Adler notes that
it is not the same kind of reality that belongs to physical
things.
Thus something other than physical, material things
can have objective existence, and can be properly designated
to be a part of reality. While Adler does not say so in
this book, the same definition could be applied to the
supranatural dimension of reality, which has personal
attributes. It is not the same kind of reality that belongs
to the natural or material universe, but it may be
conceived as being Just as real (or objectively existing)
because it is a public idea which men have claimed and
discussed for ages.
Truth
In the brief definition presented above, truth was said
to be possessed when there was an accurate correspondence
between reality and our idea of it. We must now flesh that
idea out a bit in preparation for our discussion of
knowledge.
Adler characterizes truth as the "most sovereign of all
the great ideas". � This is because it is the idea upon
which all other concepts rest. Turning again to Webster, we
find truth defined, in its simplest sense, as follows:
Truth. Basic senses firm as a tree. That
nhich is faithful to reality, or in correspondence
Mith that nhich actually exists.
To carry that definition one step further, we might
f^otB that "faithful" means the steadfast adherence to a
person or thing to whom one is bound by duty. Then, to
=Adler, 22, 64.
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elaborate. Me could de-Fine truth as that attitude or
characteristic by Mhich Me so -faith-FuUy bind ourselves to
the personal and material dimensions o-f reality that our
interactions Mith it, and statements about it, correspond to
its true nature as -firmly as a tree.
We may elaborate even -further by focusing for a moment
upon the personal dimension of truth, and the nature of our
statements about it. Mortimer Adler reminds us that we must
be careful to distinguish the truth of our thought from the
truth of our verbal statements about that Mhich Me are
thinking. Our thought is true, says Adler, Mhen the concepts
in our mind correspond faithfully Mith Mhat actually exists
in reality, independent of our minds. But Mhen someone makes
a statement. Me may say that he speaks the truth Mhen that
Mhich he communicates to someone else corresponds faithfully
to the concept Mhich is in his OMn mind, i.e., Mith Mhat he
actually thinks is true.*
When Me consider matters of theology, truth takes on an
added factor of complication because theology focuses upon
the personal and supranatural dimensions of reality.
Theologian Thomas Torrance claims that theological truth is
personal, rather than merely intellectual, because it is at
once person (God) and message (revelation). Moreover, like a
person, the truth of God has movement, and life. Thus, in
tones reminiscent of Adler, he says that Me must distinguish
betMeen the truth of God and the truth of our statements
about God. This, he says, is because, real truth is final
and ultimate, Mhereas our statements about truth are
relative and contingent.''
*Adler, 32-34.
^Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science, paperback
edition, 1978 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 143,
153.
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Knowledqt*
^t i� now time to -flesh out our earlier definition of
knowledge as the successful grasping and internalizing of
truth about reality, and the development of certainty of
that success.
Webster notes that the archaic sense of the word "know"
is to become personally familiar with (someone or something)
at a level of intimacy approaching that of sexual
intercourse. This usage calls forth both Old Testament and
New Testament teaching that, during the conjugal act, the
man and woman become "joined together" such that they are
"of one flesh", and that each thus becomes part of the
other. Thus, in the original sense of the word, to know
something is more than merely to possess information about
its reality; it is rather to so intimately touch or contact
that reality that it becomes a part of oneself.
In its more conventional senses, to know something is,
according to Mebster , to have a firm mental grasp of, to
have a clear understanding of, to be certain of, to be
convinced or satisfied of the truth or reality of, to be
familiar with, to have experience of it, or to have it
firmly in the memory or mind. Mhen knowledge has been
apprehended, one has seized it with, and taken it into, the
mind.
If we were now to combine the meat of these various
senses of the word, we might say that one truly knows
something or someone when he is able to firmly apprehend it
by, and retain it within the mind, because he has in fact
experienced a direct, intimate, and fully familiar (one
might say, personal) contact with its true reality, and is
^^srBforB able to sense an absolute and fully satisfied
certainty that his understanding of that reality is true.
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^t is Morth �fflphasizing that knowledge is not the same
as the possession o-f in-formation <which may be wrong,
incomplete, inaccurate, improperly understood, and sterile).
Ruther-ford D. Rogers, who was formerly the librarian for the
Yale, Stanford, and New York public libraries, has expressed
concern with the increasingly overflowing amount of books
and literature with which the world's libraries must
contend, and warns that "we're drowning in information and
starving for knowledge".^
WORDS AND CONCEPTS FOR TWO KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE
The fields of language, words, and semantics are so
important to the larger study of the Janusian Syndrome that
they will be given a separate treatment in a later volume of
the study. We nevertheless need to introduce some basic
semantic concepts at this point for it is in this arena that
that we encounter the first and most basic "split" in our
view of knowledge. In short, our basic words and concepts
carry attributes of two different kinds, each of which is
naturally compatible with one of our two basic modes of
gaining knowledge. Let us therefore look first at the
divisible attributes of words and concepts. We will then be
prepared to examine the manner in which we tend naturally to
split apart these two divisible attributes so they will
become useful tools for our two basic modes of gaining
knowl edge.
Our minds attempt to apprehend reality by creating some
internal representation <idea or concept) for each aspect of
the reality we intend to perceive. We then utilize that
internal representation by storing it in memory, or by
retrieving it for manipulation by our processes of
^Colin Campbell, "Libraries Drowning in Sea of
Information," New York Times News Service article, Lexington
pat^ald-Leader . 3 March 1985: Fl.
15
reasoning. We thus learn about reality by manipulating the
concepts and ideas we -form about that reality.
Word and numbers are the signs and symbols which we use
to mediate meaning between each aspect o-F (external) reality
we perceive, and the (internal) ideas or concepts we create
to represent it. Meaning, in its simplest sense, is the act
o-f pointing which is performed by the word or number when it
is used as a sign. The thing "meant" is the real or imagined
aspect of reality toward which one intends to refer the
listener's attention by use of the word or number. The
symbolic function of the word or number is to represent the
internal concept or idea in human communication.
There is admittedly a somewhat complex relationship
between individual aspects of external reality, the internal
ideas or concepts which represent them, and the intermediate
words or numbers which mediate between them. Refer,
therefore, to Figure 1.2 for a graphic view of that
relationship. It is here that we can first begin to
appreciate the "split nature" of our knowledge, for we see
that we use two fundamentally different kinds of ideas or
concepts (and corresponding words) to represent reality:
verbal words or numbers on the left, and visual or pictorial
words on the right. From this point on, I will consider
these two parallel columns as "channels" for knowing.
The reason for graphically placing our concepts into
two (right and left) channels may not be apparent at the
moment, but should become increasingly apparent as the study
progresses. For the moment we merely note the following
correspondences: (1) reality is characterized by two
radically different kinds of features: one which is natural
and material, and another which is supranatural and
personal, (2) our minds create two radically different kinds
of ideas or concepts to represent these features of reality:
one which is abstractly verbal or numerical and another
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which is visual or pictorial, and (3) th* two radically
different kinds of ideas and concepts of reality are
processed in two different "channels" of the mind. We now
move to see how we use these two radically different
channels of the mind to gain two radically different kinds
of knowledge about corresponding aspects of reality.
METHODS AND CHANNELS FOR GAINING KNOWLEDGE
Several methods are available to us for employing the
two "channels of the mind" to gain knowledge about reality.
We must therefore begin to think both in terms of "channels"
for knowledge and cognitive "methods" for employing these
channels to gain knowledge.
The term "cognitive" refers to a mental power or
faculty for grasping, apprehending, or perceiving knowledge
about reality, and we generally recognize two basic
cognitive powers: our SENSES and our INTUITION. These two
powers are distinguished in one primary way. In sensory
perception, the knowledge we gain is MEDIATED, i.e., our
sense organs convert characteristics of reality into forms
suitable for conception. Intuitive knowledge, however, is
considered to be IMMEDIATE, i.e., it is somehow direct
knowledge, and requires no process of mediation via the
senses. Chesterton agrees with the the brilliant medieval
scholar, St. Thomas Aquinas, in arguing that God made man
with both senses and intuition specifically to make him
capable of "coming into contact with reality"."^
^G. K. Chesterton, "St. Thomas Aquinas", Chapter 8 in
As I Was Saving: A Chesterton Reader, ed. Robert Knille
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.,
1985) , 224.
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As shown in Figure 1.3, our sensory and intuitive
powers o-f cognition utilize, respectively, the verbal and
numerical or the visual -pictorial kinds o-f concepts. We may
there-fore consider the le-ft "channel of the mind" to be the
"sensory channel" for processing and internalizing
knowledge, and the right "channel of the mind" to be the
"intuitive channel" for that processing and internalization.
Figure 1.3 also shows, for comparison, how the various
branches of philosophy concern themselves with the various
entities in the knowing process (reality, knowledge,
personal values, and moral behavior).
While these two channels of the mind constitute means
for processing and internalizing two radically different
kinds of information about corresponding features of
reality, we may use the two channels by following different
methods. One method is the collection of information about
reality by simple PERCEPTION; we simply collect useful
information about reality, as it presents itself to us, by
use of our senses or our intuition. A second method is the
use of LOGIC upon that information so as to generate new
analyses or syntheses of the concepts we have already formed
about reality. A third method is to seek EXPERIENCE as a
means for exposing us to new aspects of reality which may be
perceived. Some thinkers have even added a fourth (disputed)
method: the recollection of our own, INBORN knowledge.
Let us now consider a detailed review of the sensory
and intuitive channels of knowledge, and of the logical and
experiential methods for using these two channels.
The Channel of Sensorv Perception
By sense perception, we mean use of the "five senses",
namely sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste. Each sense
is a kind of transducer, that is, it converts some attribute
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o-f reality into a signal -from which the brain may -form
use-ful concepts. As such, the senses mediate reality, i.e.,
they stand between the person and reality, and trans-form
in-formation -from reality into a -form which the mind can use.
Knowledge gained by the senses is there-fore re-ferred to as
"mediated knowledge" to emphasize that it is not direct, but
must pass through a transducer which alters it in some ways.
If that transformation is perfectly reliable, we can
still "know" reality via the senses (as when we see a fork
on our table). If that transformatifsn process is not
perfectly reliable, our knowledge of reality may be
distorted. Thus it is that our senses sometimes "fool us" or
"mislead us", as when we see an optical illusion, or when we
hear a ringing in the ears which we mistake for a real
sound, or when the presence of an amputated ("phantom") arm
is "felt".
The founders of the empirical science movement tried to
crown sense perception as the source of all our knowledge,
the first being the English philosopher Francis Bacon (1561�
1626) , with the more influential perhaps being the English
physician John Locke (1632-1704). Locke originated the idea
that the mind was, metaphorically, a blank piece of paper
upon which the senses "wrote". Hot long afterward, the
German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) made the
incarnation of the senses complete when he declared that
ultimate reality was completely unknowable; he proclaimed
that we only know the world by the way our minds construct
it from its appearance to the senses.
Kant, Locke, and Bacon were primarily philosophers, but
they have exerted an enormous influence upon the development
of modern science. As a result, many in the scientific
*^'^John Macmurray, The Self as Agent (1957j reprint,
Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1978), 46-
52.
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community have come to believe that one can only apprehend
reliable knowledge about reality by using the senses. Much
more will be said, throughout this study, about the huge
distortions this view has wrought -for the modern
understanding of knowledge. For the moment, it is perhaps
sufficient to say that total reliance upon an empirical view
of reality forces one to use only the sensory channel of
knowing, denying any contribution to knowledge from the
intuitive channel.
Purely empirical knowledge is therefore limited to the
powers of mediated knowledge, and is thus subject to two
primary weaknesses. First, it may illegitimately declare as
non-existent (and thus of no interest to the knowing mind)
any dimension in reality which cannot be perceived by the 5
senses; this is an illegitimate attempt to declare the
supranatural non-real. Secondly, it is subject to the
distortions the senses can bring to bear on knowledge of the
sensible portion of reality.
As an aside, we should take note of the incorrect view
that the senses are the only cognitive modality in a direct
line with the powers of logical reasoning. This view tends
to cause many modern thinkers to erroneously couple sensory
perception with rational or logical thought. Such thinkers
may believe that the empirical procedure is therefore the
only "rational" approach to knowledge. As we shall learn
later, however, both channels of knowledge have their own
rational processes (sensory�rational or deductive reasoning,
and intuitive�rational or inductive reasoning). The
exclusive connection between the empirical approach and
rational thought is therefore an illegitimate one.
The Channel of Intuitive Perception
By intuition, we mean the direct apprehension of true
knowledge about reality, without the conscious use of the
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senses. Intuitive knowledge is thus categorized as
"immediate" knowledge, that is, the knowing is direct, and
not mediated through the transducers o-f the senses. It is
sometimes referred to as a "sixth sense", but in its most
proper meaning it refers to a means of apprehending truth by
direct mental connection, without any use of the senses. It
is, however, in a direct line with the imagination, and thus
the two � intuition and imagination � are often linked or
invoked together when discussing this modality of knowledge.
John Macmurray has noted some contrasts between sensory
and intuitive perception, to which we will have occasion to
return many times during the course of this study. He notes
that the contrast is easily seen in the different approaches
to knowledge which were adopted by the Cartesian
rationalists and the romantics. In the view of the followers
of Descartes (the Cartesians), all knowledge came by way of
the senses and the (deductive) reason. They felt that the
imagination tended to "play fast and loose with the facts",
and so was something to be suppressed. By contrast, the
romantics were more artistically inclined, and saw the
imagination as the basis of knowledge; they affirmed this
because the imagination was a synthetic activity, like that
of art.^^
Again, we will often return to the different ways of
knowing as envisioned by the rationalists and the romantics,
and we will eventually see that each is an important but
incomplete and complementary way of knowing. The two must be
used together to gain true knowledge.
The Method of Logic
Philosophers who study the human thought process are
called "logicians", and they generally define the term
* Macmurray , 44.
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"logic" in a very general sense} by "logic", they mean
"correct or valid thought or reason". They also caution that
there are many ways o-f thinking and reasoning, but that not
all ways produce correct or valid results. The modes o-f
thought or reason which are known generally to lead to
correct or valid results are termed, collectively, "logic".
Me will deal in more detail with the whole thought process,
and the speci-fic role o-f logic in that process, in Chapter
3. For the present, I will merely mention the three kinds o-f
logic to indicate that even the logical method -for employing
the two channels o-f knowledge is not a single or simple
thing.
The human mind uses logic o-f three -fundamentally
di-f-ferent kinds: material, -formal, and directional. MATERIAL
logic is the mental procedure -for determining whether our
basic judgments, perceptions, and premises about reality are
in -fact true) i-f, -for example, we begin an argument with the
premise that "all very hot objects are white", it is the use
of material logic which enables us to satisfy ourselves that
there are indeed no such things as non-white objects which
are also very hot.
FORMAL logic is our logical method for determining
whether or not the form of our arguments is correct, i.e.,
whether or not we have correctly arranged the terms of our
primary premise, secondary premise, and conclusion. It is
similar to the algebraic manipulation of terms in a simple
equation. Me are not concerned, in formal logic, with
whether or not any particular term in the argument or
equation is true in itself (that is the function of material
logic) , but only with whether the form of the argument or
equation guarantees a correct conclusion from a correct
premi se.
DIRECTIONAL LOGIC is the means by which we work our way
along a certain direction between particular facts and
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general statements. There are two kinds. DEDUCTIVE logic
begins with a general truth and attempts to in-fer a specific
conclusion from it. INDUCTIVE logic begins with a collection
of specific facts and attempts to infer a general conclusion
from them.
We will later see that all three of these methods of
logic may be employed within either the sensory or intuitive
channels of knowledge.
The Method of Experience
Webster tells us that the root meaning of the word
"experience" indicates "trial", "proof", or "experiment".
He defines it to mean the personal living through or
participating in the events of life, with attendant efforts
to observe, test, or prove that one's knowledge about
reality is really true; the term "experience" also includes
the resulting, improved knowledge about reality so gained.
The sense of the word is that of unsolicited immersion in
reality, as opposed to a more planned, structured
"experiment" in which formal methods are employed to
observe, test, and prove things about reality.
Experience thus provides us with a great deal of
unsolicited opportunities to utilize material logic in the
apprehension of new information, and formal and directional
logic to test it. It is therefore a valid method for gaining
knowledge.
Epi stemol ogi st David Wolfe cautions us that our general
experience is a useful, though limited way to gain knowledge
about our whole interpretive scheme of reality. It is
limited, he argues, because we can interpret our experience
*'^"Experience, " Webster's New World Dictionary. 1968.
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in more than one way. Moreover, our experiences come to
us in serial -fashion, and we are tempted to integrate them
by the use o-f inductive reasoning which, if we are not
careful , can lead us to conclusions which reach beyond the
data we have assimilated.^^ We must be careful therefore,
argues Wolfe, not to rely too heavily upon one or a few
experiences in challenging our knowledge. On the other hand,
he says, experience is resistant to unlimited
interpretation, and so a "whole constellation" of
experiences may reveal some internal problems with our
interpretive scheme, forcing us to revise, or at least
reexamine, our interpretive framework.
The whole of our experience thus gives "bite" to an
interpretive scheme which has withstood long criticism.*''
We ought therefore to use experience, but in a restricted
manner � as a method for critically interpreting and
continually testing the whole web of our beliefs about
real ity.
THE ROLE OF BELIEF AND CERTAINTY.
Can either the sensory or intuitive channel of
knowledge provide us with certainty that what we believe to
be true is actually true in fact, or do we need the check
and balance of both to increase our certainty? We want to
consider, here, the whole issue of doubt and uncertainty
with regard to our knowledge and belief.
�=�David L. Wolfe, Epistemology; The Justification of
BelJjBf., one of a series entitled "Contours of Christian
Philosophy", ed. C. Stephen Evans, (Downers Grove, Illinois:
InterVarsity Press, 1982) , 28.
^^Wolfe, 32.
^=Wolfe, 61-63.
**Wolfe, 74.
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Doubt and Certainty
DesCartes initiated the whole modern -fixation with the
problem o-f doubt in relation to our knowledge. He hoped to
be able to -find whether or not there was any knowledge which
was so certain that no one could doubt it. A-fter years o-f
searching into this question, the only thing he concluded
that was actually certain was the he, himsel-f, in fact
existed.
Modern man is still seeking cenrtainty in his knowledge,
and is continually finding it an unattainable goal. We have
experienced too many instances in which those things we were
intuitively certain were true turned out, in the light of
later knowledge, to be untrue. And we have seen too many
instances in which our senses deceived us, leading us to
feel certain we had contacted a reality which did not, in
fact, exist. Therefore, common human experience has made it
clear that neither the sensory channel nor the intuitive
channel of knowledge appears to be capable of guaranteeing
us that it always leads us to certain truth.
In a sense, therefore, we must agree with DesCartes; we
feel very reluctant to conclude that there is actually such
a thing as certain knowledge. Perhaps, ultimately, there is
only strong belief- As expressed by University of California
philosopher Geddes MacGregor, "to know" may only mean,
practically, to merely claim that one has no doubt, i.e., to
believe something so strongly that there is no longer any
room for practical doubt.
* ^Geddes MacGregor, Philosophical Issues in Religious
Thought . (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America,
1979) , 235.
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Truth and Opinion
In a sifflilar line of thought. Philosopher Mortimer
Adler considers that a statement approaches the status of
knowledge as it moves away from mere opinion and progresses,
in degrees, toward "self-evident truth". He thus defines
three "meanings" of the term "knowledge" i
1. Strong knowledge. One possesses knowledge in the
"strong sense" when he possesses self�evident truth. This is
the kind of truth, like an axiom of geometry, which needs no
defense, and which does not require evidence or reasoning
for us to affirm it. It is therefore beyond the realm of
doubt. We know it intuitively.
One example of a self-evident truth is that a triangle
can have no diagonals. Another is that something cannot both
exist and not exist at the same time. We know such things
immediately and directly, i.e., intuitively. Moreover, in a
self-evident truth, it is impossible to conceive of its
opposite (e.g., of a triangle which has diagonals, or of
something which both exists and does not exist at the same
time). There are, according to Adler, very few truths which
genuinely qualify as self-evident truths.
As an aside, we might note the relation between
inductive and self-evident truth. According to the criterion
of non-contradiction, we must concede it to be self-evident
that (an inductive) generalization is false if one finds a
single exception to it. Thus, according to Adler, it is
self -evidently true that we have encountered many false
general izations.
*�Adler, 50-55.
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Using Adler 's criteria, we may there-fore say that we
may possess certainty about a very limited amount o-f
intuitively perceived knowledge, but we generally lack
certainty over inductively assembled knowledge.
2. Weak knowledge (strong opinion). Somewhere between
strong knowledge and weak opinion is the great middle ground
o-f what we call knowledge. We claim to know things, in the
weak sense, when we have rational grounds -for believing
them, or when we can appraise their probability o-f being
true based upon the best evidence and thinking at the
moment. Such knowledge, however, still remains within the
realm o-f doubt, that is, it is possible to doubt the
certainty o-f such "knowledge" because we recognize its
1 imitations.
Knowledge of this sort, says Adler, is only "evident
truth", or more precisely, "provisional truth". We must
concede that we may have to add to it, or improve it, or
alter it in the light of later findings. For Adler, such
"knowledge" may be beyond reasonable doubt, but cannot be
classified as being beyond the realm of doubt. Most of what
we call "knowledge", according to Adler (and we can clearly
insert "scientific knowledge", here) is thus evident or
provisional knowledge. Both the sensory and intuitive
channels of knowledge can provide evident or provisional
knowledge.
3. Weak opinion. Finally, there is the kind of claim to
knowledge which is properly in the realm of personal opinion
or prejudice. One may hold weak opinions either because he
has emotional attachments which lack rational or empirical
bases, or because he has made an unjustified logical leap
which lacks any intuitive conviction. He merely asserts that
he knows something which, in actuality, he merely believes
without sufficient reason.
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Weak opinion thus appears to arise from an inadequate
use o-f one channel o-f knowledge, coupled with an absence o-f
corroboration by the other channel.
The Nature o-f Belie-f
We can see, -from the above considerations, that belie-f
and knowledge are related. To more -fully appreciate that
relationship, we must distinguish between three similar
terms: -faith, trust, and belie-f. We must also note that
these are activities o-f persons, not abstract concepts.
According to Webster, BELIEF is a mental conviction,
acceptance, or assent that certain propositions are true,
regardless o-f the basis for that assent (reasoning,
prejudice, intuition, or the authority of the source)} one
believes in propositions for a variety of reasons, but one
does not ordinarily believe in persons. TRUST, by contrast,
in an assurance or confidence, often for intuitive reasons,
in the reliability of something, or in the honesty,
reliability, or integrity of someone; we usually have trust
in persons. FAITH is a complete confidence or reliance in
what a person says because of the person's trustworthiness,
even if what he says is not completely understood or
supported by reason; we also generally have faith in
per sons.
Both belief and a believing person, according to John
MacMurray, are necessary elements of knowledge; this is
because, first, something cannot be knowledge until it is
first believed, and second, because something can only be
believed by persons.*'' Principles, animals, and machines can
not believe in propositions.
^''Macmurray , 78.
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Faith is also related to knowledge. Geddes MacGregor
notes that -faith has two aspectss knowing, which is
cognitive and intellectual, and willing, which is moral and
conative.^^ Thus -faith is far more than simple belief, or
assent to propositions. It is also a willingness to do what
one believes.
Thomas Torrance puts a similar but slightly different
edge on the term faith. We discern theological truth, he
says, through obedience and decision. For example, he says,
there is no formal -logical relation between Christ's death
on the cross and the forgiveness of sins. There is a
relation, but it is established by revelation and discovered
as that revelation is accepted through faith.
Since belief relates to abstract verbal propositions,
it is the kind of "pre-knowledge" commitment we might
associate with the left channel of knowledge; and since
faith and trust relate to our intuitive trust or faith in
other persons, it is the kind of "pre-knowledge" commitment
we might associate with the right channel of knowledge. We
may thus develop "pre-knowledge" commitments through use of
either the left of right channel of knowledge.
Subjective and Objective Truth
We encounter problems when we begin to examine truth as
an aspect of objective reality "out there", and then seek to
contrast that with truth as perceived within the mind of a
person seeking knowledge. One problem the "subjective-
objective" distinction may introduce is the problem of
relati vi sm.
^''MacGregor , 209.
=2*Torrance, 214-215.
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For Mortimer Adler, the disaster o-f relativism is that
many people deny that anything is objectively true, claiming
that truth is all in the way you perceive it. This disaster,
he says, arises -from a -failure to distinguish objective
truth -from subjective truth. =^
Adler here insists upon a proper distinction between
subjective and objective truth. Objective truth, he says,
consists solely in agreement with reality, and as such it is
immutably and eternally true. Moreover, it is possible -for
man to ascertain what is objectively true or -false. By
contrast, subjective truth consists merely in a claim for
the veracity of our judgment of truth, and our claims may be
doubted, so we often attempt to provide a warrant for our
claim to truth by an appeal to prevalent opinion.
A similar problem from several centuries ago was
created by the theory of "double truth", a theory which has
in modern times been vigorously opposed by Chesterton. The
theory was advanced by the 13th century Aristotelian
philosopher, Siger of Brabant (1235-1282), based largely
upon the ideas of Averroes. Siger, as paraphrased into
modern terminology by Chesterton, taught that something
could be theologically (intuitively) right, but
scientifically (empirically) wrong. This, he conceived, was
because the truths of the supranatural world could
contradict the truths of the natural world.
In a sense, Sigur thus "split the human mind",
convincing many (even today) that one can believe something
asserted by a theological source, even though he
acknowledges that a scientific source has proven it wrong,
or vice versa. This "heresy" was first attacked by St.
Thomas Aquinas, who argued for the existence of a single.
^^Adler, 42.
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uni-fied truth which may be perceived by two dif-ferent paths,
science and theology. Real truth, said Aquinas, cannot
contradict itself.^^
Only in the "heretical" view, therefore, can the truth
of one channel of knowledge actually contradict that of the
other. In the classical view, the truth may APPEAR
differently when viewed through each channel, but cannot
actually be different if it has been correctly perceived by
each channel, simply because true truth is a united and non-
contradictory thing.
Here is a strong case for the view that truth may in
fact APPEAR differently to each channel, and therefore we
ought to use BOTH channels as checks and balances on each
other. In this view, only a COHERENCE of views through BOTH
channels of knowledge can increase our certainty that we
have perceived truth correctly, since the real truth is a
united thing which cannot contradict itself.
The Nature of Certaintv
The concept of "certainty" provides a bridge between
knowledge and belief, and Geddes MacGregor explains the
relation quite well.="*
According to MacGregor, we can never feel certain that
we have sufficiently examined all the possible alternatives
on a question, and in that respect we can never say that we
really know anything at all. In this, he echoes the problem
of the "inductive fallacy". Thus, when we claim to know that
something is true, we are actually only asserting a maximum
degree of confidence for our belief that it is true. The
logical conclusion of this is that there is no radical
"Chesterton, 215-216.
='�MacGregor , 233-235.
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dimtinction between knowing and believing; the distinction
is one o-f degree, but not o-f kind. It does not now appear
possible, says MacGregor, -for us to claim such an in-fallible
grasp o-f the truth that we can say "I know" with no
possibility o-f doubt.
Adler expands this view o-f certainty as a bridge
between belie-f and knowledge by laying out "degrees o-f
certainty" which correspond to the "degrees o-f knowledge"
already discussed:
1- Genuine certitude. One can have genuine certitude
regarding the truth o-f a Judgment about reality, says Adler,
i-f it cannot be challenged by new evidence, and i-f it cannot
be critiqued by improved reasoning or the detection o-f
errors. Only when these two criteria are met can we say that
the Judgment is indubitable and in-fallible, that is, beyond
doubt .
2. Relative certainty. Below genuine or indubitable
certainty is that degree of certainty we call "relative" or
"probable". This is the degree of certainty we possess when
the proposition is logically probable because it is based
upon the preponderance of evidence, and because we have no
reason, at present, to doubt it. Such Judgments are said to
have "a future", that is, they hold the possibility of being
changed by future knowledge. We have "relative certainty"
for things which are "beyond a reasonable doubt"; this is
the standard for testimony in a court of law. Such certainty
is not, however, beyond the shadow of doubt, so it can never
become "genuine certitude".
The matter of certainty is therefore a key element in
deciding that which is properly to be termed "knowledge".
Stated in other words, we are more confident that something
is genuine knowledge when sufficient warrant or
justification is provided for us to be certain of its truth.
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For epi stemol ogi st David Mol-fe, the main problem in the
whole science o-F epistemology is to speci-Fy what conditions
justi-Fy, or provide the warrant, -For assertions we make that
what we believe is, in -Fact, true.^'^*
Me again -find ourselves -Faced with the view that we
really need both channels o-F knowledge i-F we are to increase
our certainty o-F the truth. Since use o-F two channels can
add more evidences and perspectives -For a particular truth
claim than can a single channel, use o-F both can increase
the "relative certainty", "warrant", or "justification"
that we have considered a "preponderance of evidence", and
can thus reduce our "reasonable doubts".
Reasons for Belief
Molfe's search for "warrant" or "justification" for
one's belief is just another way of saying that "not all
beliefs are equally valid". Me are justified in holding to a
belief only when we are able to give adequate reasons for
that belief.
For Molfe, there are three INADEQUATE "reasons" which
may be appealed to as justification for a belief.^''*
1. Rationalism is inadequate. First is the argument
from pure rationalism. This is inadequate, says Molfe,
because it depends upon a certain starting premise, and no
such certain starting point exists; one always needs
additional assumptions to shore them up, assumptions from
experience, from tradition, or from self-evident (intuitive)
truth. In short, the left channel of knowledge, by itself,
it inadequate to justify a belief; the right channel
is
needed to "shore it up".
=�Molfe, 15.
^'^Molfe, 19-32.
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2. Iwmcdiate gxpgrience is inadequate. Second is the
argument -from experience. This is inadequate because all
experience must be interpreted, some cannot be expressed,
and other experience may arise which disagrees with it. We
thus need both the -Facts o-F sensory perception and the
intuitive interpretation o-F the right channel to render our
experience coherent.
3. Inductive in-Ference is inadequate. Third is the
inductive argument. This is inadequate because o-F the
"inductive -Fallacy" already attributed to Hume: this method
requires starting assumptions, and always leads to
conclusions which go beyond the data themselves. Moreover,
we can never be certain we have examined all the relative
evidence; exceptions to a hasty generalization may be just
over the horizon. Thus the right channel is inadequate by
itself; the anchor in empirical facts is also needed.
In principle, it is thus difficult to justify believing
that a relatively few data points can tell us anything
meaningful. Thus, says Molfe, one cannot justify individual
beliefs. A belief is justified only by virtue of its being
included within a global system of belief^^ which is itself
justified according to four primary criteria: consistency,
coherence, comprehensiveness, and congruity.^^ So long as
your "web of beliefs" can continue to absorb and illuminate
experience and criticism without empirical difficulty, says
Molfe, it is warranted.^'' This is much the same as the
basic criterion for acceptance of a scientific theory, and
may be considered to be a plea for not only the use of both
channels of knowledge, but even more for the continual and
==^Molfe, 57-58.
=�Molfe, 55.
^'Molfe, 74.
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long�term use o-f both channels as a means -for gradually
building up a ccN^tainty that our overall view o-f truth is
correct.
DIMENSIONS OF TRUTH AND REALITY.
Wol-fe used the metaphor o-f a web in speaking o-f one's
system o-f beliefs. It seems appropriate, however, to extend
that metaphor to the whole of reality. Using this metaphor,
we may think of reality as being an elastic web or fabric
composed of many cross strands of living cords; see Figure
1.4. The cords in the warp of this fabric of reality are
spiritual or supranatural, i.e., they transcend our
provisional knowledge of nature, and they have attributes
which can be known only through the concepts of the right
channel of knowledge. The cords in the woof are material or
natural, i.e., they correspond to our knowledge of the
natural, material world, and they have attributes which can
be known at least partly through the concepts of the left
channel of knowledge. But the sum total of reality is
composed of an intertwined warp and woof of nature and
supranature, matter and spirit, and it can be known only by
using the checks and balances of both channels of knowledge.
This web or fabric of reality is a living and elastic
thing. It has been stretched over a framework by a Master
Weaver, and it exists in a state of elastic tension. Each
strand reflects reality only so long as it remains attached
to the cross-strands, in living tension. If we cut or snip
out part of the strand for examination, it becomes a
deformed, flaccid shell of its true self. Thus, if we
segment off the natural or supranatural threads for
examination, and forget their mutual interconnections, we
examine a deformed thing.
The various strands of reality are elastic and living
because they comprise a personal reality. The source of all
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FIGURE 1.4 THE ELASTIC WEB MODEL OF
EXTERNAL REALITY, A LIVING MESH OF INTER
CONNECTED, ELASTIC THREADS OF THE MATERIAL
AND SPIRITUAL. THE KNOWING PERSON IS PART OF
THE WEB, AND KNOWS REALITY WITH THE HIGHEST
CERTAINTY WHEN USING BOTH SENSE AND INTUITION
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reality, God, has the nature o-f personality. He is a
personal being, and His creation carries the image o-f that
personhood.
We there-fore cannot properly study reality without
realizing that we, ourselves, are an integral part of the
reality we are studying. As John Macmurray says it, our
whole philosophical tradition has proceeded wrongly, as
though we ourselves were a pure subject, for whom the world
is an object. This, says Macmurray, is an egocentric view.^'*'
We have the nature of persons, and so does the ground of all
that we experience because its Creator is personal.
Therefore to study "nature" as if it were something entirely
different than we, who study it, is to leave out something
crucial: the personal and interconnected nature of
real ity.
We can have real knowledge of reality only because the
knower has the character of personality, and so does the
reality which the knower seeks to know. We, the creature,
can understand nature, the creature, only because we share a
personal nature with the Creator of both, who is a person.
KNOWLEDGE: THE PLACE OF THE PERSONAL
No one has addressed the personal nature of knowledge,
especially scientific knowledge, more than the philosopher�
scientist Michael Polanyi.^^ For Polanyi, science will make
no progress in epistemology, i.e., in its way of knowing,
^^Macmurray, 11.
Macmurray, 50�52.
=*^Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophv (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1962).
39
until we understand the extent to which scientific
knowledge has dimensions which are personal, intuitive,
tacit, and subsidiary. To this, we may add Macmurray s
concept o-f the sel-f as an agent.
Knowledge as Intuitive
Richard Gelwick, in his quite thorough overview o-f
Polanyi 's thought, gives particular attention to Polanyi 's
emphasis on the intuitive in science's attempts to discover
and interpret new knowledge. For Polanyi, the scientist who
discovers something new is enabled to do so only by the use
of his personal judgment, insight, and creative imagination;
this is illustrated, he argues, by Einstein's own admission
that he had discovered the theoretical principle of
relativity through the use of his intuition and
imagination.^^ Moreover, he says, the interpretation
necessary to derive a natural law requires three things: the
art of guessing right, skill in intuiting patterns when
looking at the unknown ( Gestalt process) , and use of the
personal intuitions passed down to him by the scientific
community, and based upon its own premises and assumptions
about nature. Echoing Hanson, Polanyi argues strongly that
there are no such things as uninterpreted facts; the pattern
is not contained in the data themselves, so an
interpretation can only be supplied by the investigator, and
this he supplies by an intuitive process of pattern
recognition, or Gestalt. ^=
The significance of this is hard to overstate. It means
that the scientist who champions the sole use of the senses
=*^Ri chard Gelwick. The Wav of Discoverv: An
Introduction to the Thought of Michael Polanyi. <New York:
Oxford University Press, 1977), 26-27.
^"*Gelwick, 26, 43.
^''Gelwick, 80.
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as a way o-F knowing does not recognize the way he himsel-F
does science. He depends much, and perhaps primarily, on
the intuitive channel o-F cognition, and without use of this
channel, he can discover and interpret nothing of
significance. Those who would assert that science is limited
to the kind of data which one can sense are conceiving of
science in a sense so restricted as to be deformed. True
science, the science of the greats, uses both the sensory
and the intuitive modes of cognition.
Knowledge as Tacit and Subsidiary
Polanyi s second major point is that science is a "way
of knowing" in which the tacit component plays an "essential
role".^^ That is, the scientist depends strongly upon
assumptions, presuppositions, and intuitions which affect
him tacitly. They are actually there, and strongly
influential, but he does not express them. Others know of
them only because their presence is quietly implied by his
line of reasoning.
The hidden, but greater part of each person's
knowledge, says Polanyi, is tacit, like the bottom of an
iceberg. It arises because the human mind has a tacit power
for integrating what it learns, and it is by this
integrating power that all knowledge is known and held to be
true.
This tacit dimension is seen in the inductive mode of
synthesis, whereby we jump from particulars to a meaningful
whole, all the while being consciously unaware of the
particulars we are considering. That is, we are tacitly able
to integrate clues, finding their joint meaning without
paying attention to the clues themselves. This tacit.
^'^Gelwick, 42.
^^Gelwick, 115.
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inductive mode of pattern recognition or integration was
first really explained by Molfgang Kohler in his work with
Gestalt psychology. Such tacit knowing, says Polanyi, has
a role in the creative imagination similar to that which it
exercises in art, literature, or religion. It is also the
power to understand metaphor. But it is not a subjective
kind of knowledge, insists Polanyi; the knowledge which
results is objective; the person who uses this tacit power
is able to establish contact with an actual, though hidden,
reality. �'^
To paraphrase Polanyi in the light of what has been
said so far in this chapter, we can say that science is able
to apprehend reality (grasp truth), and be certain that it
has done so successfully, only when it fully utilizes both
perceptual and intuitive cognition. All successful science,
in the widest and most general sense, actually does this,
though it frequently insists that it is limited to using the
sensory mode of perception only. The science which actually
limits itself to the sensory mode is therefore a severely
constrained (one might say deformed) attempt at gaining
knowledge, and is, by its own self-limiting nature,
incapable of apprehending reality completely.
What Polanyi has given us, says Gelwick, is a major
reorientation of our knowledge, a new model of human
understanding, a new paradigm, or a major epi stemol ogi cal
reform. Polanyi, because he has overcome science's mis-
impression that it seeks only the testimony of the senses,
has returned us to a capability for dealing with all of
^^Gelwick, 60-63.
^'�^Gelwick, 103-104.
Gelwick, 49-52.
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reality as it actually exists, and has thus revived a
metaphysical mode o-f thought.***
So long as science (or philosophy, or theology) limits
itsel-f to the perceptual mode o-f investigation, which can
deal only with that which is tangible and material, it can
investigate only limited questions of limited appeal,
dealing with a strictly limited portion of reality �
questions such as "how does a ball accelerate under the
influence of gravity?". When science openly uses both it's
sensory and intuitive powers, however, it is capable of
addressing the broader spectrum of reality, and of dealing
with aspects of reality which may only be expressible by the
use of patterns or metaphors. It is then capable of
addressing metaphysical questions such as "What is the
nature of man, and how did he originate?".
The use of both the sensory and intuitive channels of
knowledge does not guarantee that the searcher will find
truth about ultimate reality. But it can increase the
dimensions of reality which are accessible to the searcher,
and provide the cross-checking and additional evidence
required to increase our certainty in the knowledge so
gained. Only by use of both modes is the scientist entitled
to even address such larger questions.
Knowledge as Personal
Ultimately, says Polanyi, we must conceive of true
knowledge as a personal thing. We must understand that it is
the personal dimension of reality which links our inner self
and its awareness to, and makes contact with, external,
objective reality."*^ Only a person can understand the
^*Gelwick, xiv-xvii, 46, 55-56, 113.
'^^Gelwick, 76-77, 113.
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meaning o-f in-formation. All knowing, there-fore involves a
triad o-f 3 "centers o-f knowing": a -focal target, subsidiary
clues, and the person who in-fers things about the target by
using his integrative powers. Nothing can be kncswn unless
there is a person who knows.
This, says Polanyi, destroys the tragically harm-ful
concept that knowledge is objective in the sense that it is
impersonal. Such a concept, he laments, has become the
"central dogma o-f the scienti-fic age". It is tragic because
it attempts to coronate empirical science as the surest way
to truth, and yet such a limited approach cannot even deal
with the truth o-f love, beauty, morality, or Justice, the
greatest issues in all o-f history.**^ We can only deal with
reality as it truly exists, says Polanyi, i-f we recognize
that knowledge is a personal thing, and that everything we
know is a composite o-f that which is is known and the one
who claims to know it.
The Self as Agent
I conclude a rather lengthy chapter by making brief
mention of the contributions of John Macmurray, a scholar
who has much in common with Polanyi, and really deserves a
treatment no less extensive. It is Macmurray who introduced
the concept of the "self as agent", emphasizing that we must
cease treating the human self as a mere subject who observes
impersonal reality in a detached "objective" sense. The
human self, says Macmurray, is very much a part of that
which the self knows.
"^^'Gelwick, 74.
"�"�Gelwick, 63.
^=*Gelwick, 8-19.
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Man is not mmrmly a subject watching nature, says
Macmurray, but is an agent, capable o-f altering and
knowing reality. We cannot base our knowledge, there-fore, on
Descartes' starting point, "I think". We must, rather, base
all our knowledge on the starting point "I do".^^ Only in
this way, says Macmurray, can we account -for persons in
relation, a viewpoint necessary i-f we are to deal
e-ffectively with the reality of other persons, with God, and
the personal character of the universe.
CONCLUSIONS
We have seen that the question of our knowledge of
reality is a philosophical one, with two branches of
philosophy being of primary importance: metaphysics, which
studies the nature of reality, and epistemology, which
studies the ways in which we know reality. From these two
disciplines, we have learned that reality has two radically
different attributes or dimensions, the natural or material
and the supranatural, spiritual, or personal; and that our
knowledge of that reality is true when our mental
apprehension of both its dimensions is so faithfully and
intimately accurate that we may be certain we have
apprehended it as it really exists.
We saw next that we possess two channels for knowing
which correspond with the two major dimensions of reality: a
sensory channel for knowing the material , empirical
dimension, and an intuitive channel for knowing the
spiritual, personal, or supranatural dimension. And we saw,
furthermore, that we may employ any of several methods for
using each channel, notably the various types of logic, and
either normal or planned experience.
'***Macmurray , 38.
"?^Macmurray, 71-74, 84.
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Third, we learned that we may have di-f-ferent degrees o-f
certainty or doubt regarding our knowledge o-f reality
depending upon the extent to which we make -full use o-f both
channels o-f knowing. I-f we make only slight use o-f only one
channel o-f knowledge, we may achieve a low level of
certainty about only one dimension of reality, a level which
warrants only the statement that we have a belief or opinion
about reality. If we make full use of only one channel, but
very little use of the other, we may Justify a claim to a
rather high degree of certainty about our knowledge of one
dimension of reality, but must concede that it is still
incomplete and provisional; this is often the level of
knowledge we gain by a narrow use of either science or
religion. Only when we make full use of both channels for
knowing may we know reality in all its dimensions, and have
the check and balance of perspectives from differennt vantage
points we need to give us the fullest measure of warrant or
Justification for believing that our knowledge is as close
to the truth as it is possible to be. This is the kind of
certainty we may have when we use science and religion in
their broadest sense, use them together, and seek to achieve
a coherent view of reality in which the two views agree.
Finally we saw that. Just as reality is a united whole,
so also should our view of reality be united. Nothing can be
genuinely true in one channel of knowing (e.g. empirical
science) while being genuinely false in the other channel
(theology or religion). Our ways of knowing are distinct,
but they are not separate. They give us complementary ways
of knowing a multi -dimensional reality.
Real truth is one, and so is real knowledge. Human
knowledge is genuinely split only for the man who refuses to
see all the reality which truly exists, or who refuses to
use his full intellectual capacity for knowing it.
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Chapter 2
THE SPLIT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY
Scientists, philosophers, and theologians have long
considered their respective disciplines to be legitimate
ways o-f gaining knowledge about man, li-fe, and the universe.
Many o-f them have also believed, however, that their
respective disciplines are, and ought to remain, separate
and unconnected epi stemol ogi es. We thus -find ourselves
asking the questions: to what extent are the similarities
between them strong enough that each may lay claim to
validity as a means to truth, and to what extent are their
di-f -ferences su-f-ficient to divide them one -from the other?
We want, in this chapter, to examine the nature of
science and theology as epi stemol ogi es, and more
specifically to inquire into their similarities and
differences as legitimate ways of knowing real truth. We
will begin by considering each as a distinct "window on the
world" and inquire into the extent to which each is an
appropriate tool for knowing real truth.
EPISTEMOLOGIES AS APPROPRIATE TOOLS OR WINDOWS
Jesus called the eye the "light" or "window" of the
body. In the Middle Ages, St. Thomas Aquinas claimed that
the five senses were five "windows" into the mind.* And in
the Twentieth Century, Dr. Wernher von Braun called science
and religion two "windows on the world".^ I find the
*G, K. Chesterton, "St. Thomas Aquinas", in As I Was
Saving: A Chesterton Reader. ed. Robert Knille (Grand
Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1984),
213, 220.
=Wernher von Braun, "Science and Religion," article
syndicated by the North American Newspaper Alliance, Inc,
The Courier Journal Magazine. Louisville Courier Journal,
Sunday, 14 August 1966.
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"Mindow" metaphor enormously appealing, and have come to
think o-f any valid epistemology as a "window on the world",
i.e., as a way o-f viewing the world -from a particular
perspective.
Any window gives a view, but the question arises
whether the view it provides is clear, complete, or
undistorted. Experience has shown us that many windows are
tinted, and so restrict the light with which we view to a
limited portion o-f the whole spectrum. Similarly, we know
that some windows are blocked, and others may magni-fy,
distort, or reduce. And we know that virtually every window
limits the viewer's depth perception by columnating his
vantage point. In many analogous ways, every particular
epi stemol ogi cal "window on the world" restricts or distorts
the view o-f those who use it as a way of seeing reality, and
must therefore necessarily limit or alter the knowledge one
may apprehend by its exclusive use. See Figure 2.1.
Because each epistemology offers its own restrictions
or distortions, we must be careful whenever we decide to use
only one such window as a tool for studying reality. In
those situations, we ought to select the window which best
matches the aspects of reality we choose to study.
We may gain additional insight into this principle by
considering the nature of a window as a tool for measurement
or observation. The glowing color of a horseshoe in a
blacksmith's forge may reveal something about its
temperature, but we do not generally select color to measure
temperature; we use some sort of calibrated thermometer.
Similarly, we do not select a weighing scale to measure the
length of a board; we use a ruler. Experience teaches us
that we have many tools available for measuring and
observing reality, but that each is designed and adapted for
a specific purpose.
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FIGURE 2.1 SCIENCE and religion as
T\A/n wiMHOWS ON THE SAME WORLD.
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Mh�th�r selecting a Mindow or a tool, one principle has
always been primarys we select the instrunent which is most
M^PROPRIATE for the task at hand. By analogy, we may apply
the same principle to our selection of an epistemology.
Science, philosophy, and theology are each legitimate tools
or "windows on reality", and each may reveal something true;
but each is also different, and better adapted to revealing
certain aspects of reality. Science is well adapted to
inquire into material reality, and religion into spiritual
or personal reality. Therefore, if our question is quite
narrow, or we must restrict our inquiry to use of one tool
or window, we ought to choose the one best adapted to the
aspect of reality we seek to know.
Mhen we choose to inquire into the larger and more
mysterious questions about reality, however, we quickly find
that a single tool or window is inadequate. We gain the most
nearly certain and complete knowledge through the harmonious
use of ALL the epi stemol ogi es at our disposal. So long as
our tools and windows are complementary, our task is best
completed by employing them all.
Even though our tools and windows may be
complementary, we must alternately use one, and then the
other as we shift our attention to different aspects of the
job at hand. The good workman therefore pays careful
attention to the similarities and differences which
characterize each, so that we may choose the best tool for
the needs of the moment. We must clearly do the same for our
epi stemologi es. Therefore, we move next to a consideration
of the similarities and differences between science,
philosophy, and theology, and how we may see them as
complementary epi stemol ogi es for gaining knowledge about
man, life, and the universe.
50
We wi 1 1 concentrate upon three aspects o-f each
epi stemol ogy t (1) how it claims to know <its Mtethods) , (2)
its use o-f sensory and intuitive cognition to gain -factual
knowledge about reality, and <3> its relationship with the
reality it seeks to know.
SCIENCE AS EPISTEMOLOGY.
John Macmurray has lamented that science has come to
exert such power over the world that modern society sees it
as our central and primary means of gaining new knowledge. =^
And while Thomas Torrance agrees that science is a way of
discovering new knowledge^ (unlike philosophy, which he
thinks merely rearranges what we already know) , he also
cautions us to remember that science can never gain a
complete understanding of reality because its concepts cover
only a limited part of total reality (the natural
Unfortunately, says Macmurray (and most contemporary
philosophers of science would agree), science often acts as
if it can know everything there is to know, and this causes
it to overstep its limits.'^
How Science Knows (The Scientific Method)
Science, following Bacon, Galileo, and others, has
adopted a generalized methodology (actually a combination of
methods) which has come to be known as "the scientific
'John Macmurray, Religion. Art, and Science; A Studv of
the Reflective Activities of Man (The Forwood Lectures,
1960), (Liverpool; Liverpool University Press, 1961), 9-10,
24.
^Thomas Torrance, Theological Science. paperback
edition, 1978 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 114.
"Torrance, 16.
^�Macmurray, 11.
51
method". We will shortly see that the method is o-f ten
misunderstood to apply only to sensory cognition, Mhereas
the most real progress has always been gained by applying
scienti-fic methodology to both sensory and intuitive
cognition. Nevertheless, the "classical" methodology has
come to mean certain things which do have an enormous power
to extract new knowledge -from nature, so a brie-f review is
in order.
Classically, the scienti-fic method relies upon care-ful
observation (via the senses) , the measurement o-f data,
classi-f ication, experimentation, the generation o-f
hypotheses, mathematical modeling to make predictions, the
testing o-f hypotheses, and -finally the -formulation o-f new
theories, laws, or principles. The key steps are the
collection o-f a great deal of data, and their inductive
analysis to generate a hypothesis.
Science is thus subject to two primary limits. First,
to the extent that science restricts itsel-f to sensory data
(as it o-ften claims), it necessarily restricts itsel-f to
knowledge o-f the material aspects o-f reality. Secondly, to
the extent that it relies exclusively upon an inductive
approach (which it also o-ften claims) , it can never come to
a complete knowledge. The -first -factor limits science's
access to reality. The second limits the extent to which it
can know the limited portion of reality it has apprehended.
The second limitation arises because of the "inductive
fallacy", so thoroughly exposed by Hume. One never gets to
the end of the chain of data, and so one never sees the
whole matter. Thus, scientific concepts, laws, and theories
have what Mortimer Adler calls "a future". They must
constantly "progress". This necessarily places most of
scientific knowledge, says Adler, in the realm of doubt, not
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o-f certitude. 7 Science can never �ay "I know" with the kind
o-f certitude it so often wants to claim. The limits on its
"window on knowledge" and the tentative nature of its
inductively inferred generalizations preclude such
certainty.
As a result, according to Goldstein and Goldstein, we
may not think of scientific theories as anything real, but
only as certain kinds of MAPS of reality, maps drawn from
the limited perspective of the explorer. They are thus
abstractions which leave out a great deal from the whole of
reality. �
Science's Use of Sensory and Intuitive Perception
We have seen that science, in the larger sense, must
use both the sensory and intuitive modes of cognition if it
is to be able to examine all aspects of reality. But we have
also seen that many scientists claim it is, or ought to be,
limited to the sensory mode. We therefore need to examine
the respective roles of sense and intuition in science.
1. Science's reliance upon the senses. No one doubts
that science makes legitimate use of sensory perception in
its attempts to come to grips with reality. But there is one
particular school of philosophy which maintains that sense
perception is sciences ONLY legitimate cognitive mode. This
is the philosophy called "positivism". I plan to give this
philosophy a particularly detailed treatment in a later
volume of my larger study of the Janusian Syndrome. A brief
''Mortimer J. Adler, Six Great Ideas (New York: Collier
Books, 1984) , 49-50.
^Martin and Inge F. Goldstein, How We Know: An
Exploration of the Scientific Process, A Da Capo Paperback
(New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., Subsidiary of Plenum
Publishing Corporation, 1980), 202.
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introduction, however, will prove use-ful at the present
point.
The philosophy of positivism, which is based primarily
on the teachings of Auguste Comte, asserts that science must
base all its findings solely upon the "positive" data which
are cognized by sense perception, and that only the data so
gathered may be considered to be "scientific facts". It is
closely related to the philosophy called "empiricism", which
asserts that the only reliable knowledge comes from
observations, experiment, and general sensory experience.
It is probably true that few scientists today are
rigidly posi tivistic , but most appear to be strongly
empiricist, and a review of much within current scientific
literature will clearly reveal a strong positivistic
flavor. Combining these two philosophies, the positivist-
empiricist asserts that science can concern itself only with
material nature, and can consider in this assessment only
those "facts" which can be observed, measured, and
experimented upon.
All scientists thus rely quite clearly upon sensory
cognition, but some scientists, primarily those who affirm
the philosophies of positivism or empiricism, attempt' to
restrict science to the sensory domain.
2. Science's reliance upon intuition. It seems to
require some depth in philosophy, and more specifically with
the philosophy of science, for the practicing scientist to
understand that he does not, in fact, limit himself to the
"facts" of sense data. As Goldstein and Goldstein argue,
bare "facts" can fool the senses, and may appear to us to be
"theory laden" only because we impose an interpretation upon
them; see Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4. In actuality, the facts
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do not speak -for themselves) we must interpret them.''
Interpretation, however, is an intuitive and not a sensory
�function. Thus, say Goldstein and Goldstein, science "in the
larger sense" works by intuition; this is seen particularly
when the scientist "makes an imaginative leap beyond the
�facts",*** and when he uses inductive inference, memory, or
pattern recognition to develop a hypothesis.**
David Molfe sees philosopher of science Carl Hemple
advancing much the same argument. The older, inductive
picture of science cannot account, he says, for the way we
see science actually operating:*^
"Very emrly in the process o-f scienti-fic
think ing there occurs a creative leap of the
imagination , mhich Einstein referred to as
intuition . The mind of the scientist leaps to a
possible explanation of the problem nith nhich it
is confronted , and a hypothesis is born."
Today's scientist illegitimately insists that his
knowledge, and knowledge-acquisition activities, are
restricted to sensory data about the material universe. In
actuality the scientist must necessarily use both sense and
intuition if he is not only to gather facts, but also to
interpret the meaning and significance of those facts for
himself and for other affected persons.
''Goldstein and Goldstein, 12-18.
*^Goldstein and Goldstein, 20.
**Goldstein and Goldstein, 242.
*='David L. Molfe, Epistemology; The Justification of
Belief, one of a series entitled "Contours of Christian
Philosophy", ed. C. Stephen Evans (Downers Grove, Illinois:
InterVarsity Press, 1982), 33.
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Science a Relationahip with the Realitv Known
Scientists have often asserted that their views can be
trusted because, unlike philosophy and theology (which are
asserted to be "subjective"), science is "objective", with
the scientist acting as a detached, dispassionate observer.
He does not, it is said, get "personally involved" in the
reality he is studying.
Such a view o-f science, say Goldstein and Goldstein, is
a "myth".*=� The scientist has "highly subjective feelings"
about his work, bordering on those of the poet.*"* The
experimenter can hardly avoid influencing the outcome of his
experiment because he brings to it his own preconceptions.*^
Logician Michael Scriven is even more caustic about the
supposed "objectivity" of science.*"^ The "rigidity of
established science", he says, is "so extreme as to refute
every claim for the objectivity of the scientific method."
Scriven may have been overly disaffected with the
scientific establishment because it did not recognize his
work in some of the para-scientific arenas. Clearly our best
science teaches that it is necessary to lay aside our
personal attitudes and try to let the data tell their
message, whether or not it fits our preconceived notions.
The point is, however, that very few human scientists are
capable of doing that. Me must continually come back to
Polanyi 's view, and Macmurray's too, that knowledge is a
highly personal thing and that the scientist, too, is an
'''Goldstein and Goldstein, 254.
*'*Goldstein and Goldstein, 195-196.
'"Goldstein and Goldstein, 222.
***Michael Scriven, Reasoning (New Yorks McGraw Hill
Book Co. , 1976) , 5.
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agent who has an agenda. Try as it Nill, science cannot
escape the -fact that its practitioners are very deeply and
personally involved in their enterprise.
In the words o-f theologian Thomas Torrance, quantum
mechanics has taught science, as few other experiences
could, that "our knowing enters into what we know". Me are
therefore "unable to distinguish between things and our ways
of knowing them because our modes of inquiry (e.g.,
mathematics) affect the content of our knowledge of the
object (the universal character of nature)". Thus, says
Torrance, scientific and mathematical laws "bear the imprint
of both the nature of the object and the mode of its
cognition".
Me conclude that science continues to labor under two
illusions. One illusion is that true knowledge can only be
gained about the material universe, using sense perception;
science in the larger sense uses the intuitive mode as well,
and when this is acknowledged, it may legitimately speculate
on matters metaphysical. If, on the other hand, it insists
on limiting its tools and windows to the sensory, then it
must desist from investigating the origin of man, life, and
the universe, for there are inherently metaphysical issues
whose solution requires both sensory and intuitive
cognition.
The second delusion of science is that it is objective
while theology and philosophy are subjective. In reality,
the knowledge acquired by science also bears the imprint of
the subjectivity of the scientist. It is present in his
choice of subject matter, his selected manner of inquiry,
his chosen mode of cognition, and his philosophy of
interpretation. The scientist's knowledge, too, is "personal
knowledge". And if it is to be the most nearly certain and
'^Torrance, 94.
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conplete kind o-f knowl ANigef it will utilize both mensory and
intuitive modes o-f inquiry, and as a result it too will be
an amalgam o-f the objective facts known and the subjective
philosophy of the knower.
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY AS EPISTEMOLOGY.
In their widest sense, the ranges of science, theology,
and philosophy overlap a great deal. So they are most easily
distinguished by considering each in its narrowest sense.
Most narrowly defined, science focuses strongly upon sensory
cognition of material reality; theology focuses most
strongly upon intuitive cognition of spiritual or personal
reality; and philosophy examines the consistency of the
information either might gather and seeks to formulate them
both into a larger, synthetic picture or world view.
In a sense, then, philosophy adds nothing new to our
knowledge about reality; it only rearranges the knowledge
gained by other epi stemol ogi es. Following that reasoning,
some might not consider it a legitimate epistemology in its
own right. We will therefore concentrate, in this section,
on theology as a way of knowing, but in so doing we must
bear in mind that in its wider senses, theology overlaps
with both science and with philosophy.
How TheoloQv Knowst The Theological Method
Theologian Thomas Torrance clearly and thoroughly
compares and contrasts science and theology. Among their
primary similarities is the fact that each progresses
according to a carefully prescribed methodological
relationship between the inquiring person and the object of
reality under study; they are different, however, in the
priority they give to the "subject" and "object" involved in
that relationship.
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Thus, as Torrance explains it, both scisnti-fic
knowledge o-f nature and theological knowledge of God involve
a two�way communication. But science learns by violating
nature, forcing it to reveal itself to our senses. By
contrast theology learns by being acted upon by its object,
God; it is we, says Torrance, who are acted upon, and
questioned, by Him. Thus science and theology have, relative
to each other, an inverted relationship with their proper
objects of concern.'" Science puts nature on the rack and
compels it to reveal its secrets; theology stands in
reverent openness to God and allows Him, in His own manner
and time, to reveal personal knowledge about Himself and His
character, purposes, and activities.
Theology's Use of Sensorv and Intuitive Cognition
Theology is not a matter of the intuition alone; it is
the strong claim of theology that it gains new knowledge
about reality by using both sensory and intuitive cognition.
In the words of religious philosopher Arthur Holmes,
Christianity relies not only upon man's insights into his
relationship to God, but also upon God's revelation about
Himself.
1 - Theology's reliance upon the senses. Theol ogy
'
s
relation with its proper object of study is the personal
relationship between man and a personal God (in either his
heavenly, spiritual form as Father or Holy Spirit, or His
earthly form as Jesus Christ), and all personal
relationships rely heavily upon sensory cognition.
'^Torrance, 96.
*�'Arthur F- Holmes, Phi losophy; A Christian
Perspective. Revised Edition (Downers Grove, Illinois:
InterVarsity Press, 1975), 21.
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The disciples o-f Jesus Christ knew Him personally, and
did so by using their senses. They saw him, heard him, and
touched him, and they tasted and smelled bread and wine with
him. Mhen John the Baptist wanted to know i-f Jesus was the
Promised One He appeared to be, Jesus told his messengers to
"Go and tell John what you have seen and heard," re-ferring
to Christ's teachings and works, including his miracles. And
when the apostles bore witness to Him, a-fter his dramatic
resurrection, they spoke boldly o-f the -fact that their
testimony was not merely speculation or insight; they spoke
o-f what they had themselves personally witnessed, by their
own senses.
The same can be said o-f the prophets be-fore Jesus. They
claimed to know God directly and personally, by use o-f their
senses. They claimed to have heard His voice, -felt Him pass
by, and to have seen His glory and His works among men. And
they reduced His words to visible -form when they wrote the
scriptures, thus leaving a sensible record -for the
instruction o-f others who would -follow.
Theology is thus -firmly anchored in the real, sensible
world o-f history, o-f nature, and o-f sensible personal
relationships. It relies heavily upon sensory cognition.
2. Theology's reliance upon the intuitive. Philosopher
o-f religion Yandall Mood-fin reminds us that some o-f
theology's knowledge claims are perceived intuitively. Such
items o-f knowledge present themselves to us "with an
intrinsic compel 1 ingness which inwardly and immediately
convinces us o-f their validity", a process in which we
"-feel" their truth in something like Polanyi s tacit
dimension.
=^�Yandall Mood+in, Mith All Your Mind: A Christian
Phi losophv (Nashville, Abingdon Press, 1980), 23.
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Macmurray �mphasizes that this way o-f knowing is
apprehended in some way other than by the senses, in a way
in which we mysteriously reach out to touch this reality, or
He reaches down to reveal himsel-f to us.='* And Arthur Holmes
emphasizes that this is not simply an intuitive "working
out" o-f the truth about the supranatural) rather it relies
upon the "inner testimony of the Holy Spirit", a process in
which the third Person of the Trinity somehow directly
impresses His truth upon the human mind.^^
We ought, therefore, to be somewhat careful here with
our use of the word "intuitive". Much of what theology
claims to know appears to come by use of the intuitive
faculty. But it is not always a normal intuition, like the
process of recognizing a mathematical truth) it may also be
more like a direct personal communication between minds, one
natural and the other supranatural, a communication which
comes to us in a way which we feel is like that of
intuition.
Theology's Relationship with the Realitv Known
Theology, like science and philosophy, assumes both
the existence of the reality it sc>eks to know, and the
ability to know it truly and accurately.
1. The reality known. Theology begins all its efforts
with the "self-evident" knowledge that God exists, that is,
that He exists objectively, independently of our knowing of
Him, whether or not we choose to try to know Him. For many,
this knowledge of God is like Adler "s "strong knowledge" of
axiomatic truth.
='Macmurray, 48.
=*=^Holmes, 22.
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2. The wanner o-f theol oQic�l knowing. Like science and
philosophy, theology claims the ability to know the reality
in which it is interested through the use o-f words and
concepts.
Theology's use o-f words is no di-fferent than that o-f
science or philosophy. As Torrance is quick to point out,
theology is devoted to a Reality which reveals Himself to us
in verbal propositions, though our understanding of the
revelation is limited by the finite capacity of words to
represent Him. While our words about God may lack the
authenticity of the reality they represent, we must never
forget that it is the reality Himself which we claim is
true, not every word we say about that reality; the words of
revelation attempt to point us past our own images of God to
the reality of God Himself." It is the reality of God, not
human words about that reality, which are the final goal.
Theology uses not only words, but also non-verbal
concepts. Often, the concept is so large and mysterious that
it must rely upon metaphor, which can express more than mere
verbal words. All of this is in order to relate some true
concept about the reality to which it is devoted, i.e., God.
A. W. Tozer has cogently argued that the concept we
develop of God shapes dramatically the manner in which we
attempt to inwardly relate to Him, and that if that concept
is in error, we will not be successful in relating to Him.
Thus, the success of our attempts to know God is directly
proportional to the accuracy of our concepts about God. In
turn, our concepts of God cannot be completely reasoned out,
because He retains an element of mystery about Himself,
revealing only what He chooses to reveal. Our only accurate
knowledge of Him, therefore, revolves around the attributes
"Torrance, 20.
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claim* -for Himsel-f, attributes such as holiness,
goodness, love, mercy, grace, sovereignty, omnipotence, etc.
This is a knowledge, says Tozer, which can only be discerned
spiritually <or, we might add, intui ti vely > . =s-�
One o-f God's main revealed attributes, from the
standpoint of the present analysis, is that He is a personal
reality, not an impersonal principle." Theology deals with
a person who can act as an agent, i.e., who speaks, acts,
and has purpose; this distinguishes theology strongly from
science, which does not claim the ability to know personal
objects.
^- IhE.�truth of theological knowing. Like philosophy,
theology is concerned with the truth. Moreover, theology
claims that its knowledge of the reality it studies is both
true and objective.
The importance of this point can hardly be
overemphasized. C. S. Lewis is insistent that Christianity
is not to be preached because, as some imagine, it is merely
good; Christianity is rather tied to history, objective
data, and facts, and is thus to be preached because it is
true."
The truth of theology is not only in the actual
existence of that which theology studies; it also resides in
the objective nature of our knowledge of theological truth.
^'*A. M. Tozer, The Knowledge of the Holv <San
Francisco, Harper and Row Publishers, 1961), 6-24, 122.
^"Macmurray, 50�53.
==<^Torrance, 39-41.
^^Holmes, 23.
"C. S. Lewis, God in the Docks Essays on Theology and
Ethics, ed. Malter Hooper (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William
B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1970), 90-91, 101.
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Theological knonnledge is not merely subjective; it is
objective, or public, in the sense Adler described it. This
point may seem m bit more esoteric, but it nonetheless
important, and its importance resides in a correct view o-f
objectivity.
Torrance explains the point well. Like science,
theological knowledge is true, he says, when it relates
faith-fully to a reality which exists independently of our
knowing of it.^" And like science, the aim of theological
objectivity is to allow our reason to be freely attached to
its proper object, thus being free to submit to its demands.
But this objectivity does not deny interest in its object;
it is not "detached" from its proper object of study. It's
detachment, the property which makes it objective, resides
in the observer's severance of bondage to his preconceptions
and deceptions.'**
COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS.
We can now begin to see that there are both
similarities and differences between science, philosophy,
and theology as "ways of knowing" reality. I think it will
now be useful to compile a sort of list of these and other
comparisons and contrasts. This will help us assess how well
each may help us gain legitimate knowledge about origins
and other such large issues, and the extent to which they
are complementary or dichotomized windows on the world.
^''Torrance, 13.
'**Torranee, 36.
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Simi lariti��
Thomas Torrance lists several similarities between
science and theology; the major ones are as -Followsi'*
1. The proper object o-F each is assumed not only to
exist, but also to be intelligible and open to rational
investigation.
2. Each has a pro-Found respect -For the objectivity of
facts. While each uses reason to construct models, each is
also willing to submit its model to the criticism of
objective facts.
3. Neither operates with a completely preconceived
metaphysics; each is willing to renounce unsupportable
presupposi t i ons .
4. Each recognizes that there is a real limit to its
investigative powers.
5. Each has problems trying to use ordinary language to
relate its deepest concepts to the average person.
6. Each is devoted, in sheer objectivity, to its proper
ob ject .
In his preface, Torrance summarizes what is perhaps the
overriding intellectual similarity between the three modes
of knowing:"
"� the great story of modern thought, whether
it be in theology, science, or philosophy (is) the
struggle for fidelity, for appropr iate methods and
"Torrance, 286f .
'=^Torrance, 116.
"Torrance, ix.
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mpposite modes o-f speech, and therefore for the
proper adaptation of the human subject to the
object of his knowledge , whether it be God or the
Morld of nature or man f�
"
Di-f -ferences
Torrance also lists the -following differences between
science and theol ogy s
1. Science deals with the Creation, and theology with
its Creator (and also, I would add, with the Creation).
2. Each differs from the other with respect to the kind
of subjectivity and objectivity which characterizes it.
3. Science is more concerned with nature, and theology
with history.
4. Each methodically excludes the other and departs
from opposite starting points or premises. In science, we
bracket off a part of nature for experiments of our own
devising. Theology, by contrast, is set up by divine will,
and we are directed beyond nature and ourselves to our
Creator.
5. Science assumes that nature is objectively rational,
and therefore it lets nature speak for itself and then
science interprets it. In theology, however, we encounter a
reality which both speaks and interprets itself-'" This
requires the theologian, says Torrance, to effect an
"epi stemol ogi cal inversion" in comparison with science,
yielding us a "unique form of inquiry". Out of respect for
the personal nature of its unique object, theology allows
'^Torrance, 102.
'"Torrance, 30.
66
its�l-f to be subdued by its object, allowing Him to reveal
things to us.'**
Comolementarv or Dichotomized?
We previously quotcKi the late rocket scientist Wernher
von Braun as saying that science and religion were like
sisters, or like two windows on the same world. Using a
similar metaphor, Torrance sees science and theology as
partners, or as complementary ways o-f knowing.'"^
When we couple our view o-f reality as multi -dimensi onal
(natural plus spiritual), with such metaphors for our ways
of knowing reality, then we may better understand Torrance's
earlier cited remark that the great task of modern thought
is to develop methods which are "appropriate" to the reality
we seek to know. If reality is mul ti -dimensi onal , then in
order to appropriately know it, we must utilize more than
one method of knowing. In short, we must use a whole
spectrum or battery of complementary epi stemol ogi es, each of
which is best adapted for revealing some aspect of this
composite reality. Only the composite view through all of
these windows can provide us with the "triangulated"
perspective we need to see the "fabric" of reality as it
truly exists.
SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE NET OF REALITY
The "elastic net" metaphor I previously proposed for
reality may now be used to inquire into the use and validity
of the "windows or tools" metaphor for knowing that reality.
Consider, for example, the following correlations:
'-^Torrance, 132-133.
'^Torrance, 102.
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1. The interconn�ctednem� o-f realitv. One aspect oi
reality upheld by the elastic net model is its dynamic
interconnectedness. So long as the elastic net is maintained
upon its supporting -frame, the various threads -fit together
in a designed and meaning-ful pattern. In a similar way, we
can only know reality as it actually exists when our various
ways o-f knowing it work together to maintain the live
interconnection and interdependence o-f its -formative
strands.
Consider what happens when one tries to know reality by
cutting out one or more o-f the threads. The portion so
excised now becomes limp, 1 i-fel ess, and de-formed, and indeed
the remaining reality de-forms under the tension o-f' its
remaining strands. Thus, when we try to separate out one
strand o-f reality by cutting it apart -from its cross
strands, we are le-ft with a de-formed shell o-f the real thing
we originally sought to understand. We can know reality
truly only when we allow the reality itsel-f to retain the
live interconnection between its material and spiritual
strands, and use enough appropriate windows to see that
reality in that actual interconnectedness.
2. Our view o-f the weaver. A second useful feature of
both the "elastic net" model of reality and the "windows"
model of knowing is the manner in which they provide us with
insight into the need for a relationship between the
observer and the Weaver of the net. One is better enabled to
appreciate the living, dynamic tension between the strands
of reality when he knows that is has been fabricated, for
some purpose, by a Master Weaver. This knowledge becomes
even more important when the observer realizes that he,
himself, is part of the same system of dynamic liveness,
elasticity, and interconnectedness which he is observing.
Moreover, it is mainly because of this sharing of reality,
that he is enabled to sense his unity with the reality he
is
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observing. Such knowledge c*n come only -from a view through
many epi stemol ogi cal windows.
I-f one examines reality only by cutting out, or
excising a strand -for close scrutiny (as when the scientist
considers a portion o-f material nature, cut apart -from its
living origin), he misses the most important element: the
element o-f liveness in the strands and their original
stretching into an organizing framework. This can easily
happen when one views reality only through a window
appropriate for the non-living, non-personal, material
dimension of reality.
If one looks through this one window only at the
flaccid strand which has been excised, he can never infer
anything about the origin of the strand, the time when it
was originally woven into the fabric of reality, or its
purpose. One can never infer the extent to which the
Original Weaver may have intervened to repair a rent in the
fabric of reality. Indeed, one is apt to infer from its
"deadness" that it was never even a part of a recent
constructive activity.
If one uses at least two windows, one of which is
appropriate for the living, personal, spiritual dimension of
reality, then he may examine the elastic net as it remains
interconnected, and recognize the tension designed into it.
This may help him correctly infer something about its origin
and purpose under the designing hand of the Master Weaver.
Only then can an Ansel m infer from the presence of a design
to the existence of a Designer, or from an original motion
to an Original Mover. Others will examine his arguments and
find them wanting. They cannot see the evidence for a Weaver
because they cannot recognize the true nature of the fabric
He has woven, based upon the flaccid facts to which their
view compels them to limit themselves. They cannot see both
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the Creator and Creation strands because they are using a
window capable o-f seeing only the Creation.
3. Stretching -facts versus restoring tension. A third
use-ful -feature o-f the "elastic net" model o-f reality and the
"windows" model o-f knowing is the way in which they
illuminate our motive and purpose when we try to reconcile
theory and -facts about some aspect of reality, for example,
the origin of the universe. The previous feature provides us
with the needed clue.
Consider the man who is trying to fashion a view of the
origin of the fabric of reality by knowledge gained through
the single window appropriate for empirical, material
reality. He is limited to an attempt to integrate only the
limited data from the material strands into a coherent
theory. If he recognizes no original stretching into an
integrated and purposeful network, and examines only the
flaccid strands excised from the net, he can never infer the
truth about the original state of the strand.
Suppose, now, that he encounters another investigator
who is "stretching" the excised portions onto what he has
perceived, by viewing through two different windows, to be
their original framework. The first investigator may make an
unwarranted leap in logic, accusing the other of "stretching
the facts to fit a preconceived philosophy". He will miss
the point that the truth can only be found by viewing the
strands of reality in their original, live,
interconnectedness. Because of his "single window view", he
will fail to see that the second investigator is not
"stretching the facts", he is merely "restoring the original
tension" with which those facts were endowed, so he can
examine them as they were intended to be seen.
There is a sense in which the "two window view" compels
us to see that we MUST stretch the facts of the universe to
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�fit a proper framework of interpretation. From the two
coherent perspectives, we can now see that isolated facts
are bits of limp thread which have been assaulted by a "one
window" inquiry; they are deformed images of truth, torn
from their designed place within the fabric of reality by a
"one-window" tool which forces all information to fit its
own way of seeing. Once we know how the threads were
originally strung, we will only delude ourselves by trying
to piece together the isolated bits in the hope of learning
"the truth". We must first see that they are INTENDED to fit
together in a living pattern. Only then can we properly
interpret the role of each in the whole.
4. Coherence of the view. By viewing reality through
two, complementary windows, we can see that reality is not a
dichotomized thing, but is rather composed of interwoven
strands of the material and the spiritual. It has been woven
into a pattern which is intended to form a coherent,
intelligible whole, a meaningful pattern according to which
we may infer the existence of a Master Designer.
One measure of the truth of our statements about
reality is whether or not we get the same answer when we
question reality through different "windows". In short, if
reality is coherent, as I take it to be, then our modes of
inquiry must provide coherent answers if we are to take them
to be true. Science, religion, and philosophy are three
windows on reality. If they do not provide the same answers
when we look through them toward reality, or at least
coherent answers, then we must seriously question whether we
have successfully apprehended reality.
Since truth is a united, non-contradictory whole, it is
not possible for something to be true scientifically and
false theologically, or vice versa. There is no "double
truth". So long as science and religion APPEAR to disagree
about the origin of the universe, or about any other
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important issue, we must recognize that our view through ANY
o-f the windows may be in error, and we must there-fore
reserve Judgment regarding the correctness o-f ANY o-f our
perceptions.
Science is well suited to apprehend the material
strands o-f reality, though it -faces the danger o-f in-ferr ing
too much -from excised strands o-f data. Theology is well
suited to apprehend the spiritual strands o-f reality, though
it -faces the same danger when it restricts its view to
excised theological data and forsakes the correction of the
empirical. Using both together under the tutorage of
philosophy can help us achieve a "triangulated perspective"
because philosophy is well suited to recognize the pattern
in the fabric, to uncover contradictions, and to insist that
the inquiry continue until the view is clearly resolved.
Figure 2.2 illustrates how these three can be used together
to achieve a coherent view of reality.
We can only rightly claim to "know" reality when we
properly use the windows of science, theology, and
philosophy together, and achieve a focused, triangulated,
coherent view from these three independent perspectives.
Only then can we be justified in feeling confident that our
mode of inquiry is so completely appropriate to the complex
nature of reality itself, that we are warranted in making an
an assertion about real, if still provi sionary , truth.
TRUE KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY: AN ULTIMATE GOOD
Science, theology, and philosophy have been engaged in
the almost continual pursuit of truth about the origin or
man, life, and the universe, and other such grand issues.
But for many people our "knowledge" remains fragmented, what
we "know" from science seeming too often to be at variance
with what we "know" from theology. And yet we continue the
pursuit. We realize that we have not learned all the truth,
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FIGURE 2.2 THE COHERENT VIEW OF REALITY.
I. EACH WINDOW (SCIENCE, THEOLOGY) IS
APPROPRIATELY SUITED FOR VIEWING ONE
DIMENSION OF THE WEB OF REALITY.
2. USING BOTH WINDOWS CAN PROVIDE A
TRIANGULATED PERSPECTIVE.
3. PHILOSOPHY SEEKS A COHERENCE BETWEEN
THE TWO VIEWS TO MATCH THE TRUE COHERENCE
OF REALITY.
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and perhaps can never do so, and yet we possess an
insatiable drive to know the truth.
And so we ought. Somehow, man senses that he should
never rest until he is sure that he really "knows".
Philosopher Mortimer Adler argues, in one o-f the most cogent
de-fenses I have read, that the possession o-f truth is the
ultimate good o-f the human mind, and that we ought never to
rest until we have achieved it.'^
He first concedes that the pursuit of truth is a never�
ending one. This is because, he argues, we use many
different methods in our pursuit, that each of these is
continually adding new truth or replacing less accurate
truth, and that we are continually discovering errors and
falsifying our generalizations and theories. This
necessarily means, argues Adler, that the search for truth
is progressive, and therefore we can never reach a final
certainty that we have attained the whole truth.'*'
Me possess admirable means for our pursuit of truth,
says Adler, but we find ourselves continually embroiled in
disputes over matters of both truth and "taste". This is
unfortunate, he argues, for we can never resolve differences
in our Judgments of matters of taste (disputes here are
"fruitless"). Nevertheless, disputes over matters of truth,
argues Adler, are fruitful because is is possible to resolve
them, and reach a unanimous agreement. Me ought, therefore,
never to abandon our efforts to reach a unanimous agreement
where matters of truth are at stake. Me are obliged to
continue our search where we disagree about truth, says
'^Adler, 63.
'''Adler, 56-57.
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Adler, and we should be "unrelenting" in meeting that
obligation.'**'
But can we actually reach agreement on such things?
Yes, says Adler, i-f they are really a matter o-f truth rather
than taste. The problem in matters o-f philosophy and
religion, he says, is that they are "composite" things;
i.e., they contain elements o-f both truth and taste. (We
might add here some examples: theology deals with issues o-f
truth such as God's activity in origins, and also with
issues o-f taste, such as the proper kind o-f literature to
read) .
The key, says Adler, is to separate, for discussion
purposes, the matters of truth from the matters of taste,
and then deal with each appropriately. The matters of truth,
he argues, can be resolved by "rational" (we might interpret
this to mean both sensory and intuitive) means.
Adler s second primary point is that we OUGHT to WANT
knowledge of the truth. This point, he argues with very
close logic. His "major premise" he takes to be a self-
evident truth: that we ought to want that which is truly a
good, or which we truly need. His "minor premise", which he
takes to be a matter of "factual knowledge", is that man
"needs" knowledges it is a good thing to possess. His
conclusion, therefore, is that man ought to want
knowledge. Carrying his logic one step further we may say
that if knowledge of the truth is possible by diligent
effort (and he affirms that it is), and if man "ought" to
want that knowledge, because it is a real good and meets a
-��^Adler, 58-59.
Adler, 63.
"*==Adler, 76-81.
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real need, then man ought to strive diligently to acquire a
knowledge o-f the truth.
It is hard to argue with either Adler 's premises or his
logic. And so I conclude this chapter by applying his
conclusion to the issue o-f Janusian or dualistic thought. We
can know the truth, though it is complex and will require
untiring e-f -forts to be certain we have apprehended it
accurately. The issue o-f origins is one o-f the greatest
issues with which man has struggled -for ages, and the nature
of its truth is so wide, al 1 -encompassing, and fundamental
that it may be classified as a metaphysical truth. Indeed,
most of the great issues of our age are equally difficult,
and are often anchored in the metaphysical.
Such great issues are difficult to resolve partly
because the various epi stemol ogi es we have employed in our
efforts have not always given us clear, coherent answers.
But we can never be sure we have learned true knowledge
until we find Adler 's "unanimous agreement" between these
various epi stemol ogi es. So long as science, philosophy, and
theology appear to give us conflicting or incoherent views
of the truth of origins or other great issues, we are
obligated to continue our pursuit, using all three in a
coherent effort to know the truth about who we are, and how
we came to be on this earth.
We want to know, we ought to want to know, and we can
know the answers to such questions. And in the pursuit of
these answers, we ought to use every resource of faith and
reason in our possession.
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Chapter 3
THE SPLIT IN OUR LOGIC AND UNDERSTANDING
In Chapter 1, we saw that our sensory and intuitive
cognition are distinct modes of perception which head up two
channels for apprehending knowledge or developing belief. We
also saw how some people see a split between these two
channels, but how a coherence of their respective views can
enable us to better come to grips with the two major
dimensions of reality, and thus increase our certainty that
we have seen reality clearly.
We now turn our attention to the inner complexities of
the processes involved, i.e., to the several components of
the understanding which follow each channel of cognition but
precede the internalization of its knowledge. It is because
there are several components on each side, making up two
distinct chains of understanding, that we are able to
conceive of them as two complementary "channels of the
understandi ng
"
.
We will proceed in three stages. First, we will examine
what we mean by the term "understanding", and the place of
the mind, the brain, and the personal self in that process.
We will then examine the various components within each of
our two channels of understanding, and develop a graphic
picture of them to help us visualize why many people see
them as not only distinct but also separate. And finally, we
will focus upon the major "rational" processes within each
channel of the understanding: our two distinct modes of
logic and reason.
To anticipate just a bit, the reader should be advised
that our two channels of knowledge and understanding
correspond to the two distinct hemispheres of the brain, a
perspective which will be developed in Chapter 4.
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BACKGROUND
Me each have a desire to know and understand reality,
ranging -from the ordinary individual s desire to know "how
and why things work as they do" to the deepest desires of
the scientific, philosophical, and theological mind to
understand the mysteries of the universe.
But scholars from many disciplines are warning us that
our ideas about knowledge and understanding are far too
heavily conditioned by the scientific spirit of our age. Me
often hear some scientifically or theologically-inclined
person to say, in a discussion of a complex issue like
origins, that he "knows" such-and-such about the matter,
that his opponent "doesn't understand" the matter, or that
his own view is "rational" and that of his opponent is not.
It is not only interesting, but highly significant as
well that such clearly distinct terms as "knowledge",
"understanding", and "rational" are often used as if they
were interchangeable. This betrays a fundamental ignorance
about the human mind, brain, and the knowing self; their
processes of understanding; and their distinct but
complementary processes. Let us begin our inquiry with a
brief introduction to the mind, the brain, and the knowing
self.
MIND, BRAIN, AND THE KNOWING SELF
The human brain equips each normal, healthy person with
enormous intellectual resources, a statement which I trust
will reflect a fundamental premise of my interpretive
framework: I take the mind and brain to be distinct though
interrelated entities.
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To de-fend that view would require a separate and
lengthy study o-f its own, and I do not propose to do so
here. I will rather state my present perspective, which I
de-fine to be theologically Trinitarian and anthropologically
tripartite, and move -forward -from there.
Just as classical theology understands the Divine
Person to be composed o-f three distinct but interrelated
entities (Father, Son, and Spirit), so I take the human
person to entail three distinct but interrelating entities:
mind, body, and spirit. One further level of distinction
seems, to me, to be necessary, a distinction to which we
will give more attention in the next chapter: our minds and
bodies (brains) are symmetrically split, and so require some
coordination by the third element, our spirit, if they are
to work together.
The term "split", which I am using in most of my
chapter titles and throughout the text, should therefore
not be taken to mean anything approaching a complete
separation or dichotomy. 1 mean rather that the two halves
of our minds and brains are quite distinct because they
differ radically in their intellectual functions, but these
functions are not completely dichotomized because they may
be continually coordinated by the spiritual self, that third
entity of our personalities which exercises will, purpose,
and self-determination.
In all the descriptions that follows, therefore, I
invite the reader to envision this kind of split in the
understanding of our minds and brains, each half being
radically distinct, but having the spiritual self standing
between and acting, as a purposeful agent, to either
separate or coordinate their processes. If the spiritual
self willfully chooses to make incomplete use of his full
intellectual resources, he may choose to use only one of the
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two channels. If he chooses, instead, to fully utilize all
his intellectual resources, he will make purposeful efforts
to integrate the processing of both channels in an
interactive, dialectic, or synthetic manner.
Our knowledge and understanding may thus be either
unified or dichotomized depending upon the will and purpose
of each personal self.
THE TWO CHANNELS OF UNDERSTANDING
When we wish to express a Judgment about how "smart" a
person or an idea seems to be, we make frequent use of such
words as "reason", "rational", "knowledge", "intelligence",
"understanding", or "thinking". If we consult a dictionary,
we find that each of these has a bewildering array of
overlapping meanings and senses, and consulting more
sophisticated reference works in science, philosophy,
psychology, or theology can be even more frustrating.
I have spent a great deal of time researching the
meaning of the term "understanding", from a wide variety of
both general and technical sources, and have experienced
that frustration first-hand. Virtually no two scholars seem
to agree on the details of the interrelationships between
all these terms. I therefore found it necessary to settle
upon some scheme for defining, distinguishing, and
interrelating the various components of the understanding.
A Diagram of the Understanding
I have assembled this scheme into a diagram, which is
entirely of my own construction, and which has been
assembled entirely from a word-study of the various
definitions of the components involved. The diagram is shown
in Figure 3.1. It was particularly significant to me, given
the "split-knowledge" thesis of my general study, that the
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components o-f the UNDERSTANDING, as we generally use them in
verbal conversation, -fall clearly into two basic "channels"
which are remarkably congruent with the two channels o-f
KNOWLEDGE which I introduced in Chapter 1 and 2.
Note specifically that the two channels of both
"knowledge" and "understanding" are headed by sensory and
intuitive cognition. Note also, however, that there are many
interconnections and lines of feedback between the two
channels, and these can prevent them from being isolated.
For example, one can use inductive reason on either sensory
or intuitive data and concepts; and similarly, one can use
deductive reason on either.
An Overview of Understanding
I have included, in the concept of "understanding", all
the entities between the cognition of information about
material -spi ritual reality and the internalization of that
information as knowledge or belief which has some attendant
degree of certainty, and which leads to some degree of will
to act upon the knowledge.
Again for emphasis, I have placed the personal,
spiritual self as a third entity, spanning these two
channels with its own reflection, contemplation, judgment,
and wi 1 1 .
Components of the Understanding
Detailed descriptions of the individual components of
the understanding are as follows, each basic definition
being a composite from a wide range of general and technical
reference sources:
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1. Cognition. Cognition is the process o-f apprehending
or perceiving in-formation about reality, and preparing it
-for processing. The sensory channel is headed by SENSORY
PERCEPTION; in-formation the sel-f gains through this channel
is thus mediated by the organs of sight, sound, touch,
taste, or smell, and is therefore subject to deception by
their imperfect discrimination. The intuitive channel is
headed by INTUITIVE PERCEPTION; information the self gains
through this channel is by direct, immediate grip on
reality. Many people have come to depend strongly upon their
intuitions, and may therefore attribute to them a high
degree of certainty, even though they may not (after
analysis) correspond accurately to reality. Both modes of
cognition are thus subject to error.
2. Filtering and classification. Our minds "see"
reality through the filters of our presuppositions. In
short, we filter our view of reality by relating it to what
we already suppose to be true, via some sort of feedback
loop from our world view. If the incoming information does
not agree with our presuppositions, we often reject it as
erroneous. If it does, we sort it into sensory or intuitive
boxes and develop, from it, the concepts we need for
thinking. Only when a great deal of information contradicts
our basic presuppositions are we likely to examine, and
possibly revise them. Presuppositions are therefore
extremely powerful lenses, filters, or even blinders for our
view of reality.
3. Formation of concepts. Information cognized, and
then filtered and classified by the presuppositions, is next
transformed into concepts which can be manipulated by our
mental faculties and powers. The left (sensory) channel
forms propositional or ideational information into VERBAL or
NUMERICAL ENTITIES (facts, thoughts, ideas, theories,
principles) which represent those aspects of reality which
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constitute actions or state o-f being. The right (intuitive)
channel forms "object descriptive" information about those
aspects of reality which may be grasped as PICTORIAL OBJECTS
(visual images, symbols, models, pictures, or notions).
The way we "view" reality thus depends, to a great
extent, on the channel which the self utilizes to cognize
and conceptualize it.
As an aside, we might note that we often view the
formation of concepts as an "impression" on the mind. The
etymology of this word reminds us that we actually "stamp
out" our concepts of reality, in cookie�cutter fashion, and
thus shape them by the conceptual forms we choose to impose.
4. Basic Judgment or hypothesis. Mhen we combine or
oppose simple concepts into a simple statement or
proposition ("this animal is a dog"; or "no wheels are
square"), we are performing the simple mental act called
JUDGMENT. From the perspective of the logician. Judgment is
simply the act of assenting that something is, or is not,
something else. In the words of Raymond McCall, a Judgment
"unites by affirmation, or separates by negation".' Such
resulting propositions or Judgments are the basic grist for
our logical and reasoning mills, i.e., they can become basic
PREMISES or algebraic terms for manipulation by our logical
reasoni ng.
5. Thinking, reason, and logical faculties. We are able
to think because we possess certain innate mental powers or
faculties for mentally manipulating facts, terms, premises,
simple Judgments, or other single or combined concepts about
reality. These powers or faculties include reason (and
'Raymond J. McCall, Basic Logic; The Fundamental
Principles of Formal Deductive Reasoning. 2nd Edition (New
York: Barnes and Noble Books, Division of Harper and Row,
1952) , XXV, 38.
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logic) , memory, and imagination, and they enable the
personal sel-f to engage in complex re-flection, judgment, and
contemplation.
a. REASON And LOGIC are our most basic engines -for
conceptual manipulation. They enable us to in-fer verbal and
numerical information deductively, and to develop
generalizations and recognize patterns inductively. Since
they are perhaps the most important components of the
understanding for our purposes, they will be given a
detailed treatment in a following section. For the moment, I
will merely note that I classify both inductive and
deductive processes as "rational" means of reasoning; I call
one "sensory-rational reasoning", and the other "intuitive-
rational reasoning".
b. MEMORY is both the power of storing verbal and
pictorial concepts, and the locus of that storage. Me are
able to assess the validity of new information and concepts
partly because we can access our memories for comparative
information and concepts from past learning experiences.
Memory has been correlated with both the sensory and
intuitive channels of understanding and may well be located
at several points within the brain.
c. IMAGINATION is the mental power to draw upon,
or recreate, memories of experiences or objects which are
real, but are no longer present. It is also the power to
create mental experiences or objects which are speculative,
and may therefore be non-real , or non-sensible. Imagination
is generally associated with the intuitive channel of
understanding, though it draws upon past sensory experience
to determine what sorts of things may be imagined.
d. REFLECTION is the mental power whereby the self
moves stored facts, concepts, or ideas around within and
between both channels of the understanding, like images
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reflected from a series of mirrors, so they may be mentally
considered from a number of perspectives as they pass by the
attention of the self.
e. CONTEMPLATION is the mental act whereby the
self intently studies, views, thinks about, or focuses upon
the facts, concepts, or ideas circulating within his
reflection.
6. Presentation to the attention of the self. We must
continually remind ourselves that there is a knowing,
purposeful self in all our considerations of reason and
logic. It is the self which uses reason and logic, and which
employs memory, imagination, reflection, and contemplation,
for some purpose, namely, to gain an accurate knowledge
about reality. Accordingly, it is the self which gathers the
processed information from its two channels of understanding
and gives it a full measure of attention.
7. Complex judgment and decision bv the self. We saw
earlier that a simple judgment is the mental act of
affirming that something is, or is not, equal to or the same
as, something else.^ After full processing by the
understanding, however, there still remains the more complex
judgment that the constellation of information which is
circulating around in the contemplation does or does not
represent the truth.
Complex judgments result from a more complex process.
Geisler and Feinberg call it "rational activity", and
include within it the use of argument, critical evaluation
of evidence, and intuition.' Logician Henry Leonard calls it
"taking thought" so as to solve a problem or find valid
==McCall, xvii-3.
'Norman L. Geisler and Paul D. Feinberg, Introduction
to Philosophv: A Christian Perspective (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Baker Book House, 1980) , 13.
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grounds -for belief,'* and includes within it analysis,
imagination of solutions, testing the imagined solutions by
connecting them with other knowledge, weighing their
relative plausibility, selecting, and then adopting the
best.
The rational judgment used in rational activity will
often involve an assessment of the extent to which the
rational and intuitive fit together (are "coherent"). It
also nearly always incorporates the person's faith, his
values, his emotions, and both his sensory and intuitive
world views. After utilizing this complex battery of tests
in judgment, the self is usually able to affirm some
position on the simpler issues of life. Depending upon
whether his complex judgment has been able to provide a
relatively incomplete or very extensive degree of warrant,
these positions may become, for him, either belief or
knowledge. They are then internalized, along with some
assessment of their degree of certainty. The more certain
the self is in its knowledge and belief, the more he is
willing to act on the basis of that knowledge or belief-
Some issues, like origins, are so large that he may
experience difficulty in developing certainty over his
conclusions. His need for a more accurate judgment may then
compel this self into the public arena, to seek more data,
or to discuss the issue with others.
Such issues may be well described as "forensic" in
nature. Webster traces the origin of this term to the two
Latin words for "public" and "marketplace", and defines
forensic issues as those characteristic of, or suitable for,
a court of law or for public debate. Whenever a complex
judgment is called for, we seem unable to resolve it
'^Henry S. Leonard, Principles of Reasoning; An
Introduction to Logic. Methodoloov. and the The"'"Y Sions
(New York; Dover Publications, 1967), 6.
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completely in our own minds. We there-fore turn the issue
over to the courts, to the scienti-fic community, to the
consensus o-f history, or to some other -forum in the
"marketplace o-f ideas" where our Judgment can be tested,
tried, supplemented, in-formed, and complemented by that o-f
others. As our earlier quote -from Wol-fe makes clear, it is
only when we are able to integrate our basic belie-fs into a
more complete web o-f belie-fs about reality (in our world
view) that we may -finally consider them adequately
warranted.
LOGIC AND REASON
Having now completed a brie-f overview o-f the entire
length o-f each channel o-f the understanding, we need now to
look more deeply into the particularly power-ful components
we call reason and logic, and consider in more detail their
place within the processes o-f understanding.
Reason and Reasoning
REASON may be defined in three senses: as a power, as a
process, and as an inherent property of the universe.
Moreover, the power and process of reasoning can be limited
or even incorrect. Let us therefore begin by considering
these various dimensions and limitations of reason.
Reason as a power. As a POWER (or faculty) , reason is
the ability of the self to know reality by relating, or
making coherent connections between, one part of an idea or
concept about reality and another; it is therefore the power
to extend knowledge beyond the realm of immediate
experience.
"Yandall Woodfin, With All Your Mind: ^ Christian
Phi losophv (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1980), 25-26.
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Reason as a process. As a PROCESS, reasoning is any
mental procedure for manipulating statements or propositions
involving concepts, whether valid or invalid, so as to work
one's way from a premise to a conclusion. The product of
this reasoning activity is termed an INFERENCE.
Reason as a universal property. Mhen the word reason is
spelled with a capital R ("Reason"), the user is following
the practice of Hegel. It recognizes that the universe
exhibits, by its meaningful interconnectedness, an inherent
rationality because it was created by a rational God in
ways which are intelligible to the created mental faculties
of man .
Reason as fallible. Our reasoning power is not perfect.
Me have already seen that the senses can be deceived, and
that the intuition can misinterpret. Therefore, our
reasoning processes are prone to error. Naturalists believe
this is simply because we have not learned to use reason as
well as we can; theologians follow the Biblical teaching
that human reason is "fallen".
Since our reason is so prone to error, we need to make
distinctions with regard to the locus of our error. Thus, we
distinguish between the truth, validity, and soundness of
our statements and arguments. Mhen a conclusion has been
reached by correctly following the rules of form for the
kind of reasoning employed (e.g., correct formal logic), it
may then be said to be VALID (whether true or not); invalid
processes of reasoning include appealing to emotion,
appealing to authority, ridiculing the idea, or attacking
the person who has advanced the idea. If both the premise
*"G. M. F- Hegel , Reason in Historvs A General
Introduction to the Philosophv of History. (written 1837)
(Indianapolis: The Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merr i 1 1
Educational Publishing, 1982).
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and the conclusion agree with the -facts (according to
material logic), then they are said to be TRUE. If the
premise is true, and the conclusion has also been validly
inferred from that premise, then the requirements of both
formal and material logic have been met, and the argument is
said to be SOUND.
Logic
The term LOGIC is applied to any process of reasoning
between starting and ending points which has been
established, by experience, to lead to generally valid
results. We reason in different directions, however, and we
utilize different processes for seeking valid results. We
must therefore make some important distinctions at the
outset .
Natural and acguired logic. Raymond McCall makes a
major distinction between "natural" and "acquired" logic.
NATURAL LOGIC is, for him, the natural or inborn power our
minds or brains possess for manipulating concepts so as to
draw inferences and make judgments, and is an element of
"common sense"; this is the native power by which we know,
for example, that true beliefs cannot be contradictory.
By contrast, ACQUIRED LOGIC is a learned discipline of
reasoning which incorporates reflection, criticism, and
systematization. Because our natural logic is prone to the
error of logical fallacy, we need the discipline and
restraint of acquired logic; it might, for example, provide
us with proven procedures to test for non-contradiction.^
^S. Morris Engel , With Good Reason; An Introduction to
Informal Fallacies. second edition (New York; St. Martin's
Press, 1982), 9-13.
�McCall, xvii-3.
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Inductive and deductive logic. All logic is an attempt
to relate simple facts and concepts to larger, more general
constellations of interpreted information. And there are two
basic directions in which our logic may operate. DEDUCTIVE
reasoning attempts to begin with the general, and distill
out the specific facts. INDUCTIVE reasoning attempts to
begin with a collection of individual facts and move upward
toward some general pattern or framework which ties them
together .
Induction. INDUCTIVE reason is the basis of the
scientific process. Logician Herbert Searles calls it the
"method of discovery", but notes that the discoveries made
by induction are never certain, but possess only a given
probability. This represents a major weakness of induction.''
As Hume's rather devastating critique showed, one never has
access to all the data to examine; he must reach conclusions
by making a logical "leap" suggested by the pattern of
available, but limited information.
Deduction. DEDUCTIVE reason is the basis of
mathematics and philosophy, and is often utilized not only
in mathematical science, but also in political, literary,
historical, or religious debate. It begins with some
general, accepted axiom or postulate and, by logically
combining the postulate with some fact or other proposition,
teases out some implications which are sub�sets of the more
general premise. As pointed out by Searles, deduction may
also be used in a backwards direction, i.e., the supporting
of some conclusion by appealing to a premise which entails
it. 1�
�'Herbert L. Searles, Logic and Scientific Methods (New
York: The Ronald Press Co. , 1956) , 5-6.
'"Searles, 5-6.
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The advantage o-f deduction is that, given the truth o-f
its premises, and a proper (valid) procedures for in-ference,
the truth o-f the conclusion is guaranteed. The disadvantage
is that it cannot really lead to new truth; it can only lead
to a proposition which was already entailed within the
original premises, and thus is merely a means -for more
-finely dividing knowledge. Given that the proposition is
true within the general realm, deduction only partitions out
a smaller portion of that realm and upholds it as the truth.
FORMAL AND MATERIAL LOGIC
The distinction between formal and material logic is so
crucial, and so intimately tied to the difficulties we
encounter in our reasoning on the "big issues" such as
origins, that we need to give their distinction a
particularly detailed treatment. This will help us to
understand why it may be relatively easy to spot fallacies
of form in another's argument, but difficult to spot the
fallacy in its content. In a more general sense, it can help
us to be more alert when we need to analyze the argument of
another who says that his view is very "logical".
Formal Logic
Plato, the intellectual ancestor of all rationalists,
asserted that deductive logic, based upon self-evident
premises, was the source of all real knowledge. But it was
not until the time of his pupil, Aristotle, that the formal-
logical principles of deduction were worked out. DesCartes,
Spinoza, and Leibniz elevated deductive reasoning to the
status of "sole source of knowledge", but the principles of
its use have changed little since the days of Aristotle.**
**McCall, xxii.
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We have, however, come to appreciate one important
thing about -formal logic: it appears deceptively simple, but
is actually quite a complex thing. It is complex because it
involves, at once, our ways o-f -forming concepts, our
assumptions about the way concepts can be partitioned into
components, and our semantic use o-f words as symbols -for
those concepts.
The interrelated -form o-f realitv and language. The
modi-fier "-formal" signi-fies that this logic is concerned
with the -form or structure o-f reality and our statements
about that reality. Its validity is based upon two
assumptions about reality and language, and an in-ference
drawn -from these two. First, it is assumed that there is a
structural relationship between the intei�connected aspects
of reality. Second, it is assumed that there is a similar
relationship between the words and concepts of our language
about that reality. And third, it is inferred from these two
that an analysis of the interconnected form of our arguments
will reveal something about the interconnected form of
reality. Formal logic is thus concerned with the FORM,
STRUCTURE, AND SEQUENCE of thinking, arguing, and reasoning,
and their relationship to the reality about which we are
thinking. At bottom, it presumes that the correct form of
reasoning will yield correct information about reality if
the terms of the reasoning are true. If one grants its basic
premises, he must also concede that it possesses an
intrinsic autonomy.
The form of deductive argument. Consider, for example,
the following development of the formal statement of a
DEDUCTIVE argument. Let us begin with the "fact" that
(according to our own, man-made scheme of classification)
all dogs are mammals. That statement or proposition reflects
'^^McCall, xxii.
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a judgment that there is, in reality, some sameness about
dogs and mammals. The validity o-f that proposition is,
itsel-f, a matter o-f material logic, which will be discussed
shortly.
The proposition is stated in verbal language, which
uses the concepts o-f what it means to be an "animal" and a
"dog". Thus, we use verbal concepts to denote a structural
relationship, in reality, between dogs and mammals. Next, we
add the observation that "this animal is a dog". This
proposition or statement is also a judgment about reality,
and is also expressed in verbal, conceptual language.
Now consider what happens when we combine these two
judgments about reality. Suppose we write each judgment in
the -form o-f a mathematical -fraction, with a numerator over a
denominator, the -first being the "major premise" and the
second being the "minor premise". Then suppose -further that
we combine the two in the same way that we algebraically
multiply -fractions, and then "multiply" the two, judgments
to reach a "solution" or "conclusion". The -form o-f our
argument will be as -follows:
Al 1 dogs This animal This animal
are mammals is a dog is a mammal
This -form o-f deductive logic, in which judgments are
written in the -form o-f three propositions using verbal
symbols, was called a "syllogism" by Aristotle. *= Note that
the terms o-f each verbal statement can be treated just like
the terms o-f a numerical -fraction, "canceling" the numerator
o-f the -first term with the denominator o-f the second term.
Thus, by -following the "rules o-f -form" of deductive logic
(which are like the numerical rules of algebra), "solutions"
to a verbal "problem" can be "derived". Perhaps it is not
without significance that our verbal and numerical deductive
'^McCall, xxiii, 132f.
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logic are both located within the same channel o-f the
understandi ng .
Deductive looic and new knowledge. The important thing
to note here is that we appear to have "-found" some "new
in-formation" about REALITY <that this animal is a mammal) by
merely manipulating the FORM o-f our STATEMENTS about that
reality, hence the name "-formal" logic. While it may appear
that this has actually occurred, a closer inspection will
reveal that it has not. Actually, the "new -facts" were there
all along, being contained within the premises. We have
merely rearranged what we already knew; nothing really new
was "discovered".
Theologian Thomas Torrance cautions us that such logic
is only a "paper logic"; it may clari-fy our order o-f speech,
but we must be care-ful in making assumptions about how well
the -formal rules o-f language represent the -formal behavior
o-f the reality it represents. We will shortly consider the
possible "disconnectedness" o-f reality and logic.*"*
The -form o-f inductive argument. Let us now consider how
the -formal principles o-f symbolic manipulation work in the
process o-f INDUCTION, which Aristotle de-fined as the
exhaustive enumeration o-f possibilities.
Again, we begin by considering an illustration. Suppose
we make the observation that a certain swan is white. Then
we notice that another swan is white. A-fter a while we note
that every swan we have ever seen in past experience is
white. We then begin to investigate the matter in a
controlled way, and continue to -find that every swan we
encounter is white. A-fter some time we decide that we have
*'*Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science. (London:
Ox-ford University Press, 1969), 219.
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collected a "�u-f -f icient enumeration without exception" , * =
and conclude that "all swans are white".
This conclusion was reached -Following a di-f-Ferent kind
o-F logic, thought it is also a -Formal procedure, hence it is
a sort o-F -Formal logic. Each proposition ("this swan is
white") can be written as a numerator over a denominator,
like the above propositions about dogs and mammals. Each
proposition is lined up, side�by�side, in what appears to be
an unending series of identical terms (like a mathematical
series). Then a question is asked by placing the term "all
swans" over a question mark for the denominator; the person
is asked "Mhat goes in the blank?" Its appearance is as
fol lows:
Swan one Swan two Swan three Al 1 swans
is white is white is white ?
A similar formal arrangement is often used in the
intelligence testing of students (what is the next term in
the series?). Many people will answer "white; the next
swan, or all swans, will be white". This conclusion is
based purely upon the form of the information he has
available, and the assumption that its numerous repetitions
indicates something necessary about that form, in reality.
Inductive logic and new knowledge. The inductive method
for gaining accurate information about reality was first
codified by Francis Bacon, and later became the basis of
what is now called "the scientific method", and thus one of
our most powerful methods for gaining generalized
information about reality.
Me can, however, raise the same kinds of questions here
which we raised for deductive formal logic: is there some
necessary relationship between the form of our argument and
the true form of reality?
'^'McCall, xxiv.
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strengths and weaknesses o-f �formal logic. Formal logic
has some powerful advantages. If the premises (major and
minor) of formal deductive arguments are known to be true,
and nature has a "connectedness" which matches that of our
statements about it (see, however, the caveat below), then
formal logical procedures assure us that the conclusion will
be necessarily true. It can thus lead us to information
about reality which we had not "seen" before, provided only
that our starting point is known to be true. And if a
sufficient number of instances of similar data about
anything in nature are collected, as in the scientific
process of repeatedly observing and testing, we may be able
to derive some very useful and powerful general principles
of nature, based solely upon the form of our analysis of the
data collected.
But formal logic also has some disadvantages, some of
which are quite serious. The foremost disadvantage for
DEDUCTION is that there are very few "absolutely certain"
starting judgments to serve as premises. As we earlier
quoted Mortimer Adler to say, the number of absolutely
certain propositions is limited to a very few "self-evident"
truths. Therefore, we cannot use true deduction as a
guarantor of truth in many situations. A second disadvantage
o-f formal deductive logic inheres in the questionable
relation between the structure of our verbal manipulation
and the structure of reality, as we will shortly discuss in
more detai 1 .
The primary disadvantage of formal logic for INDUCTION
is that there are no "formal rules" for it. In spite of the
fact that we all "jump to conclusions" based upon a large
number of repeated instances of observed form, Hume showed
in a devastating critique that it is impossible to
successfully demonstrate the necessary relationship between
a few instances and a more general principle. One may always
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encounter a "black swan", and thus destroy the validity o-f
the inductive conclusion. Thus the "scientific method of
discovery" provides no inherent reasons for its
generalizations from an incomplete enumeration.*^ In the
words of philosopher of science, Carl Hemple, any such leap
from data to generality requires the use of creative
imagination.*^ And even then, one can actually make
conclusions only with some degree of probability. Scientific
knowledge may thus be quite powerful and useful, but it
still clearly belongs in the arena of "probable" or
"provisional" knowledge and not "strong knowledge".
Material Logic
The modifier "material" signifies that this is a logic
which seeks to apprehend valid or correct knowledge about
that which actually exists. It is thus concerned with the
"matter" or "content" of our judgments and premises about
reality, i.e., with whether or not they are actually "true".
Thus, as it is described by McCall, material logic is
primarily concerned with epistemology.
Material logic also has the surface appearance of
simplicity and reliability, but it conceals some dangerous
fallacies; as we have already seen, both our senses and our
intuition can easily fool us into thinking that we "know"
something "true" about reality, when we really do not.
Examples of material logic. Mhen someone makes the
statement that this particular swan is white, he is using
his material logic, i.e., his natural, inborn ability to
recognize, and make a statement about, reality. In that
'^�McCall, xxiii..
*^Carl G. Hempel , Philosophv of Natural Science, one of
the "Foundations of Philosophy Series", ed. Elizabeth and
Monroe Beardsley (New Yorks Prentice Hall, 1966), 15.
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case, his material logic may be a simple matter o-f
observation or de-finition. I-f he were to make the
generalization that all swans are white, he would also be
making a statement o-f material logic, except in this case it
would have been derived inductively rather than by simple
observation or de-finition (and is more apt to be wrong). And
i-f he said that no triangle can have a diagonal, he would be
making another use o-f material logic, except this one would
be deductively (and intuitively) derived.
Methods -for material logic. Our techniques -for material
logic are not very well de-fined, which is why philosophy
must spend so much time with epi stemol ogi cal speculation. To
be able to make an absolutely true statement about reality,
as a basis -for any -further argument, is actually a quite
di-f-ficult (some would say impossible) thing to do. There are
nevertheless -five methods in general use -for exercising
one's material logic. These are as -follows.
1. Sense real ity. One technique of material logic
is to use the senses. We presume that we are able to "see",
"touch", "hear" or otherwise sense reality accurately, and
so we are prone to make statements about "what actually
exists" based upon our sense impressions. This is, of
course, subject to the limitations of distortion, illusion,
etc.
2. Definition. A second technique of material
logic is to use logical definition, which in turn relies
upon our capacity for Judgment. That is, we define one thing
in terms of other things we presume to know are true. In
short, we start with some Judgment we believe we "know" to
be true, and extend our knowledge by equating this thing
with other things, via the making of definitions. Thus, we
say that "a dog is an animal", which presumes that we know
what both dogs and animals truly are, and that we can
correctly discern that there is some sameness about them. Or
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alternately, we divide up the things we believe we "know"
into smaller parts (we "analyze" them). Thus, we may say
that "blue is one of the colors of the rainbow".
3. Inference from cause to effect. A third
technique of material logic is the argument from cause to
effect. We presume that every visible effect has a
"rational" cause and that, if we can sense the natural
effect, we may legitimately infer the existence of a natural
(though perhaps hidden) cause. Thus we come to believe that
we "know" that the cause "truly exists" because we infer its
existence from causes we "know truly exist".
4- Intuit the existence of some realitv. A fourth
technique of material logic is the use of intuition to infer
the presence of a reality which is not immediately present
to the senses. This may be similar to an inference from
effect to cause, only one in which the clues constituting
the effect are more tacit than explicit. We "feel" that
something is actually there, even though we cannot sense it
directly.
5. Ask an authority. A fifth technique of material
logic is to ask someone who we trust to reveal something
about an aspect of reality with which he is intimately
familiar. Thus we may approach an "expert" or an "authority"
for information verifying the factual existence and
characteristics of something within his legitimate area of
experti se.
Science, theology. and material logic. Science is a
more�or-less formalized procedure for using material logic
to investigate reality. While it relies somewhat on the
latter two of the above five methods, it relies most heavily
(some would argue, exclusively) upon first three: the
testimony of the senses, natural classification and
definition, and the inference of natural causes from natural
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B-f-fects. Theology is a more-or� less formalized procedure for
investigating material logic using the latter two of these
techniques. Mhile it also relies somewhat on sensory data,
classification and definition, and inference, it relies
quite strongly upon intuitive knowledge and the authority
and trustworthiness of God's revelation in scripture.
A legitimate question arises when, for example,
science attempts to investigate the reality of phenomena
(the material -logical aspects of its investigations) which
may have both material and spiritual dimensions; there is no
established reason to believe that sensory perception,
natural classification, and the inference of natural causes
are appropriate to those aspects of the phenomena which may
be extra-sensory, on a natural�supranatural continuum, or
(at least partially) the result of supranatural causes.
Whenever science restricts itself to sensory data, to
the exclusion of the intuitive, it has restricted its
activities those issues whose premises are completely
satisfied with a naturally-based material logic, and so
forfeits the claim to authoritative answers on those larger
issues which have a potentially supranatural component. Only
when science uses ALL the epi stemol ogi cal tools available to
material logic may its use of mathematico�deductive and
inductive discovery provide an authoritative warrant for
its conclusions.
Material logic and origins. Let us consider an example
of material logic as it might be used in a deductive
argument in the origins arena. Suppose someone argues as
follows: "There are natural causes for all changes in
species. Man is a species which has undergone demonstrable
changes. Therefore, man owes his origin to purely natural
causes." The middle term is a judgment which demonstrably
agrees with reality; we can see, and have seen, changes in
man, and so can agree that the middle premise is a true
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judgment. But what about the primary premise, that there are
natural causes -for all changes in species. Can we say that
this premise is unequivocally true?
It depends upon one's personal philosophy. I-f one is a
thorough�going naturalist, he considers only natural
"causes" to be "real" and so, by de-fault, no supranatural
causes could have been involved. But he has no hard evidence
that it must be so. He is relying upon his senses (he never
saw a supranatural agent cause change in a species) , upon
de-finition and judgment (by extension, all the changes he
can account -for in species appear identical to those he
knows to be natural in cause) , and upon inference from
effect to cause (he knows that certain natural causes result
in certain natural effects upon species) . He therefore
concludes that his premise is "true", and thus that his
deductive argument is sound.
He has ignored, however, other techniques of material
logic in developing his major premise: intuition and
revelation. This may be, perhaps, because he distrusts these
techniques. Nevertheless they may be the only ones which can
provide the truth about the origin of man (and equally, they
may not). The truth of his deductive argument thus depends
upon the truth of his major premise. Since the phenomenon
under argument (the origin of man) may have both natural and
supranatural dimensions, and he has excluded the
supranatural in his material logic, he can arrive only at a
natural conclusion. The issue here is thus one of material,
and not formal logic.
An example of material logic could also be cited for
some inductive argument, but the principle is the same. Each
term in the inductive argument represents a judgment whose
truth can only be determined by some technique of material
logic. If any term in the enumeration cannot be so
established, then any conclusion reached may lack material
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validity even though, -formally speaking, correct reasoning
was applied.
Fallacies of material logic. Just as formal logic may
be subject to fallacies, so can material logic. McCall notes
especially the material fallacies of arguing in a circle,
begging the question, or confusing antecedent with cause.
1- Circular argument. First of all, one can argue
in a circle. Creationists enjoy pointing out, for example,
the circular argument involved when an evolutionist argues
that a fossil is dated by the rock which encases it, and the
rock is dated by the fossil it contains; neither judgment
appeals to an independent source of material logic.
2. Begging the guest ion. Secondly, one can beg the
question. Instead of offering independent proof from
material logic, the arguer may simply state the conclusion
in another form, for example as an unfounded generalization.
If, for example, a creationist were to say that he opposes
evolution because it is a communist idea, he presumes the
listener will concede that communism is a bad thing, but
that may in fact be the issue at hand.
3. Confusion of cause and antecedent. Third, one
can confuse the antecedent of an effect with a cause for
that effect. For example, the fact that radiation occurred
before a mutation does not mean necessarily that it caused
it; by the same token, the fact that a certain change
occurred in political power at a time when God was active in
human history (e.g., during the Roman occupation of Israel
in the time of Jesus) does not mean necessarily that He
caused that particular change.
*�McCall, xxii
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LOGIC AND THE QUESTION OF CONNECTEDNESS
As I began to study the three types o-f logic, and their
relationship to reality, I began to realize that there are
issues o-f connectedness and disconnectedness whose
resolution can help us immensely in understanding not only
the use of logic, but also its strengths and weaknesses.
These issues address the CONNECTEDNESS of the logical types,
their INTERCONNECTEDNESS with regard to logical direction,
and their possible DISCONNECTEDNESS to reality.
The Connectedness of Logical Types
I had to wrestle quite a while with the relationship of
logical types to the two channels of knowledge and
understanding before I realized how they were connected and
interconnected. I finally produced a resolution which
appears to me to be quite fruitful. It is presented, in
Figure 3.2, in graphical form. This graphical approach is
entirely of my own formulation and, so far as I know, it has
not been addressed in quite the same way in any other work
on the subject of logic and reality. I therefore advance it
as provisional and untested.
Logic as two sets of coordinate axes. In this figure, I
have represented logic as a set of two orthogonal (x , y, z)
coordinate systems for reasoning, within and between the
domains of the general (on the left) and the specific (on
the right). One set of (horizontal) axes, labeled D,
indicates the direction of the reasoning, with INDUCTIVE
reasoning proceeding from the domain of the specifics on the
right toward the domain of the general on the left; and with
DEDUCTIVE reasoning proceeding in the opposite direction,
i.e., from general on the left toward specific on the right.
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REALITY
(INHERENT RATIONALITY)
DOMAIN OF
THE GENERAL
DOMAIN OF
THE SPECIFICS
M= MATERIAL LOGIC. SEEKS FIDELITY
WITH EXTERNAL REALITY.
F= FORMAL LOGIC. SEEKS INTERNAL
CONSISTENCY AND FORMAL RELATION.
D= DIRECTIONAL LOGIC. MOVES FROM
GENERAL- TO -SPECIFIC (DEDUCTION) OR
SPECIFIC -TO-GENERAL (INDUCTION)
FIGURE 3.2 LOGIC as a set of
ORTHOGONAL COORDINATE SYSTEMS.
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The second set o-f (vertical) axes in each orthogonal
set, labeled M, points upward, indicating the use o-f
MATERIAL logic within each channel to check the
correspondence o-f each step in the logical process against
reality. And the third set o-f axes, labeled F, is
perpendicular to the other two and points inward; it
indicates the use of FORMAL logical processes to construct
the chain of reasoning within each domain.
Properties of the logical coordinates. This set of
logical coordinate systems indicates certain properties
which I believe to be representative of logic the way we
actually use it. First of all, it makes clear that we may
use ALL the logical types WITHIN EITHER channel. For
example, we can use material logic in either a sensory or
intuitive mode; formal logic of either an inductive or
deductive type; and directional logic from either channel
toward the other. We must therefore be careful to remember
that there are TWO types of formal logic and TWO types of
material logic, and that the one being applied depends upon
which channel of knowledge and understanding we are using.
Secondly, it indicates that there is BOTH connectedness
AND disconnectedness in logical type. Within each channel of
knowledge and understanding, the logical types are
connected. Since, however, there is a set of logical axes
within BOTH channels, there is also a measure of
disconnectedness; the logic of each channel s coordinate
system is radically different from the other (e.g.,
inductive and deductive logic are both of the directional
type, but are radically different from each other).
There is therefore the opportunity for EITHER unity OR
dualism between logical types, depending upon the extent to
which the knowing self chooses to use the logic of the two
channels together, or keep them separate.
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The Possible Disconnectedness Between Realitv and Looic
In a previous example, I used some deductive logic to
investigate the connection between dogs, mammals, and
animals in general. Recall, now, that this example also
illustrated an important but hidden assumption which we will
do well to challenge: logic presumes that an analysis o-f the
connectedness o-f our words and concepts about reality can
reveal to us something true about a corresponding connection
within the reality we discuss. That is, i-f our logic tells
us that a dog is an animal, or a mammal, then we presume
that those judgments actually re-flect a -factual
characteristic of dogs, mammals, and animals as they truly
exist in reality.
The truth of this presumption has been subject to
searching criticism by contemporary philosophers of language
and logic. By what provable principle, they ask, can I be
certain that the "terms" of reality follow the same
"manipulative logic" as the terms of my statements about
reality? The reader may refer to Figure 3.3 for a graphic
aid in understanding the following discussion of that issue.
The disconnectedness in phvsics and theol oqv. Many
Philosophers of Science now question the validity of this
presumption, largely because of the many perplexing results
of theory and experiment in the disciplines of particle
physics and quantum mechanics. Logically, for example, it is
not possible for an elementary quantum to be both a particle
and a wave at one and the same time; yet experience
indicates that, in the real arena of the sub-atomic
universe, that paradoxical situation is exactly what
happens. Even stranger paradoxes exist, such as the
"Schrodinger 's cat thought experiment" which indicate an
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BETWEEN THE COHERENCE OF REALITY AND
OUR STATEMENTS ABOUT REALITY.
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even more bizarre disconnectedness between the terms of our
logic and the terms of the reality our logic addresses.
Me can easily find similar examples in the field of
theology. For example, it does not seem to human minds for
it to be logically possible for God to be both infinitely
loving and also capable of consigning people to eternal
hellfire, for love seems logically to exclude such
"harshness"; yet theologians are convinced that, indeed,
such "paradoxical" attributes are characteristic of God.
Do conceptual judgments and realitv coincide? the
problem is that each of the judgments in our material logic
is only an approximation of truth, based upon our limited
understanding of reality. For us, something cannot be, at
once, both particle and wave, or loving and judgmental,
without logical contradiction. The contradiction, however,
occurs only because each judgment is defined using words and
concepts of QUR QMN CONSTRUCTION, and that construction may
or may not accurately reflect reality. Thus, when we
manipulate such inaccurate terms and concepts rationally, we
reach conclusions that are an equally inaccurate reflection
of reality. As logician Herbert Searles puts it, the
relation between reality and our statements about reality is
an abstract thing.
Theologian Thomas Torrance has a great deal to say
about this matter, especially about how our formal -logical
statements about God don't necessarily reflect the true,
internal logic of God. The character of God is defined, not
by our understanding of Him, but by the interconnected,
material content of His own, interior nature. Our statements
about God (Torrance calls them EXISTENCE STATEMENTS) are
* ''Searles, 13.
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merely an interconnection between our own 1 ogi co�verbal
patterns o-f symbols <words) , and these represent our limited
understanding o-f God. They are, however, ontological ly
detached -from their referent, God, Who truly exists. The
true "logic of God" therefore inheres within His own, true
character and nature, as it really exists (which we could
state in a COHERENCE STATEMENT if we knew enough), not in
our statements about Him. The closest we can come to
statements about God which are both true and exhaustive is
to use analogical language, the language of model s.^*^
Is truth about God reasonable? One profound truth comes
out of this sort of analysis of logic, language, and
reality, which is perhaps more important than anything else
we may say: it is a logical error of the first magnitude to
say that something is not true about God (e.g., that he
created man, or the universe, by fiat) because it is "not
logical" or that it is "unreasonable". The inner logic and
rationality of God ("Reason", in Hegel's term) is true in
its own right, whether or not we choose to like or accept
it, and it matters not one whit whether we are capable of
reaching a clear understanding of it by use of our own,
fallen reason.
There is no connection of logical necessity between
truth and our logical understanding of that truth. Reason is
a necessary but not sufficient condition for a true and
exhaustive knowledge of reality.
The Division of Logical Directions
Each channel of the understanding appears to be
specialized for logic and reasoning in a particular mode and
direction: deductive reasoning or logic goes with sensory
'Torrance, 218-220.
110
perception in the le-ft channel , and inductive reasoning or
logic goes with intuitive perception in the right channel.
There are, of course, important cross-connections, too.
For example, the many speci-fics in the intuitive channel may
have been gained by either sensory or intuitive cognition,
and the general judgments upon which deduction operates may
have been generated by the intuitive channel or perceived
by the sensory channel. But the existence o-f such cross
connections must not blind us to the -fact that deductive
logic and reasoning appear to be correlated with the sensory
channel, and inductive logic and reasoning appear to be
correlated with the intuitive channel. There is there-fore a
basis -for the existence o-f either dualism or unity between
logical processes depending upon the choice o-f a primary
channel o-f knowing and understanding by the knowing sel-f.
CONCLUSIONS
Me have seen that the human mind contains two channels
of understanding which correspond with the sensory and
intuitive channels of knowing. Me saw also that the knowing
self stands astride these two channels and is able to choose
to use either or both.
Me saw that the left channel of the understanding uses
its powers of sensory cognition and conception to form
verbal and numerical concepts of reality, after filtering
its view through the self's sensory presuppositions, and
then to form them into simple judgments and premises; and
the power to manipulate them, by deductive reasoning, to
reach conclusions about reality. And we saw that the right
channel of the understanding uses its powers of intuitive
cognition and conception to form visual or pictorial
concepts of reality, after filtering its view through the
self's intuitive world view, and then to form them into
simple judgments and premises; and the power to manipulate
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them, by inductive reasoning, to reach conclusions about
real ity .
We saw that the knowing sel-F, which stand between these
two channels of the understanding, uses the two channels to
reflect and contemplate upon the conceptual information
which circulates within and between them, and then reaches a
complex judgment and an assessment of its degree of
certainty, and acts upon that judgment accordingly. We saw
also that, depending upon the extent to which he chooses to
appropriate and harmonize the powers of both channels, he
can understand reality with greater or lesser clarity.
We saw that we have the power to learn truth about
reality because we can form mental concepts about that
reality, and then manipulate these concepts in powerful ways
with two radically different kinds of formal logic
(inductive and deductive) , material logic (sensory and
intuitive), and directional logic (deductive and inductive).
To the extent that our concepts and logic reflect the
character of reality, this power to manipulate concepts may
reveal aspects of reality to us which were previously
hidden. Our two channels of understanding can therefore give
us real and powerful knowledge about reality.
We also saw, however, that there are levels and
dimensions of reality for which we must ask searching
questions about the extent to which the conceptual terms of
a fallen and easily deluded reason can accurately reflect
reality, and the extent to which the terms of reality follow
the same manipulative rules as the conceptual terms we
invent to represent it, and think logically about it. We saw
for example that, at the sub-atomic level of nature, and at
the conceptual level of theology, reality does not always
act in ways which appear to us to be "reasonable" or
"logical", and why we therefore need to make every effort to
understand with our whole mind if we are to be able to
1 12
intellectually cope with the greater mysteries of God and
the universe.
It now becomes important to see how these two channels
o-f logic, reason, and understanding correlate with the way
in which the human brain -functions. That is the subject o-f
the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
THE SPLIT IN OUR BRAIN FUNCTION
In the previous chapter, we saw how human thought,
reason, and understanding operate in two distinct channels,
and how each personal sel-f can use them in either a
dichotomous or uni-fied manner. I now turn the reader's
attention to the striking parallels between the -functions o-f
these two channels o-f human understanding and the two modes
o-f processing employed by the le-ft and right hemispheres o-f
the human brain. To be more speci-fic, I hypothesize that the
epi stemol ogi cal split in our minds corresponds quite closely
with the physiological split in our brains.
I will begin to build the case -for this view by
describing the manner in which recent research has
demonstrated radically di-f-ferent -functions -for the le-ft and
right hemispheres o-f the brain (our brain -function is
divided). 1 will then discuss the -finding that one
hemisphere in each individual tends to dominate over the
other (we are biased in choosing which side o-f the split to
use). And -finally, I will argue that this biological split
and bias in brain -function corresponds with (or predisposes
us toward) the epi stemol ogi cal split and bias we experience
between our sensory-rational and intuitive-rational modes o-f
knowing and understanding; and that each human self can use
his brain hemispheres in either a dichotomous or unified
manner .
BASIC BRAIN ANATOMY AND FUNCTION
Because the human brain is a system of extraordinary
complexity, the focus of this section will be limited to
those gross anatomical and functional differentiations which
may be relevant to the issue at hand. No attempt will be
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made to detail the neural anatomy and physiology o-f the
brain.
The following discussion begins with a gross anatomical
orientation, presenting the brain as an organ anatomically
divided along three directions or axes. Following that, the
focus will narrow to the major anatomical and functional
differences on the left and right of one axis.
The Three Coordinates of Brain Division
Figure 4.1 shows the basic structure of the human brain
in relation to a set of three coordinate axes. Following is
a brief description of the major anatomical divisions along
each axis.
The vertical coordinate. Along a vertical axis through
the head, the functional organization of the brain is
generally classified into three or four major sections: the
brainstem and cerebellum at the lowest end (sometimes
collectively called the hindbrain) , the limbic system in the
middle, and the forebrain at the top.
The BRAIN STEM sits just atop the spinal cord, and
adjoins the cerebellum. One major component of the brain
stem is the reticular formation, a net like structure of
neurons which regulates our state of sleep or wakefulness,
and appears also to alert the cerebral cortex that
information is arriving from the thalamus. A second major
component is the locus of the vestibular nuclei, neural
relay stations where postural and motion stimuli are
coordinated for the sense of balance. The CEREBELLUM, which
adjoins the brain stem, is also involved in posture and
muscular movement, as well as stored "memories" of learned
and patterned responses to our body's movement through
space. Thus, the hindbrain and midbrain are more concerned
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THE BRAIN re A 3-D COORDINATE SYSTEM.
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with our general level o-f alertness and movement, and not
with any primarily intellectual -functions.*
The LIMBIC SYSTEM consists o-f a number o-f organic
structures just above the brain stem (e.g., the
hypothalamus, hippcampus, and pituitary) which are involved
primarily in homeostasis, i.e., the maintenance o-f a
regulated internal environment -for the body (temperature,
blood pressure, etc.). It is also strongly involved in
certain emotional reactions having survival value -for our
body. For example, it regulates the sense of smell, sexual
desire, sel-f protection, hunger, -fear, and thirst. =
The FOREBRAIN is the major, and intellectually more
important portion o-f the brain, and consists o-f the thalamus
at the center, the two hemispheres o-f the cerebrum, and the
corpus call osum which connects the two. The THALAMUS is the
primary receiver and coordinating center -for all the sensory
in-formation coming into the brain; here, all sensory
in-formation is received, classi-fied by receptor areas
specialized -for each kind o-f sensory in-formation, and
relayed to the appropriate portions o-f the cerebral cortex.
The CORTEX is the outer "bark" o-f the cerebral hemispheres
and is the seat o-f all our intellectual activities
(production and understanding o-f speech, hearing, and sight;
organization o-f our view o-f the world; the storing o-f
memories, and the making of decisions).^ The cortex has
long been seen as a direct outgrowth of the thalamus, and
there are direct connections between the thalamus and every
*Robert Ornstein and Richard F- Thompson, The Amazing
Brain (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1984), 25-27-
^Ornstein and Thompson, 28.
^Ornstein and Thompson, 31-40.
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portion of the cortex.^ The CORPUS CALLOSUM, a cable of some
300 million neuron fibers, is the primary "trunk line"
connecting the two cerebral hemispheres, and is larger in
women than in men, especially in the rear of the brain where
information about movement and visual space is transferred ,=
a recent finding attributed to Columbia's Ralph L. Holloway
and The University of Texas's Christine de Lacoste-
Utamsing. ^
In summary, we may say that the lower�or-innermost
portions of the brain regulate the body's posture, movement,
and state of alertness; the middle portions regulate the
body's internal environment and the emotions important to
survival; and the higher-or�outermost portions control the
classification of sensory information, the intellectual
functions, and communication between the cerebral
hemi spheres.
The lateral (hemisphere) coordinate. The cerebrum of
the forebrain is divided, left-to-right, into hemispheres,
and each hemisphere is further divided, front-to-back, into
lobes. We will discuss the left-right (lateral) division
here, and the finer division into lobes following that.
In the simplest terms, it has been found that the left
hemisphere of the human brain is the primary locus of
1 i near�sensory�sequent i al�deducti ve thought processes and
the right hemisphere is the primary locus of holistic-
intuitive-inductive-pattern-recognizing thought processes.
^Arthur C. Guyton , Textbook of Medical Phvsioloqv.
Third Edition (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1969),
849f -
^Ornstein and Thompson, 34, 171.
^News brief. Science 82, September 1982, 14.
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There seem to be sexual as well as cultural, i-f not
racial di -f-ferences , in hemispheric utilization. We are only
in the initial stages o-f investigating such di -f-f erences,
though some interesting preliminary results have been
reported. For example, some Japanese researchers have
proposed that hemispherical specialization is driven by the
nature o-f the language one learns. Sibatini claims, -for
example, that the nature o-f the Japanese language causes the
Japanese brain to develop its neurophysiological pathways so
as to process all speech vowels and music in the left
hemisphere, whereas Westerners process speech vowels and
music in the right hemisphere. Moreover, it is claimed that,
while Western brains "partition" logical and emotional
activity into left and right hemispheres, the logical and
emotional activity of Japanese brains are in the same
hemisphere. Such neural differentiations may account for
many of the characteristics of the "Eastern mind".^
In the later discussion of left and right hemisphere
functions, therefore, we must be cautious for two reasons.
First of all, most of our data were collected during
scientific investigation of Western brain function, and we
do not know that it is typical of other cultures. Secondly,
the data on which our understanding of brain function is
based were often available only because the hemispheres were
cut apart by a radical surgical technique, or because one
hemisphere had been seriously damaged, for example by a
tumor or gunshot wound. As theologian Thomas Torrance
reminds us, we make progress in science only by violating
nature and observing its response to the violation; the
extent to which this informs us about the normal functions
of nature remains open to debate.
^Atuhiro Sibatani , "The Japanese Brain", Science 80,
December 1980, 24-27.
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The anterior�posterior (lobe) coordinate. The human
brain is divided in a "fore-and-a-f t " direction into lobes,
each hemisphere being divided into -four lobes. At the -front
are the two -frontal lobes. At the top o-f the brain are the
two large parietal lobes. At the rear are the two occipital
lobes. And on the sides are the two temporal lobes. Modern
brain research is detailing certain areas o-f each lobe which
appear to correlate with certain brain -functions; these will
be discussed in a -following sub-section.
Whether or not each lobe is specialized -for only
certain particular -functions remains an open question. Some
-functions appear to be localized in only one lobe, or one
part o-f a lobe, while the evidence for localization of other
functions is more nebulous. One example relates to our
memory; there is some evidence that our memories are stored
primarily in the limbic structures called the hippocampus
and amygdala, while other evidence suggests that different
kinds of memory (for skills and for facts) and memories of
different aspects of the same concepts may be distributed
widely throughout the brain. See, for example, recent
information by Alper^ and Squire**. It is nevertheless
interesting to speculate on the possibility that each of the
4 sets of brain lobes may be correlated in some way with
four distinct kinds of personal attributes, for example, the
four major sets of "polar" personality attributes measured
in the Myers-Briggs Personality Inventory.
^Joseph Alper, "Our Dual Memory", Science 86.
July/August, 1986, 44-49.
''Larry R. Squire, "Mechanisms of Memory", Science.
Volume 232, June 27, 1986, 1612-1619.
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A Focus on the Two Brain Hemispheres
While it is interesting to speculate upon the
di-f -ferences in brain function between the individual lobes,
we have more information on the col 1ecti ve� lobe functioning
of the two primary hemispheres. Therefore, while individual
lobe functions will be mentioned where appropriate, the
primary distinctions in this chapter, and in the rest of the
study, will be upon right-and-left hemispheric functions.
Figure 4.2 following is a highly summarized listing of
the functions and concerns of the left and right hemispheres
of the brain; it is a convenient summary of the functions to
be addressed in this chapter. Unless otherwise indicated,
this information has been taken from the physiological and
psychological investigations of Sperry and others, and also
a variety of other sources, many of whom provide
interpretations of Sperry 's work, or who report left-right
brain testing results, particularly Ornstein and Thompson , *'=�
**^Ornstein and Thompson, 151-163.
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Le-ft Hemisphere Right Hemisphere
Sense Per cept i on
Thinking as Way o-f Deciding
Analysis into Details
Letters, Sounds, Mords
Musical Notes
Numbers
Units of Time
Visual Dots or Points
Organize Into Clusters
Facts
Judgements
Definitions
Proposi ti ons
Laws or Rules
Impersonal Principles
Musical Chords
Algebraic Combinations
Temporal Functions
Logical Manipulation
Sentence Structure
Algebraic Equations
Deductive Argument
Infer Cause to Effect
Predict Trend Outcome
Plan Future Action
Complex Judgement
Reaching Closure
Emoti ons
Positive Emotions
Control Over Emotions
Intuitive Perception
Feeling as May of Deciding
Intuit Aspects of Reality
Being, Existence, Becoming
Line, Color, Texture, Mass
Timeless vs Changing
Simultaneous vs Sequential
Personal Character, Agency
Personal Values, Feelings
Logic, Interpreting Meaning
Discern real Existence
Mean ing of Ex i stence
Discern Change, Becoming
Interpr. Person. Character
Interpr. Pers. Feelings
Discern Personal Agency
Discern Personal Motives
Interp. Complex Language
Create and Synthesize
Imagine Objects in Space
Create Objects in Space
Interact with Persons
Creatively Pursue Purpose
Express Self in Art, Music
Inductive Logic
Pattern Recognition
Interp. Complex Situation
Solve Geometric Problems
Open-Ended Problems
Emotions
Negative Emotions
Expression of Emotion
Figure 4.2. Primary Functions of the Left and Right
Hemispheres of the Human Brain.
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Geschwind, * � Hampden-Turner , Rico,*=� Edwards,** Wond
and Donovan, *= and Guyton.***
It will be well -for the reader to note the many
correspondences between the hemispheric brain -functions
described, and the components of the understanding
previously discussed. In order to highlight these
correspondences, the functions of each hemisphere will be
described in outline form in terms of (1) its sensory
perception, <2) its "thinking", including its formation of
concepts, organization of concepts, and logical manipulation
of concepts, and <3) its "emotions".
LEFT HEMISPHERE FUNCTIONS
The left hemisphere of the brain is considered to be
the seat of our sensory, verbal -numerical , linear,
analytical, sequential, deductive thinking processes.
**Norman Geschwind, Scientific American 241, no. 3
(September 1979) : 180-199.
* ^Charles Hampden-Turner, Maps of the Mind; Charts and
Concepts of the Mind and its Labyrinths. (New York: Collier
Books, Division of Macmillan Publishing, 1981), 86-89, 108-
111.
*^Gabriele Lusser Rico, Writing the Natural Way: Using
Right-Brain Technigues to Release Your Expressive Powers.
(Boston: J. P. Tarcher , Distributed by Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1983) , 63-87.
*^Betty Edwards, Drawing on the Right Side of the
Brain: A Course in Enhancing Creativity and Artistic
Confidence, (Boston: J. B. Tarcher, Distributed by Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1979), 26-43.
*^Jacquelyn Wonder and Priscilla Donovan, Whole-Brain
Thinking: Working from Both Sides of the Brain to Achieve
Peak Job Performance, (New York: William Morrow and Company,
1984) , 15-30.
**Guyton, 849f .
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Following is a review o-f its functions related to our
perception, thought, and emotions.
Sense Perception in the Left Hemisphere
Cognition via the left hemisphere of the brain appears
to rely primarily upon sensory means of perception. It is
thus able to perceive only those aspects of reality which
are sensible. Similarly, because it "sees" only the sensory
portions of reality, it is inclined toward a dominant bias
which seeks to "impose" a sensory criterion upon reality,
that is, to assume that everything in reality is sensible
and must therefore be reduced to sensible terms which it can
mani pul ate.
The perceptual means employed by the left hemisphere
include sight, sound, touch, taste, and smell. It also
utilizes a strong sense of time, and perhaps motion <from
the vestibular motion sensors). The sense of sound and time
open up the left hemisphere to the amplitude, frequency, and
temporal variations of spoken communication as well as
music. The visual sense opens up the left hemisphere to the
"observation" of material reality, and to written symbols of
audible speech. These sensory capabilities also open up, for
cognition, those aspects of reality which are exhibited as
law-abiding and therefore predictable natural behavior.
Thinking as a Way of Deciding
By the term "thinking", I mean here thinking in the
left hemisphere sense, which Jung calls simply "thinking"
and which de Bono calls "vertical thinking".*^
More specifically, I am using the term "thinking" to
mean the left hemisphere's capability for creating,
* ^Hampden-Turner , 89, 108.
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organizing, and manipulating conceptual representations o-f
the sensible portions o-f reality. In short, the left
hemisphere appears to be consumed with a drive to break
sensible reality down into small, "digital" concepts,
organize those concepts into structured packages or
clusters, and then manipulate these clusters so as to
assemble chains of information.
Analysis into detailed. digital concepts. The left
hemisphere appears to work with reality only by analyzing it
into small details.
Analysis is the process whereby sensible reality is
conceptually divided or broken up, in Aristotelian fashion,
into small, discrete, clearly definable constituents. Each
resulting detail is an individual dimensionless or one-
dimensional unit, what I choose here to call a "digital
concept". Such concepts include the following:
a. Spoken or written letters, sounds. or words.
The left hemisphere is concerned with the basic building
blocks of language. It is known that the left hemisphere is
particularly concerned with individual letters and words in
a written work, and is therefore concerned with examining
the spelling and grammar of existing information in order to
detect and correct errors.
Those who have strong left hemispheric functions are
known to be highly verbal. They generally have good verbal
skills, and are comfortable in relating information to
others, either by public speaking or writing. Moreover, they
appear to prefer to come by their information by means of
precise verbal description rather than the more visual
charts, graphs, maps, or pictures.
b. Musical notes. The left hemisphere concerns
itself with individual musical notes, but not with complete
songs or melodies.
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c. Numbers. The left hemisphere concerns itsel-f
with individual numbers, but not with entire numerical
patterns.
^- Units o-f time (seconds, minutes, etc.). The
le-ft hemisphere is much concerned with the whole concept o-f
time, and is aware o-f it at the most fundamental, unit
level. It can count and pace seconds as time passes.
e- Visual dots or points (pixels). The neural
connections from the eyes to the brain are split in an
unusual way: the left visual field of each eye is connected
to the left hemisphere, and the right visual field of each
eye to the right hemisphere. It appears, however, that very
little of the actual processing of visual information occurs
in the left hemisphere.
The sense of vision appears to divide an image down
into individual dots or points (pixels, in computer display
jargon) , and the left hemisphere processes these only. It
does not process whole lines, contours, or areas, such as
one would find in a picture, photograph, map, chart, or
graph.
2. QroanizinQ digital concepts into structured
clusters. The left hemisphere solves problems via
organization. It seems to be si ngl e-mi ndedl y consumed by a
drive to organize its own detailed, digital concepts into
simple clusters, each joined by a unit hinge or connection.
Such connected clusters include the following:
a. Judgments. The basic method of clustering is
the making of a judgment, the mental act of joining two
things as equal or equivalent. The left hemisphere seems to
be particularly adept at the formation of simple judgments;
these are the basis of all its "logical" thinking.
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De-finitions. A concept is defined when, by a
process of judgment, one known thing is identified, by
denotation, with another. Thus "A dog is a four legged
mammal" is a simple definition, formed by the process of
judgment in which two things are clustered together as an
equal ity .
The left hemisphere was early classified as the
"language" or "linguistic" hemisphere. More recently it has
been the opinion that both hemispheres are involved in
language, but that each processes a different aspect.
According to this view, the left hemisphere is more
concerned with the mechanical details of words and language.
It is concerned, for example, only with individual words,
and only in their precise (narrow, literal) sense. One might
therefore make appreciable use of his left hemisphere in
reading strongly technical information.
c. Propositions. A proposition is similar to a
definition, except that the equality of the clustered terms
is offered for consideration rather than as an asserted
fact. Thus the statement that "a straight line is the
shortest distance between two points" joins the concepts of
line, straightness, shortness, and points in a way proposed
for consideration, but not necessarily as an asserted fact.
d. Facts. A fact is a judgment assumed to be true
(whether or not it actually is). Thus the statement that
"this man is sane" equates, by clustering, the concepts of a
particular man and sanity, but also does so in a way which
asserts that the proposition is true.
The left hemisphere seems to be preoccupied with
individual, detailed "facts", and not in interpreting their
pattern or meaning. It wants to consider the world only from
the viewpoint of simple clusters of sensory information
which it accepts as true.
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e. Laws or rules. A law or rule is a shorthand way
o-f clustering together two things which "ought" to be
equated, or which are customarily equated. Thus the rule
that "Thou shall not steal" connects the concept o-f "you"
with the concept o-f stealing by a concept o-f "oughtness";
and the rule that "the acceleration o-f gravity is a
constant" expresses the customary relationship observed in
nature between the concept o-f gravity and the concept o-f a
constant number (whether there is any necessity in this
custom has recently been questioned).
The le-ft hemisphere appears to place great emphasis on
the need -for laws and rules, both in nature and in society.
It wants to order nature into natural laws, and societies
into legally regulated systems. This tendency may also be
related to the le-ft hemisphere's perceived need -for order
and stability. A strongly "le-f t-brained" person likes for
there to be rules, and likes for everyone else to follow
them, whether he is at work or in recreation. He may
therefore also like to play competitive games where the
score is kept.
f. Impersonal principles. Many of the "rules" or
"laws" to which the left hemisphere is attracted include
what we call "principles", i.e., laws, rules, or truths
which are considered to be fundamental descriptors of
impersonal nature. For the left hemisphere to be interested
in such principles, they must be impersonal.
Personal considerations do not seem to be of interest
to the left hemisphere, perhaps because they partake too
much of the un-sensible aspects of reality (the noumenal or
spiritual) and because they are not completely lawful,
orderly, and predictable. Whenever the left hemisphere finds
that it must deal with the personal, it may therefore have a
tendency to proclaim it lawful, orderly, and predictable (as
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is done in much o-f psychology or sociology) and to ignore or
at least minimize the noumenal aspects o-f human or divine
reality <as may be done by those o-f a positivist
persuasion) .
g. Musical chords. The striking o-f a musical chord
couples the concept o-f one tone with the concept o-f another
tone according to a -fixed rule o-f tonal interval. It may
thus be considered to be a kind o-f "judgment" about the
aesthetic desirability o-f a certain -form o-f "clustering".
Trained musicians do not use the artistic right
hemisphere to tell if two musical sequences are the same.
They use, instead, the analytical left hemisphere, comparing
progressions of the sequences by mentally plugging the notes
into a musical staff.
h. Algebraic combinations. When one is using
mathematical symbols (e.g., X and Y) instead of words, the
left hemisphere still strives to relate them together. For
example, the left hemisphere creates simple equalities (X*Y)
and fractional quantities (X/Y).
i. Temporal functions. The left hemisphere also
attempts to simply relate digital aspects of sensory reality
to time. For example, it attempts to mathematically define
Y=f(x), i.e., to relate one concept to the concept of time.
It is known that the left hemisphere is particularly
time-conscious. People who are strongly "left-brained"
appear to be especially conscious of the passage of time, of
the press of meeting schedules and deadlines, and of the
wasting of time when an activity does not seem "productive".
j. The formal nature of left-hemisphere clusters.
It ought to be emphasized that the left hemisphere is
*�"Hemi spheres for Handel," Science 82. Jan/Feb 1982:7.
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concerned only with the FORMAL STRUCTURE o-f such clustered
concepts, and not with their material logic. It easily joins
the concept o-f "mass" with the concept o-f "weight" to -form
the proposition (or -fact, or judgment) that "mass has
weight", but it has no way o-f veri-fying that the resulting
cluster is "true".
3. Logical manipulation o-f conceptual clusters.
Finally, the le-ft hemisphere completes its "thinking"
activity by manipulating the concepts, and clusters o-f
concepts, in a "logical" (purely deductive) manner. In so
doing, it is recombining its concepts o-f reality, -following
strict rules of order and sequence, in order to relate, or
arrive at "new information". Some of the operations
characteristic of the left hemisphere include the following:
a. Logical structure of sentences. In the English
language, each sentence is constructed according to a
"logical" structure. We call this structure "syntax", a way
of indicating the relationship between words by their
logical or sequential arrangement within the sentence,
thereby conveying information. Thus, the simplest sentence
constructions begin with a subject who acts, proceed to a
verb to describe the action, and conclude with an object
which is acted upon. Because the left hemisphere works with
logical, orderly, sequential structures, it is this
hemisphere which is responsible for the syntax of a
sentence.
b. The algebraic eouation. The left hemisphere
provides the mental manipulations required to combine
several "algebraic combinations", as described above, so
as
to produce "new information". That is, the combination
X/Y
is folded together with the combination Y/Z (by
multiplication) to produce the result X/Z. The process
is a
FORMAL one, that is, the answer is derived merely by
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manipulating the FORM o-f the terms; the common numerator and
denominator are merely "canceled".
The syllogistic (deductive) argument. The left
hemisphere can manipulate verbal symbols in the same FORMAL
manner as numerical symbols. As illustrated in an earlier
chapter on logic and reason, the syllogism is merely an
algebraic form of argument in which the major premise (this
animal is a dog) is written as an algebraic expression
(X/Y) , as is the minor premise (this dog has four legs,
written as Y/Z) , so that the result (this animal has four
legs) falls out just like the algebraic combination X/Z
falls out of the algebraic manipulation.
d. Inferring from cause to effect. The left
hemisphere also tends to infer causes from a sort of reverse
deductive logic. For example, it is noticed that a window
was broken by a ball, and later it is noticed that a man
nearby threw a ball. Therefore, it is concluded, by
reasoning backwards, that the man's throwing of the ball was
the cause of the effect noticed, namely the broken window.
This kind of reasoning is subject to a major kind of
error, the identification of an antecedent condition with a
cause; it may well have been that some other person, or even
a mechanical device, hurled the ball which actually broke
the window. The man seen was assumed to be the culprit
because (in addition to other factors such as availability,
motive, etc.) the formal terms of our statements make such a
fine formal, syllogistic argument, to which the dominant
left hemisphere is naturally attracted.
Our statement about the man becomes our minor premise
(the man threw the ball), and this combines easily and
naturally with the form of our statement about the effect,
which becomes the conclusion (a thrown ball broke the
window). By inferring backwards through the syllogism, we
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arrive at the major premise that the man s throwing o-f the
ball was the cause o-f the broken window.
The le-ft hemisphere is thus a power-ful stimulus -for the
development o-f error in reasoning. Because it seeks to
partition all reality into simple, digital terms, and to
arrive at "new in-formation" by the purely formal
manipulation of clusters of these terms, it may fail to
concern itself with the material logic involved, i.e., with
the truth of the terms involved (though it is capable of
doing so) , and so makes logical errors by relying strongly
upon formal logic, with little regard for material logic.
e. Predicting outcomes of lawful trends. The left
hemisphere analyses and classifies reality into discrete
digital steps, and assumes that these steps are related to
each other through predictable laws and principles. The
logical inference from this assumption is that events occur
in reality, by cause and effect, in a logical chain of
events. The left hemisphere thus seems to operate under the
assumption that it can predict future events based upon past
events. Coupled with a desire to control future conditions,
this causes the left hemisphere to desire to make
predictions about future events.
f. Planning future actions. Given that left-
hemisphere reality is a continual chain of cause-and-ef fect ,
and that future events can be predicted based upon past
causes, and given its desire to control future events, the
left hemisphere desires to plan for future activities. It
does, in fact, appear to be the seat of planning in the
brain.
g. Complex decisions or judgments. The left
hemisphere is best adapted to reducing sensible reality to
digital terms, combining those terms into clusters, and
manipulating the clusters in formal ways to arrive at new
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in-formation. It does not always limit itself to the few
terms of a simple syllogism, however. It is able to assemble
a whole chain of syllogistic (algebraic) combinations into
what is generally termed a "chain of logic". Thus, for
example, from the fact that this animal is a dog, and that
this dog has four legs, and that all four legged animals
walk, and that all walking animals can climb, one can
conclude that this animal can climb.
Such a chain of logic is a more complex process for
deriving a conclusion or reaching a decision, but is
permitted by the left hemisphere's reliance upon, and
facility with, formal operations. Given its inattention to
material logic, however, and the fact that each combination
in the series represents another opportunity for faulty
material logic to enter, the left hemisphere's complex
judgment and decision making processes are notoriously weak
and unreliable for arriving at conclusions known to be true.
Mhen applied to the un-sensible aspects of reality, the
left hemisphere's reasoning can lead to grossly erroneous
conclusions. This is because it seeks so diligently to
reduce all of reality to that which is sensible and
reducible to symbols which can be manipulated by the means
of formal logic.
h. Reaching closure. Finally, it appears that the
left hemisphere likes to deal with situations which are
clear, unambiguous, and with which it is possible to come to
a clear and definite conclusion. Therefore, it seeks to
reach closure on all matters it has under consideration,
and is not inclined to take a risk on the basis of
incomplete information.
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The Emotions o-f the Le-ft Hemisphere
For some time it was assumed that the left hemisphere
was cold and emotionless and that all emotion was a
characteristic of the right hemisphere. The more recent view
is that the left hemisphere does, indeed, participate in
emotion (especially the "positive" emotions such as joy or
happiness), but at a more suppressed level. Apparently the
left hemisphere is capable of "feeling" emotion, but tries
to keep it under reins of control and does not allow it to
be expressed. Thus a person who is strongly influenced by
his left hemisphere may very well feel emotions about
certain things, but appear to keep them in check.
The Lobes of the Left Hemisphere
Some information is known about the specific areas
WITHIN the left hemisphere which are associated with certain
of its functions. These are as follows:
1. The left frontal lobe. In general, the pre-frontal
areas of the frontal lobes (anterior to the motor region)
are concerned with being able to concentrate and focus
attention, and with the evaluation of one s activities in
time (establishing future goals, planning for that future,
considering the consequences of an action, and delaying
action so that those consequences may be considered). It is
also concerned with one's morals, and with his judgment of
the appropriateness of certain activities in social
settings,*** and has rich connections with the limbic system,
so some "emotional" influence on decision making may occur
in the frontal lobes.
^�'Guyton, 854.
^�Ornstein and Thompson, 36.
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These seem to be the kinds of activities which occur at
the end of the process of understanding, where logical
manipulation occurs. How these activities are distributed
between the left and right hemispheres is not, however, now
well understood.
The one lobal difference that is known to exist relates
to language. The so-called "Broca's Area" is located in the
left frontal lobe. This is where speech is produced,
including its vocalization, grammar, word formation, and
inflection. =*
2. The left parietal lobe. In general, the parietal
lobes of the brain are involved in sensory-motor activity,
and the mental assembly of concepts into clusters.
The front parts of the parietal lobes are split by a
large fissure. On the front side of that fissure is the
motor cortex, with rich connections to the body's muscles;
this area of the brain controls the movement of different
parts of the body. On the rear side of that fissure is the
sensory cortex. This area of the brain receives neural
information from the sensory organ involved in touch, body
position, and body movement.
The parietal lobes are asymmetrical, the left lobe
having a shape different from that of the right lobe. The
left parietal lobe is wider in right-handed people than in
left-handed people, perhaps owing to the added need for
sensory-motor activity between the preferred hand and the
brain. It is also known that the left parietal lobe is
^*Geschwind, 180-199. See also Ornstein and Thompson,
153-154.
^^Ornstein and Thompson, 13, 37.
=^=^6eschwind, 180-199.
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"aware" o-f the right side o-f the body, and the right lobe o-f
the left side.
Somehow, the parietal lobes are also involved in our
ability to assemble conceptual representations o-f the world.
For example, the parietal lobe is involved in our assembly
o-f letters into words and words into thoughts. This sounds
very much like the "clustering" per-formed by the le-ft
hemisphere, so it might be assumed that these processes
occur primarily in the le-ft parietal lobe, though that is a
speculati on .
3. The le-ft temporal lobe. The temporal lobes are
located on the sides o-f our brains, near the temples, and
are below the other three lobes, near the center o-f the
brain. They are involved with verbal and spatial memory, and
with spoken and written language.
The le-ft temporal lobe is associated with spoken
language (or verbal translation o-f written language) and
verbal rather than spatial memory- Its verbal memory is
seated in the -front o-f the le-ft temporal lobe, near the
speech centers o-f the -frontal lobe.^'*
One site of particular importance in the left temporal
lobe is the so-called "Wernicke's Area". It plays an
important part in our understanding of the general
underlying structure of spoken communication, i.e., in
understanding or comprehending the meaning of the verbal
sounds we hear others speak (e.g., the semantics of words),
and the generation of auditory forms of words which we read
visual ly.^= This, or other areas within the left temporal
lobe, is responsible for our ability to recognize the
thought contained in words, and the arrangement of words
^"^Ornstein and Thompson, 35, 153-154.
=='=Geschwind, 180-199.
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into coherent thoughts. Thus, the left temporal lobe
appears to be the locus o-f much o-f the activity described
earlier as the dynamic manipulation o-f clusters o-f verbal
in-formation.
This area is directly connected to the right
hemisphere through a separate neural pathway called the
"anterior commissure", a sort o-f private corpus call osum. =^
4. The le-ft occipital lobe. In general, the inner
sur-face o-f both occipital lobes, near the temporal lobes,
contains the visual cortex.
The le-ft occipital lobe appears to have, as one o-f its
major functions, the analysis of visual information for
orientation, position, and movement.^�
RIGHT HEMISPHERE FUNCTIONS.
Having considered the functions of the left hemisphere,
and the various lobes of the left hemisphere, we now turn
our attention to the right hemisphere, and assemble a
composite picture from the references previously cited.
Again, it wi 1 1 be well to note the correspondences between
brain functions and the previously discussed components of
the understanding.
Intuitive Perception in the Right Hemisphere
The right hemisphere of the human brain perceives or
cognizes by intuition, though it may, of course, intuit
things based partially upon incomplete sensory information.
=�>Guyton, 852.
^^Hampden-Turner , 92.
^^Ornstein and Thompson, 35.
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It therefore perceives those aspects of reality which appear
to require a "sense" which goes beyond the normal 5 senses.
certain times, and in certain people, the right
hemisphere tends to dominate intellectual activity. Mhen the
right hemisphere "takes over" in this way, it is apt to try
to impose an intuitive criterion upon reality. That is,
because it "sees" primarily those things which can be
intuited, it is apt to assert the view that the primary
aspects of reality are those which can be known only by the
intuition, relegating sensory knowledge to an inferior
status.
Feeling as a May of Deciding
I am here choosing to contrast the activities of the
right and left hemispheres of the brain by describing the
decision making process of the left hemisphere, already
discussed, as "thinking", and that of the right hemisphere
as "feeling". Before proceeding further, I want to briefly
review the sense in which I am using this "vague and elastic
term".
The concept of "feeling". I use the word "feeling" to
describe the processes of the right hemisphere in somewhat
the same way the term was used by psychologist Karl Jung,
and by certain of Jungs followers who propose to measure
"thinking" and "feeling" on such personality inventories as
the Myers-Briggs test.
In this sense of the word, "feeling" refers to the
awareness, consciousness, or sensitivity one may have toward
those aspects of reality which may be only dimly perceived
because they are tacit, incompletely expressed, hidden,
nebulous, or unpredictable.
One such aspect of reality includes those things which
are PERSONAL in nature. This might include, for example, an
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interpretation of those matters which speak o-f that which is
VALUABLE to us or to other persons, matters such as the good
and the bad, the true and the -false, the beautiful and the
ugly, or the pleasurable and the painful; or of interpreting
personal MOTIVES or PURPOSES from an observation of one's
behavior; or of his state of calm or anxiety from an
observation of his "body language".
Another such aspect of reality includes those things
which are BEHIND NATURAL PHENOMENA, but which are only
incompletely perceived, such things as natural "laws", or
the behavior and interconnectedness of the natural realm as
a whole, or the "causes" for the regularities and
irregularities we observe in nature.
Finally, such aspects of reality include those things
we describe as NOUMENAL or SPIRITUAL in nature because they
are related to God and His mysterious workings, to the
spiritual realm, or to matters of faith in transcendent
things, i.e., the kinds of things which one may not be able
to cognize directly, using the 5 senses, but which he is
nevertheless convinced are real.
Feeling as the "logic" of the right hemisphere. I
should also point out, however, that I am using the term
"feeling" in even a wider sense than that described above.
As I use the term, feeling is more than a perception of, or
sensitivity to, these personal, natural, and noumenal
dimensions to reality. It also includes the right
hemisphere's means of manipulating information about these
dimensions so as to reach a decision or conclusion.
In this wider sense, the process of "feeling" is a kind
of logic <we will see that it includes inductive logic),
though it is more holistic than the logic of the left
hemisphere, and operates perpendicular to it, or at "right
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angles". De Bono calls it "Lateral Thinking". ^'^ We saw how
the le-ft hemisphere processes in-formation by -forming and
organizing digital concepts into clusters, logically
manipulating these clusters, and then analyzing these
clusters in a dynamic -fashion. By contrast, the right
hemisphere intuitively perceives, in an ANALOG -fashion, the
elements o-f personal, natural, or noumenal and spiritual
reality; "logically" processes them by recognizing or
interpreting the complex meaning and signi-f icance o-f these
elements; and manipulates them by creating or synthesizing
new expressions o-f this meaning and signi-f icance.
Right Hemisphere Functions o-f Feeling
Let us now more closely examine these right-hemisphere
"-feeling" -functions o-f intuitive perception, interpretation,
and creative synthesis. It will be help-ful to re-fer during
this discussion to Figure 4.3, which is a repetition o-f
Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 except that reality is now
considered to additionally have a PERSONAL dimension.
1 . The aspects o-f realitv anal ogi cal Iv intuited. The
right hemisphere intuitively and instantaneously perceives
the personal , natural , and noumenal or spiritual elements o-f
reality. Such elements include the -following:
a. The character o-f being and becoming. We
intuitively know that certain things exist (have being) and
that they are o-ften in some sort o-f process o-f change, i.e.,
o-f "becoming" something di-f-ferent.
We can know such things partly because we are able to
intuitively recognize the elements o-f VISUAL SPACE; the
right hemisphere is known -for the strength o-f its visual
processing powers in contrast to the le-ft hemisphere's
^''Edward De Bono, cited iri Hampden-Turner, 108.
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prowess with verbal concepts. For example, we can perceive
such aspects o-f being as lines and edges, curves and
contours, colors, textures, shadows, masses, and volumes.
We also know such things because we can intuitively
recognize the element o-f TIME. We can perceive when the
elements o-f visual space are timeless and unchanging,
permanent or temporary, instantaneous or processing,
simultaneous or sequential, static or changing, novel or the
same.
b. The character o-f personal beings. Because o-f
our right hemispheres, we have the ability to intuitively
know certain characteristics about the existence of other
persons.
We know intuitively, for example, that persons have
physical BODIES which are subject to health and disease, and
which can give one pain or pleasure, and that their bodies
permit them to engage in PHYSICAL MOVEMENT AND ACTIVITY. We
know that they have MINDS which are somehow immaterial, and
with which they can think and reason, sense and feel, and
make decisions, and which permits them to engage in MENTAL
OR INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY. And we know that they have SPIRITS
which partake somehow of the transcendent and which cause
them to engage in MORAL ACTIVITY.
c. The aoencv of personal beings. We know
intuitively that we and other persons are PURPOSEFUL BEINGS
and that we act in the world as an AGENT for certain
purposes and ends, following certain agendas.
We know, for example, that people often BEHAVE in
certain ways when they find themselves in certain
situations. We know that such behavior often reflects
certain personal MOTIVES and PURPOSES. We know that they
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send out COMMUNICATION, both verbally <in speech and
writing) and nonverbally (by gesture and body language), and
that they receive communication by listening and by
inspiration. And we know that they EXPRESS noumenal
realities through the media o-f MUSIC and ART.
d- Personal values and -feelings. We also know
intuitively that we, and other persons, have certain values
and -feelings.
We know, -for example, that we all have certain PERSONAL
VALUES; that we value individual dignity and worth, privacy,
the -freedom to speak and have opinions, and the opportunity
to do meaning-ful and -ful -filling work. We know we APPRECIATE
certain things, such as good music, and art, and common
courtesy and -friendship. And we know that we have MORAL
VALUES, such as a reverence -for goodness and truth, which we
believe to be based in the character and will of a higher
being.
2. A logic for interpreting meaning. The right
hemisphere utilizes its own kind of logic for recognizing,
understanding, and interpreting the complex pattern,
meaning, connection, and significance of the personal,
natural, and noumenal elements it intuits, even though
information is incomplete, nebulous, and unpredictable. This
is often described by saying that the right hemisphere looks
at things HOLISTICALLY. Others refer to it, in more
psychological terms, as GESTALT THINKING. Examples of
holistic interpretation, using the above described
categories, include the following:
a. Interpreting being and becoming. The right
hemisphere has the power to understand and interpret
patterns in the things that exist, for example, ART,
^'^'Ornstein and Thompson, 38.
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including its various forms, contours, edges, curves, lines,
colors, textures, shadings, and use o-f shadows.''* In a
similar way, it can recognize human FACES^"^ as belonging to
particular individuals, and can interpret the mental states
behind various -facial expressions. It is also able,
instantly, to recognize certain patterns o-f spaces, such as
MAZES, or to sense the presence o-f certain PATTERNS,
continuities, or chains o-f cause and e-f-fect among personal,
natural, or noumenal phenomena. '^'^
It is perhaps because o-f the right hemisphere's
superior abilities at processing vi sual -spat i al in-formation
that those who tend to be dominated by the right hemispheres
seem to have a high awareness on their own bodies and to be
interested in recreational activities requiring the use of
good motor skills.'*'*
The right hemisphere also has the power to understand
and interpret TEMPORAL PATTERNS in phenomena, to understand
the meaning and significance of permanence and change, and
to appreciate the value in novelty.
b. Interpreting personal character. The right
hemisphere of the human brain is acutely interested in, and
sensitive to, the personal dimension of reality. For
example, it has the power to intuitively recognize and
interpret the FEELINGS, pains, and pleasures which act upon
the bodies of other persons. It can anticipate and interpret
the MENTAL ACTIVITIES of other persons, both rational and
emotional. And it can interpret the VALUING activities of
^*Edwards, 82-109, 180-182.
^-^Ornstein and Thompson, 155. See also Edwards, 8, 46.
^^Geschwind, ISO- 199.
^*Ornstein and Thompson, 154, 170-171. See also,
Hampden-Turner, 86.
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other people, -for example, whether they were worshiping or
rebelling against God.
Interpreting personal -feelings and agency. The
right hemisphere has the power to intuitively ascertain
questions o-f agency in human behavior. For example, it can
interpret the reasons -for, and motives behind, speci-fic
patterns of MOVEMENT or BEHAVIOR. It can interpret the
FEELINGS someone intends to arouse by painting a work o-f
ART, or by structuring, in certain ways, the patterns o-f
pitch, melody, rhythm, and harmony in MUSIC.
The musical interpretation o-f the brain appears to
depend particularly heavily upon the right hemisphere, which
is the locus o-f one's recognition o-f the patterns o-f tone
and rhythm we call melody and cadence. Indeed, the right
hemisphere is sometimes re-ferred to as the "musical" or the
"artistic" hemi sphere. Those who are musical artists
generally use the right hemisphere -for musical processing,
-for example to identi-fy whether two musical passages are the
same, or i-f two isolated chords are the same.'*'^
It can interpret the meaning o-f written or pictorial
SYMBOLS, metaphor, analogy, paradox and parable. It can
interpret the meaning o-f certain patterns o-f BODY LANGUAGE.
And it can interpret how other person's -feelings would be
af-fected by certain art or music, by constraint or -freedom,
or by morally o-f-fensive conduct.
d. Interpreting complex language. While its
conceptual powers are strongly visual in nature, the right
hemisphere also possesses powers -for dealing with language,
though it deals best with expressive rather than technical
language. For example, it can interpret the non-literal
''^Geschwind, 180-199. See also Edwards, 7-f . .
''^'News Brie-f, Science 82. January/February 1982.
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meanings and associations o-f words; it can understand and
interpret metaphor, parable, analogy, and proverb; and it
pre-fers to read works o-f literature, which tell a story o-f
personal actions, rather than o-f technical detail.
Because of its association with the emotions, the right
hemisphere seems particularly able to distinguish anger and
humor in another person's voice, by interpreting the
emotional nuances of his words and the tone of his voice.
3. Manipulation by creation and svnthesis. The right
hemisphere also has the power to imagine, and then create or
synthesize new possibilities, especially new expressions of
personal, natural, and noumenal realities which are beyond
the senses. Examples include the following.
a. We can, by using the powers of the right
hemisphere, create NEW OBJECTS (e.g. machines, buildings)
in SPACE; we can CHANGE and re-organize space; and we can
create new perspectives on those things which are enduring
and permanent.
b. We can CREATIVELY INTERACT with other PERSONS,
taking into account their values, feelings, and the workings
of their minds, understanding them by their gestures and
body language.
c. We can CREATIVELY PURSUE some new PURPOSE,
increase some important freedom, or oppose some restriction
upon, or purpose of, other persons. We can act so as to
modify other's behavior. Because of the right hemisphere's
sensitivity to time and novelty, those who tend to be
dominated by the right hemisphere prefer to work at tasks
^^Ornstein and Thompson, 162.
^'^Geschwi nd , 180-189. See also Rico, 63-87; and Wonder
and Donovan, 148-179.
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which involve a great deal o-f the unknown, the ambiguous, or
the paradoxical, tasks which have no pre-existing routine. 's'*
d. Me can EXPRESS oursel-f, or in-fluence others, by
creating new art or music.
e. Me can read and understand, or create new
STORIES, or works o-f literature, using new metaphors and
analogies.
f. Me can use INDUCTIVE LOGIC, PATTERN
RECOGNITION, and integration o-f TACIT clues to LEAP beyond
incomplete data to reach a decision or conclusion. The right
hemisphere also appears to enjoy taking the RISKS which
operation with incomplete in-formation require.
g. Me can interpret the meaning o-f a complex
situation, or its si gni -f icance to oursel-f or other persons.
h. And we can work continually to solve existing
problems, including highly visual problems such as in
geometry, all the while remaining open to new in-formation,
never seeking closure.
Emotions o-f the Right Hemisphere
Mhile the right hemisphere was once thought to be the
only hemisphere involved in the emotions, we now know that
each hemisphere is involved, though in di-fferent ways. The
right hemisphere is more inclined to express emotion, in
contrast to the left hemisphere's desire to control emotion.
Moreover, the right hemisphere tends to be associated with
more of the "negative" emotions, such as anger, fear,
suspicion, jealousy, or depression; when one is processing
"negative" emotions, electrodes on the frontal scalp of the
'Rico, 71.
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right hemisphere show an increase in right hemisphere
electrical activity.*''*
The Lobes o-f the Rioht Hemisphere
While it is now -fairly clear that certain -functions o-f
the brain appear to be associated with the right hemisphere,
it is less clear how -far we can restrict any o-f these
-functions to one of the right hemisphere's lobes. Some
evidence suggests, however, that at least some of it's
functions can be localized in the right temporal lobe.
Me saw earlier that the left temporal lobe was strongly
verbal, being heavily involved in language and speech. By
contrast, the right temporal lobe appears to be strongly
correlated with spatial functions. For example, we know that
the right temporal lobe is heavily involved whenever one is
drawing, or attempting to find his way out of a maze.** It
also appears to be actively involved in our memory of
spatial locations, faces, and abstract visual patterns.*^
Since the faculty of inductive reasoning is closely related
to the faculty of pattern recognition, we might speculate
that the right temporal lobe is also involved with
induction.
Charles Hampden-Turner reports one additional function
of the right temporal lobe which is intriguing. He finds
significance in the report that there is a "hallucinatory
area" in the right temporal lobe, connected via the anterior
commissure to Mernickes area in the left temporal lobe
<which regulates the understanding of speech). Electrical
stimulation of this area caused subjects to hear voices, and
'^'^'Ri chard Davidson, cited i_n the Louisville Courier.
Journal , July 10, 1985, A2.
Ornstein and Thompson, 154.
*==Geschwind, 180-199.
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sometimes to see visions. He believes this is related to the
motivation o-f certain persons by "god-like commands" which
they believe direct them to engage in certain actions.
THE QUESTION OF HEMISPHERICAL DOMINANCE
It is a common observation that some people seem
naturally "better" at such 1 e-f t-hemi sphere tasks as verbal
expression, algebraic mathematics, logical thinking, and
task organization, while others seem more inclined to excel
at such right-hemisphere -functions as art, music, pattern
recognition, and intuition. The question there-fore naturally
arises whether such individuals are as they are because one
o-f their brain hemispheres "dominates" over the other.
The exploration of this question received a significant
impetus from the research of Roger Sperry and his
contemporaries. Two observations are worthy of note. First,
in his split-brain research, Sperry noted that one
hemisphere often tried to "dominate" over the other, i.e.,
to "be the boss". Indeed, Sperry uses the metaphor that such
patients have "two minds", one of which seeks to subdue or
interfere with the other. Secondly, because of such
intriguing findings, psychological tests are being given
with increasing frequency to university students, industrial
employees, church groups, and others, and these tests are
confirming that most people "prefer", either strongly or
moderately, to use one hemisphere over the other.
Such results have given us a whole new vocabulary for
classifying each other's personality and thinking style (not
always fairly or accurately, it is to be emphasized).
Certain people are now called "left-brained thinkers" and
others "right-brained thinkers", or more pointedly, some are
called "left-brained rationalists" and others "right-brained
^'Hampden-Turner , 91-92.
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intuitives". Such characterizations build upon the
observation that people interpret -facts dif-ferently (see
Figure 4.4) and that the interpretation may be radically
influenced by the "blinder" or "filter" effect of
presuppositions, which may in turn be a reflection of brain
hemisphere dominance (see Figure 4.5).
One conclusion, however, is emerging with increasing
clarity. Each normal, healthy individual uses both
hemispheres of the brain. No-one is locked into or out of a
particular hemisphere. The point is, rather, that most of us
prefer, or have become more proficient in the use of, one
hemisphere. Thus those who are left-brained "dominant" like
and work easily with math, logic, and impersonal ideas, and
are often attracted into professions such as science or
engineering. Others who are right-brained "dominant" like
and work easily with art or music, personal relations, or
with vi sual -spat i al tasks, and are often attracted into the
arts, sports, humanities, personnel, or other person-
oriented work. Once one finds himself doing such work on a
day-to-day basis, increasingly exercising the "preferred"
hemisphere and allowing the other hemisphere to
(metaphorically speaking) atrophy, he reinforces his
"thinking style" and becomes increasingly left-or�right
hemisphere dominant.
People in the Western countries are sometimes
characterized as being predominantly left-brained, so an
increasing number of business seminars are being conducted
in American industry for the purpose of "getting in touch
with the right brain" so as to stimulate creativity.**
Writers are teaching students to use the right hemisphere
for more creative writing. *= And artists are teaching art
'^'^See, for example. Wonder and Donovan,
"^^See, for example, Rico.
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students to draw better by tapping into right-brained ways
o-f "seeing".-*** The results o-f such activities are showing,
increasingly, that it is possible to recapture our ability
to "think" and "see" with both hemispheres o-f the brain; one
need only learn to "switch modes" and exercise the
"-forgotten" hemisphere.
My larger study of the Janusian Syndrome will make
extensive use of the "right-brained" and "left-brained" ways
of describing certain thoughts, ideas, and arguments related
to origins and other large issues. I feel compelled to make
it clear, however, that such characterizations are intended
to classify the "mode" into which such thoughts and ideas
appear naturally to fit, but not to make any judgment upon
the extent to which the thinker or speaker is actually left-
or-right brain dominant. While one's arguments almost
certainly reveal something useful about how his mind and/or
brain are functioning at the moment, the question of actual
hemispheric dominance could only be determined by tests on
the individual in question.
CONCLUSIONS: UNDERSTANDING AND THE HUMAN BRAIN
Consider, now, the progression in our thinking over the
last few chapters. First, we saw that verbal or pictorial
words and other symbols represent our most basic concepts
about mater i al -noumenal reality, and form the grist for our
thinking mills. Second, we saw that there are two quite
different types of knowledge about materi al -noumenal
reality: sensory knowledge, expressed in verbal words or
numerical symbols, and intuitive knowledge, expressed in
pictorial concepts or patterns. Third, we saw that our minds
utilize two different channels for processing these two
'***See, for example, Edwards.
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kinds of knowledge, a sensory channel and an intuitive
channel, and that each of these utilizes different processes
of cognition, concept formation, concept manipulation, and
judgment, which make up our two channels of understanding.
Now, we have seen that the human brain consists of two
hemispheres, a sensory hemisphere and an intuitive
hemisphere, and that one generally dominates over the other.
In all of this, we have also seen that each person has
the capacity to use his two channels of perception,
knowledge, understanding, and hemispherical functioning in
either harmonious and united ways, or in dualistic,
dichotomized ways; and that one channel tends to be favored
or dominant in each individual, which favors the
dichotomized mode of knowing and understanding, though with
effort both modes can be used together.
Perhaps our right brains can now see a pattern emerging
from all this. There appear to be close and compelling
correlations between our brain structure and function and
the ways in which we claim to know and understand reality,
and speak about that reality to others. Therefore, when one
speaks to us about what he "knows" or "understands" about
the question of origins, or any other of the "great issues",
all these things must necessarily influence his views.
Every person's views on the great issues such as
origins is therefore a reflection of many things: of his
view of material -noumenal reality; of the cognitive
processes by which he attempts to apprehend this
information; of the concepts he has formed; of the words he
chooses to represent those concepts and the meaning he
attaches to each; of the sensory or intuitive processes he
utilizes to form and manipulate those concepts; and of the
extent to which his thinking is dominated by one or the
other hemisphere of his brain.
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One other connection may be noted at this time. Many of
the words we use to describe our struggle with concepts such
as origins are familiar to the field of personality
investigation. For example, the Myers-Briggs Personality
Inventory classifies a person along scales labeled
"Perceiving", "Judging", "Sensing", "Intuition", "Thinking",
and "Feeling". This suggests a connection between a person's
personality, his brain structure, and his views on origins
or other "great issues". That connection will be explored in
a future volume of the larger study.
What a person says about origins or other great issues
is therefore not a simple thing; it is a constellation of
things which integrates a great deal of who he is as a
biological-spiritual person with the unique ways in which he
chooses to think, know, and understand. All of this may be
reflected in the kinds of philosophies to which he gives his
affections. His statements about origins or other great
issues may thus conceal a great deal more than they reveal,
though much can be gleaned from the philosophies which his
arguments reveal. We therefore turn, in the next chapter, to
the most basic philosophy which is related to our use of the
two channels of perception, knowing, and understanding: the
philosophy of dualism
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Chapter 5
DUALISM: THE SPLIT IN OUR PHILOSOPHY
Each person has some overarching, synthetic picture of
the way things are in the world, a "world view" against
which he may interpret the occurrences in his everyday
world. Each world view is philosophical in nature, and
consists of a whole constellation of adopted philosophical
systems and presuppositions.
The philosophies one adopts tend to be those which
agree with his "way of seeing and knowing reality", and so
are influenced by the manner in which the knowing self
prefers to unify or dichotomize his two channels of
perception, knowing, and understanding, and his two brain
hemispheres. Therefore, underlying each world view is some
primary philosophy which expresses the unity or dichotomy
according to which the self desires to utilize these two
channel s.
Dualism is the basic, underlying philosophy of those
who prefer to dichotomize their perception, knowing, and
understanding, and thus the manner in which they utilize
their brain hemispheres to view and know reality. It is
often expressed as a philosophy which sees science and
religion belonging in radically different realms which are,
and ought to be, kept separate and not allowed to mix.
It is the hypothesis of this study that the split-brain
nature of each human being correlates with, and perhaps
predisposes him to, a mode of world-view formation which is
dualistic; and that this tends naturally to cause each
person to see reality, and his ways of knowing it, in at
least somewhat dualistic terms until such time as he
recognizes the fallacy of this way of thinking, and begins
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to exert e-f -forts to overcome this dualism by means o-f
unified, holistic, whole-brained thinking.
In this chapter, we will review the nature and history
of dualistic thought, up through the age of Enlightenment,
and see how we may visualize it as a "Janusian" way of
thinking. Then, in the following chapter, we will review how
Immanuel Kant profoundly influenced dualistic thought, and
established it as the "scientific" mindset of the modern
age, with the most tragic consequences for synthesis in all
of modern thought.
THE NATURE OF DUALISTIC THOUGHT
Some dualistic philosophy has been prominent throughout
much of recorded history, from as far back as the 6th
century BC into contemporary times. In that sweep of time
and history, many movements have woven threads into its
fabric, and various strains of the basic view have resulted.
Thus, the simplest thing we can say about dualism is that it
is both pervasive and complex.
Following is an overview of the nature of dualism and
its various types. After that overview, we will consider how
its various constituents have developed through history.
Dualism: Nature and Tvpes
Understanding Dualism is complicated by the basic
problem of semantics: the word has several meanings, not all
of which are exactly comparable.
The basic nature of dualism. It is first of all
imperative to understand that dualism is a doctrine of
philosophy, not science. In the words of philosopher of
science John Ziman, it has resulted over the centuries from
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a sort o-f "treaty o-f partition" which cedes issues of the
spirit to religion and issues involving matter to science.
In the simplest, layman's sense, the word implies a
view which sees reality, or some aspect o-f it, as having two
basic entities, like mind and body, or matter and spirit.
But technically, in the philosophical sense, it has come to
mean not only an essence o-f duality, but also a radical
separation or dichotomy between these dual essences. This
semantic con-fusion is a major source o-f mi scommuni cati on in
scienti-fic discussions. Some protagonists in the public
arena use the word in the layman's rather than the technical
sense, -for example split-brain researcher Roger Sperry, who
uses the word "dualism" to mean the view that there are both
material and spiritual dimensions to reality. We thus see
the con-fusing situation in which Sperry argues -for a
dualistic dichotomy between science and religion, all the
while saying that he hopes to "overcome dualisms".^ What he
really means is that he hopes to overcome the view that
there exists a supranatural dimension to reality, and then
uni-fy the remaining natural dimension by reducing mind and
brain to a common (natural) essence.
In the technical, philosophical sense, however, DUALISM
implies both duality and separation or dichotomy. It refers
to any view, theory, or system of interpretation of reality
which seeks to explain the universe, or some major
constituent (like man) as being composed of two distinct,
exclusive, mutually irreducible and radically independent
factors, elements, substances, or principles. It is
^John Ziman, "What is Science?", in Introductory
Readings in the Philosophv of Science. ed. E. D. Klemke,
Robert Hoi linger, and H. David Kline (New York: Prometheus
Books, 1980) , 36.
=Roger Sperry, Science and Moral Priority; Merging
Mind. Brain, and Human Values (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1982) , 38, 68, chapter 6.
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distinguished -from MONISM, which admits o+ only one
ultimate, unified reality (of which all else is merely a
particular dimension or manifestation) and PLURALISM, which
invokes more than two ultimate principles.
The tvpes of dualism. Philosophical dualism, like the
philosophy which is its father, has three variations: the
metaphysical, epi stemol ogi cal , and ethical or religious.
1- Metaphysical dualism. This type of dualism
postulates a dichotomy between two fundamental aspects of
ultimate reality, such as mind and body, nature and supra
nature, matter and spirit, or noumena and phenomena. There
are two variations: in one variation, there are two aspects
of reality, but they are so dichotomized that they are
totally unconnected; in the other, there is really only one
aspect, the other being imaginary but conceded in argument
to those who believe in its existence. For example, some
metaphysical dualists assert that man is entirely material
and that, either God and the spiritual do not actually exist
or, if they do, they are in a separate realm. It is also
possible to divide metaphysical dualism into an ONTOLOGICAL
dualism, which dichotomize being and reality, and
COSMOLOGICAL dualism, which dichotomize the origin, nature,
and structure of the universe.
2. Epi stemol ogi cal dualism. This type of dualism is a
variation of the first, but asserts that since the two
realms are so completely ultimate and unconnected, it is
impossible for knowledge to pass from one to the other.
There is thus a dichotomy between the real object (if it
exists at all) and our data about it, between the knower and
the known, and between the subject and object. For example,
some epi stemol ogi cal dualists assert that man is a subject
who is completely material and governed by the senses, and
thus can gain no reliable knowledge (e.g., intuitively)
about objects in the other realm, e.g. God, the spiritual,
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or the noumenal; "real knowledge", they assert, only comes
by sensory perception o-f the material.
3. Ethi cal -rel i gi ous-theol ogi cal dual i sm. All o-f these
varieties o-f dualism are really only metaphysical or
epi stemol ogi cal dualisms o-f interest to religious or ethical
thought. They postulate a dichotomy between -facts (in the
material realm) and value judgments (in the spiritual or
noumenal realm); between the body o-f a man (material) and
his mind or soul (spiritual); between the powers or
principles o-f good and those o-f evil. For example, an
ethical, religious, or theological dualist would argue that
scienti-fic -facts about the material belong to a di-f-ferent
realm -from, and ought to be separated -from, the realm o-f
spiritual value judgments about what is good and evil.
The primary di-f-ference between mere duality and
dual i ty-wi th-dichotomy is seen in the di-f-ference between
Christian and secular�moral thought about good and evil. For
the modern, secular "ethical man", good and evil are equally
ultimate, irreducible, and eternal, so there is a dichotomy
between them. But -for the Christian, good and evil are none
o-f these things; evil is subsidiary to good, having been
created by good, and is thus contingent and non-eternal.
Evil has been given its day o-f rage, but has been ultimately
de-f eated.
THE HISTORY OF DUALISTIC THOUGHT.
The growth and development o-f metaphysical, ethical,
and epi stemol ogi cal dualism has been underway -for ages,
though the term "dualism", itself, was first used by Bayle
to describe the views of Zoroaster, and by Thomas Heyde,
about 1700, to describe the views of the Manichaeans.
Following are some of the major signposts along that way.
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Dualism in Ancient Thought
Dualistic thought has its roots in the Ancient Period
which began with Chinese philosophy in the 9th Century BC
and extended up to the time o-f the Middle Ages.
Zhou Yin and Yano. (9th Century BC) . About the time the
Hebrews were living in the divided kingdom, toward the end
o-f the Western Zhou dynasty in China, the Chinese Yi Jing (1
Ching) text was published, containing the -first explicit
concept o-f Yin and Yang as the metaphysical basis -for all
change in the universe. According to this view, all things
are an admixture o-f two ultimate opposites, Yin and Yang.
Yin is that ultimate aspect o-f reality which includes
everything dark, hidden, secret, cool, passive, yielding,
and -female, while Yang is the aspect containing everything
bright, shiny, light, open, active, aggressive, warm, and
male. All change in the universe is then explained by the
interaction of the dualistic powers of Yin and Yang.'^
Zoroastrianism (6th Century BC) . The ancient Persian
prophet, Zarathrustra (Zoroaster, in Greek), lived about the
same time as the Hebrew prophets who guided Israel after the
time of the divided Kingdom. While living near present day
Teheran, he claimed he was given a vision from God about
ultimate reality, which was dualistic. There were two
kingdoms, a good Kingdom of Light and Truth, and an evil
Kingdom of Darkness and the Lie. Each was ultimate,
eternal, and irreducible, and equally governed the universe.
His was thus both a metaphysical and an ethical or religious
dual i sm.
^Niels C. Nielsen, Jr. et al . Relioions of the World.
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 263-265.
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'^^^ religion also spoke o-f angels and demons, a coming
Messiah, human -free will to choose good or evil, a -final
resurrection o-f the dead, and an eternal day o-f judgment,
concepts which some scholars believe in-fluenced or at least
anticipated later Judaism, Islam, and Christianity, and even
later Greek and other thought, and to that extent, these may
still retain an element o-f Zoroaster s Dualism. His religion
later became corrupted by the Magi, and others, who
introduced elements o-f magic, augury, astrology, and
sorcery. "*
Earlv Greek dualism. (4th-6th Centuries BC) . After the
Greeks conquered the Persians, their own thinkers began to
be influenced by the Zoroastrian Dualism of Persian culture.
Perhaps the first to be affected were the followers of
Pythagoras (born 569 BC) whose ontological dualism saw all
things as ultimately being either limited or unlimited, and
as being manifested by 10 pairs of opposites, such as odd
and even, or male and female. Plato later developed
metaphysical dualisms between being and non�being, ideas and
matter, and between forms and particulars, but also an
epi stemol ogi cal dualism between opinion and reliable
knowledge; and his pupil, Aristotle, dichotomized form from
matter, body from soul, and the material from the
immaterial. Thus, it seems, did Plato and Aristotle develop
Greek thought upon the dualisms inherent within Zoroastrian
ideas.
Gnostic dualism. (2nd Century AD). Greek Gnosticism
was at its peak about 150 AD, and was seen by the early
Christian Church as the first major heresy against which it
must fight. Gnosticism was a rational, philosophical attempt
to wed Christianity with Greek philosophy. Following
Zoroastrian ideas, it had both Persian and Greek roots, and
^Nielsen, et al . 372-382.
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upheld a metaphysical and ethical dualism at its core,
particularly a dualism between the material and spiritual.
It taught the existence of two ultimate gods, good and evil.
The "god" o-f the Old Testament was evil; since he created
the material world, all matter, including the human body,
was to be considered evil. The "god" of the New Testament
was good, and he would one day redeem or purify the evil,
�naterial world. Out of this basic dualism came many other
polarities, for example between spirit and matter, soul and
body, heaven and earth, and male and female. In order to
overcome the evil of the material world, one must practice
ascetic acts of denial, and learn the secret, mystical
"gnosis" (knowledge) of the elite leaders of Gnosticism. =
By contrast, the newly developing Christian theology
argued that Jesus Christ had been both fully God and fully
man, and thus the material body was not to be considered
evil, for it existed in union with the spirit.
Manichaean dualism. (3rd Century AD). Mani was a third
century Persian who claimed to be the Holy Spirit promised
by Jesus, and who formed a syncretistic religion from the
elements of Zoroastrianism, Gnosticism, and Buddhism. He was
strongly dualistic, claiming that the universe was a
battleground featuring eternal conflict between two ultimate
gods or principles, one a king of evil and darkness, and the
other a king of goodness and light. The good god had created
man's spirit, which was thus good, but the evil god had
created man's body, which was thus evil. Thus man, too, was
a battleground; his spirit longed for good, but his body
dragged him down into darkness. Salvation could be found in
ascetic practices to subjugate the body and a spiritual
turning toward the light of Christ.
=See, for example, Nielsen, et al , 493.
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^^fore his conversion, Augustine became a Manichaean.
But a-fter becoming a Christian, he -found it barren o-f love
and intellectually shallow. He therefore opposed it
vigorously.
Janus and Roman thought. The idea -for the mythological
Roman god Janus was developed long be-fore the Christian era,
but is discussed here because o-f its use-ful symbolism.^ He
seems to be such an appropriate image, or metaphor, -for
Dualism that I have chosen his name as the root word -for
"Janusian" thinking. The -following in-formation on Janus has
been taken -from Aldington and Ames,� Bell,*^ Cavendish,
and Kravitz'*.
In Roman mythology, the gods were sexless, spiritual
powers called "numina" (singular, "numen"). The Roman god
Janus had two -faces, and was considered to be the guardian
o-f all doorways, bridges, gates, passageways, thresholds,
and entrances, and the patron o-f all beginnings and
-^See Neil sen, et al . 379, 513-514.
"^See Arthur Koestler, Janus; A Summing Up (New York,
Vintage Books, Division o-f Random House, 1978), 39, 57, 235,
244-45, 293, 304. Koestler uses Janus as a symbol -for a
di-f-ferent sort o-f phenomenon: the -fact that every physical
and social entity entails two polar entities: the whole and
the part, or the complementary "-faces" o-f particle and wave.
�Ri chard Aldington and Delano Ames (translators) , New
Larousse Encvclopedia o-f Mythology (Prometheus Press, 1968) ,
200-202.
''Robert E. Bell, Dictionary o-f Classical Mythology (ABC
Clio Publishers, 1982), 25, 70, 99, 173, 247, 254, 317.
^ "^Richard Cavendish, editor, Mythology: An Illustrated
Encvcl opedi a (New York; Rixxoli Publishers and Orbis
Publishing Co., Ltd., 1980), 136-143.
**David Kravitz, Who s Who in Greek and Roman Mythology
(Clarkson N. Potter Publishers, 1975).
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journeys. Janus has no counterpart in Greek or any other
mythology.
The name Janus was originally associated with an
ancient king o-f Italy who was elevated to the status o-f a
god a-fter his death. He was -finally seen by many Romans as
second only to Jupiter, chie-f o-f all the gods and all
mankind (like the Greek Zeus), though others saw him as
chie-f o-f all the gods, superseding Jupiter himsel-f.
As guardian of gates and bridges, the Romans considered
Janus to have the power to open or close any gate, even the
gate to Heaven itsel-f, and thus to control passage over any
road or way which passed through a gate, whether public or
private, real or figurative. For this reason, whenever Roman
porters were assigned authority to deny entrance to any
person at a gateway, they used sticks bearing the insignia
of Janus to drive them away. As patron of the beginning and
ending of journeys, Janus was honored by assigning his name
to the first month of the year; for this reason, we still
use the name "January" to signify the beginning of one year
and the ending of another.
As the chief of all gods, he was believed to have
created the universe. According to Ovid, the constituents of
the primeval universe existed as a formless mass of air,
fire, water, and earth. At that time, the original name of
the creator god was "Chaos", but after he separated the
elements, Chaos became Janus Bifrons, and he had two faces
representing the confusion of his original state. Because he
had two faces, he could look both ways at once: to both the
past and future, to both the exterior and interior of a
house, and to both the entrance and exit to a bridge or
public building. By extension, Janus was considered to be
the god of all means of communication, all human initiative,
and all enterprise. He was considered to preside over the
rising of the sun and the beginning of each day.
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Because he was creator and -first o-f the gods, the image
o-f Janus was placed at the head o-f every religious ceremony,
and the name o-f Janus was the first to be invoked. He was
even given a special temple in the Forum, the gates to which
the Romans opened in time of war, and closed only in times
of peace. The gates, we are told, were rarely closed.
United Scholasticism and Dualistic Nominalism
During the Middle Ages, new varieties of dualism began
to emerge as prominence began to shift from the "united"
Scholastics to the dualistic Nominalists.
Scholasticism. (Middle Ages, 500-1500 AD).
Scholasticism was a medieval (llth-14th century) movement in
European monasteries and cathedral schools, which followed
the revival of interest in Aristotle, and sought to develop
a "rational" or "philosophical" theology. It began with the
affirmation that God was the author of both human (Greek)
wisdom and Christian (August ini an) theology and, since God
could not contradict Himself, it must be possible to
harmonize faith with reason. Except as noted, much of the
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following is taken from reference works by Funk and
Wagnalls,�= Dowley,^' Harrison,^* Douglas, ^= and Cairns.
The movement was started by 12th century "realists" or
"radical idealists" such as Ansel m of Canterbury (1033-1109)
and the Bishop of Paris, Peter Lombard (1095-1169). They
began by affirming that Plato's "universal s" (beauty, truth,
etc.) had real, objective existence. In upholding this view,
however, Lombard's texts on the Trinity, Creation,
Incarnation, and the Sacraments relied too heavily upon the
tradition and authority of the Church Fathers, and Anselm's
"five ontological proofs of God's existence" tried to make
faith the foundation for reason ("I believe that I may
understand") and overestimated the ability of reason to
prove theological doctrines. They thus cut some chinks in
the armor of their own unified thinking which later thinkers
would exploit.
By the 13th century, scholastics such as Peter Abelard
(1079-1142) and Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) had
softened the prevailing view to a more mature or "moderate
realism" and sought to give a place for both faith and
reason by clearly distinguishing the two. Abelard, for
^^"Scholasticism, " Funk and Waqnalls New Encvclopedia,
Volume 21 (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1979), 167-169.
^''Tim Dowley editor, Eerdman's Handbook to the History
of Christianity, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing, 1977), 274-289.
^^Everett F. Harrison editor. Baker's Dictionary of
Theol OQV (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1960) ,
435, 474.
*="Nominal i sm,
" and "Scholasticism," The New
International Dictionary of the Christian Church (Grand
Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1978). 713-
714, 885-886.
*^Earle D. Cairns, Christianity Through the Centuries:
A History of the Christian Church (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1981), 231-243.
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example, used doubt as a stimulus to question whether
tradition and authority were su-f-ficient to prove theological
doctrines accepted on -faith, and dialectical logic to
reconcile possible contradictions in the writings o-f the
Bible and the Church -fathers. And Aquinas sought synthesis
in distinction. In his seminal Summa Theol ogi ca, he sought
to synthesize philosophy and theology by incorporating
Aristotle's distinction between -form and content with
Augustine's distinction between nature and grace. This led
him to distinguish sharply between the realms o-f -faith and
reason. He placed -faith on one side along with grace,
heavenly experience. Christian revelation, and sacred
doctrine; and reason on the other, along with nature, sense
experience, natural theology, and human philosophy.
Nomi nal i sm. The nominalists gained pre�eminence in the
14th century by their stinging attacks upon the authority
and Platonic idealism o-f the scholastics. For example, they
argued that the scholastics were able to harmonize reason
and authority only by stretching the intent o-f the original
authority; and they argued that the Platonic "uni versal s"
were merely convenient names for subjective ideas having no
real existence. One prominent nominalist, John Duns Scotus
(1266-1308), sought to invalidate Aquinas's synthesis by
arguing that faith was an unprovable matter of the will. A
second, William of Ockham (1280-1349), opposed Aquinas on
grounds that he had reinterpreted Aristotle to make him fit
his own theology. And a third, Roger Bacon (1214-1292) used
inductive ("scientific") observation and experiment to
overthrow Aristotle's deductively-based science.
The realists had made one crucial mistake. They tried
to unify faith and reason by wedding Christianity to a
particular (Aristotelian) philosophy of science, perhaps
trimming one to fit the other. When the nominalists later
overturned this philosophy of science, they appeared to have
also overturned the unity scholastics had sought to weave
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between -faith and reason. �^ The scholastics had begun with a
DISTINCTION between -faith and reason; but the nominalists
enlarged that into a DICHOTOMY. From then on, many
intellectuals claimed justification in believing that the
realities of the universe could be known by reason, but one
could believe in God only by faith.
The Enlightenment (17th-16th centuries)
The time period from Galileo to Kant marks an era when
science began to increasingly ally itself with philosophy to
harden the dualisms erected between the time of Zoroaster
and the medieval nominalists.
Dualism in science and philosophv. The astronomer and
physicist Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) began the denigration
of speculative thought by elevating the role of systematic
observation and experience (the "scientific method"). Social
Philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) elevated the material
side of the dualism by introducing the notion that all of
human thought could be reduced to nothing more than motions
within the basic constituents of the organic body.
A giant step for dualism was taken when philosopher and
mathematician Rene Descartes (1596-1650) proposed
ontological ly splitting the universe into "thinking
substance" (the mind) and "extended substance" (the material
world, extended in space), causing generations of followers
to see mind as a separate entity inhabiting a machine-like
body, but so completely distinct and separated that the two
could not interact at all (mind could not influence body,
and vice versa). Empirical philosopher John Locke (1632-
1704) then defended the view that the objective universe was
composed solely of natural material following mechanistic
*^Colin Brown, Philosophv and the Christian Faith
(Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1968), 7-36.
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laws, while DesCartes' "mental substance" was nothing more
than private opinion; he thus -further dichotomized -faith and
reason. Sir Isaac Newton then separated reality into
theoretical and empirical portions, dichotomizing geometry
from experience. And finally, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)
erected the final and definitive wedge between faith and
reason when he so forcefully defended both a metaphysical
dualism (splitting the "phenomenal" world of things from the
"noumenal" world of meanings, values, and ideas) and an
epi stemol ogi cal dualism (arguing that no knowledge may pass
across the noumenal -phenomenal barrier).
Kant, in particular, has had a profound influence upon
the whole of modern speculative science and philosophy. He
was, for example, Einstein's favorite philosopher.^� Indeed,
his role has been so influential that we are justified in
devoting a great deal of space to him in the next chapter.
Dualism in theol oqv: deism (17th-18th Centuries). The
dualistic theology of deism was initiated in England in the
17th century by Edward Herbert, Lord of Charbury, who wrote
"On Truth" in 1624. It shortly spread, however, to France,
Germany, and America. Other formative influences included
John Tolland ("Christianity Not Mysterious", 1696), Matthew
Tindal ("Christianity as Old as the Creation", 1730),
Charles Blount, and Lord Shaftsbury.
The roots of deism were in a scientific approach to
knowledge, coupled with the philosophies of rationalism,
mechanism, empiricism, mechanism, and positivism. It has
been called a "natural religion", a "religion of reason",
and a "desupernatural i zed religion". Its basic tenet is that
God created the universe, wound it up like some sort of
giant clock, and thereafter left the universe to its own
*�Ronald W. Clark, Einstein; The Life and Times (New
York; Avon Books, Division of the Hearst Corp., 1971).
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devices, -following natural laws which men could discover by
their use o-f reason. God thus became an "absentee landlord"
and ceased to "inter-fere" in the history o-f man and nature.
There was, -for the deists, no reality to prophecy,
revelation, or the miraculous; religion became purely a
�natter o-f duty to rational ethical principles, and the Bible
a purely ethical guidebook. God and man were dual i sti cal ly
separated such that no in-fluence could cross the boundary.
Deism became quite popular among the intellectuals o-f
the Enlightenment age. In Europe, deism's adherents included
Voltaire, Rousseau, D'Alembert, Diderot, and Kant. And in
America, it claimed Ethan Allen, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas
Paine ("The Age o-f Reason", 1795), and Thomas Je-f-ferson, who
snipped out, with scissors, all the miraculous passages -from
the Bible (later published as "The Je-f-ferson Bible").
CONCLUSION: DUALISM AS A JANUSIAN WAY OF THINKING
From its most ancient roots in the thought o-f the
Persian Zoroaster to the beginnings o-f the "modern age" in
the Enlightenment, some type o-f dualistic philosophy has
been prominent, each o-f which attempted to separate all o-f
reality into two ultimate realms across which no reliable
knowledge or in-fluence may pass. On one side o-f the
dichotomy were proposed to be those attributes we may now
associate with le-ft-brain thinking: science, sensory
knowledge, the particulars, the material, the body o-f man,
empirical -facts, and authoritative proof. On the other side
were proposed to be the "right-brain" attributes: religion,
intuitive knowledge, the general universals, the spiritual,
the mind, subjective opinion, and -faith.
The Roman god Janus seems a particularly apt image -for
metaphorically summarizing the will-ful energy behind
dualistic thought, and a representation o-f that metaphor is
shown in Figure 5.1. Like Janus, the dualistic thinker is
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(metaphorically) two-faced, and thinks with two minds,
neither of which looks toward the other. His will stands,
like Janus at the bridge, driving thoughts back toward their
"proper realm", closing off the gateway of communication in
the brain's Corpus Call osum, and seeking to assure that
reason and faith, science and religion, facts and values are
never permitted to come together into the same room of his
mind for contemplation and reflection.
Janusian thinking arose from the "death" of the
historical King, and has now made Janus (figuratively) the
"god of all gods", leading the procession of modern
scientific mythology, and marking the beginning of a new age
in "rational religious" thought where only he can subdue the
chaos of warring lef t-and-right brain factions, and explain
the creation of the universe.
Perhaps those thinkers are partially right who claim
that there has always been a war between science and
religion over origins and other such large issues. But if
that is so, it may be because, in this time of war, the new
Romans have closed the gate in the temple of their
mythological god, prohibiting the only cross-fertilization
of science and religion which might bring peace across the
bridge of the Corpus Call osum.
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LEFT BRAIN RIGHT
BRAIN
Sci ence
The known
Ob jecti ve
Knowl edge
Deduction
Empirical
Senses
Material
Earth
Man
History
Nature
Brain
Body
Being
Facts
Reason
Light
Male
Yang
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Truth
Form
Phenomenal
Exper i ence
Phi losophy
Particul ars
Natural law
Natural Theology
Rel igion
The knower
Subjective
Opinions
Inducti on
Theoretical
Intuition
Spiritual
Heaven
God
Divine Act
Grace
Mind, ideas
Soul ,spirit
Non-being
Values
Faith
Darkness
Female
Yin
Good
Falsehood
Content
Noumenal
Doctrine
Revelation
Universal s
Miracle
Revelati on
an communication across the Corpus
Callosum.
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Chapter 6
THE KANTIAN SPLIT IN ALL OF MODERN THOUGHT
Me saw in the last chapter how man's split and biased
brain had predisposed him to an underlying dualism in his
world view, and how the speci-fic philosophy of dualism
developed, over the course o-f nearly 25 centuries, to
become, by the Age o-f Enlightenment, a serious -force -for
division between science and religion. Me also invoked the
image o-f Janus at the bridge o-f the Corpus Callosum as a -fit
metaphor -for the dualistic thinking which not only resists
any uniting o-f our two channels o-f perception, knowledge,
and understanding, but also works actively to make science a
left-brained enterprise and religion a right-brained
enterprise, and compel them to remain in separate realms.
It was Immanuel Kant who transformed this Enlightenment
view into a dualistic foundation for virtually all of modern
thought. Me therefore close this volume of the study by
focusing upon the crucial role played by this German
philosopher, and review the many ways in which he set the
stage for modern-day Janusian thinking.
Me will begin by reviewing aspects of Kant's background
which may have contributed to his dualistic thinking. Me
will then review the thorough-going scope of his dualistic
views; summarize the doctrines which have developed from
them, together with their catastrophic consequencesj and
grapple with the mystifying but admittedly powerful
attraction of his views for the modern thinker. Finally, we
will fashion an overview of Kantian Dualism, and compare it
with the dichotomies we have observed in our knowledge,
understanding, and brain function. Me will conclude this
volume with the call for a unified view which can heal the
split which has so powerfully rent our view of knowledge and
real ity.
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THE DUALISM OF IMMANUEL KANT
In the briefest of terms, we may understand Kant's
contribution to the issue to be two-fold. First, he build
upon Descartes' METAPHYSICAL DUALISM, and proclaimed that
all reality was dichotomized into a PHENOMENAL realm of
physical reality and sense experience, and a NOUMENAL realm
of ideas and metaphysical realities which lie beyond sense
experience. He then magnified this into an EP I STEMOLOG ICAL
DUALISM by declaring to have proven that no knowledge could
cross the ontological barrier. He concluded that one could
have certain knowledge only within the phenomenal realm, but
none regarding any noumenal realities believed to underlie
phenomena, which may only give us th* appearance of true
existemce.
His concepts were so powerfully argued that they
continue to gain a wide acceptance within the scientific
community, even today. Paradoxically, this acceptance has
come without the scientist generally knowing anything about
their source, or their philosophical nature, and without
giving them any serious critique.
Kant's Background
We may gain some insight into Kantian ideas by
understanding something of the man's background, as
summarized for example by Beck* and Greene^. Immanuel Kant
was born in KOnigsburg, Germany, in 1724. His father was an
^Lewis White Beck, introduction to Immanuel Kant's
Prolegomena to Anv Future Metaohvsics (1783i reprint,
Indianapolis: The Library of Liberal Arts, Babbs-Merr i 1 1
Educational Publishing, 1980), xxi-xxii.
^Theodore M. Greene, introduction to Immanuel Kant's
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793| reprint.
New York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, 1960), xiiif.
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industrious and honest saddlemaker who was given more to the
use of reason than -faith, and more concerned with moral and
ethical behavior than with religion. By contrast, his mother
was warm and loving, and -full o-f vibrant -faith and honest
pietism. By the time he went to school, he came under much
social pressure to adopt a front of pietism, rather than one
which sprang from inner conviction. These social and
parental influences produced, in the young Kant, an
intellectual and emotional tension which he strove, for the
rest of his life, to resolve.
At the University of KOnigsburg, Kant's professors
included not only honest pietists, but also strong deists
and rationalists. The tensions between pietism and
rationalism increased within him, and drove him all the more
to seek a resolution. By the time he became FVofessor of
Logic and Metaphysics, he was actively seeking to reconcile
the emotional and rational aspects of his religion. He
became much inclined toward Descartes' dualistic ontology
and Newton's experimental science. And then he read Hume,
whom he claimed woke him from his "dogmatic slumber".
Kant's first published work was his General History of
Nature and Theory of the Heavens <1755>, and it was here
that he first proposed partitioning science and religion
into separate realms. It was the first of a number of
carefully written publications which eventually made him the
most famous philosopher in Germany, and all of Europe. His
other primary works were Qritique of Pure R>asQn (1781),
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783), Critique of
Practical Reason (1788), Critique of Judgment (1790), and
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone ( 1 793 ) .
Kant's Many Dualisms
Kant's philosophy addressed a great deal more than the
notion of dualism, but since this was at the core of his
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Hork, w� will focus our attention on that aspect. The basic
dichotomy he constructed opposes several pairs of
ontological or epi stemol ogi cal entities (faith versus
reason, appearance versus reality, sensible versus
intelligible, etc.). If we are to gain an understanding of
the full influence of Kant, we must examine each of these
opposed pairs.
1. Phenomenon vrsus noum*non. The most basic dichotomy
Kant postulates is an ontological ones it is the distinction
he makes between the "phenomenal realm" and the "noumenal
realm", for example in his Prol eoomenai ^
"Since the oldest days ot philosophy ,
inquir ies into pure reason have conceived , besides
the things of sense, or appearances (phenomena) ,
Mhich make up the sensible norld, certain beings
of the understanding (noumena) which should
constitute an intelligible Morld."
"After long reflection on the pure elements
of human knomledge (those Mhich contain nothing
empir ical) , I at last succeeded in distinguishing
Mith certainty, and in separating the pure
elementary notions of the sensibility (space and
time) from those of the under standing" .
Note, here, that Kant is not using the words
"knowledge" and "understanding" the way they are defined
today, and in this study.
Theodore Green gives us some additional insight into
Kant's dualisms in his introduction to the Religion Within
the Limits of Reason Alones*
"Upon this analysis of the knoMing process
Kant noM bases certain revolutionary conclusions
Mhich are of great importance to his philosophy of
religion. � he insists on branding the physical
Morld Mhich Me can knoM merely 'phenomenal
'
. This
^'Kant, Prolegomena. 61, 70.
^Greene, "Introduction", Kant's, Religion, xxxi ,
xMxix , xli .
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is the Morld Mhich scientists study Mith so Imrge
m measure o-f success. � It is a Morld of order,
untouched by miracles and subject ever to the
categor ies of substance and causality. � Kant yet
insists upon the possibility, suggested to us by
our reason, of an ultimate or 'noumenal ' reality,
so constituted that mortal man cannot apprehend it
through sensuous intuit ion or even grasp its
essential structures through reason,"
"Kant had urged, in the introduction to his
first publication , The BenTal History of Nature
and th� Theory o-f the Heavens (1755), the complete
separation of religion and science" .
"The phenomenal Morld is later called the
'Morld of appearance' , and the noumenal Morld is
the 'Morld of ultimate reality'".
From these quotations, we may now add some additional
pairs o-f opposed entities in Kant's dualism.
2. Sense versus intelligible understanding. In the
language o-f the present study, we would say that Kant was
here opposing sensory-rational (which science apprehends via
the senses) and intuitive�rational understanding (which we
apprehend by the intuition) , placing each in a separate
realm.
3. Appearance versus reality. Kant here argues that
there is a major di-f-ference between what really exists, and
what is a mere appearance o-f reality.
4. Material versus non-material. The Phenomenal realm,
says Kant, contains things in the physical world o-f material
reality. By contrast, he sees noumenal ideas or concepts to
be non-material.
5. Knowable vrsus unknowable. Kant argues that we can
gain certain knowledge only o-f the phenomenal (material)
world, and that we can gain no reliable knowledge o-f the
noumenal world, whether by sense or intuition.
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^- Science v�r�uB religion. Science, says Kant,
opsratm^ in the phenomenal world o-f material reality; it is
a world of order, cause-and-ef feet , and empirical laws which
we can reliably know by reason. But religion, argues Kant,
deal� with the noumenal realm, including such things as
<niracles, and about these we can know nothing reliable.
Kant next opposes another basic pair of entities in the
dualisms empirical and metaphysical knowledge.
7. Empirical versus metaphysical knowledge. Kant gives
us his spi stemol ogi cal distinction in the Prol eoomenai
"�as concerns the sources of metaphysical
knowledge , its very concept implies that they
cannot be empir ical . Its pr inciples � must never
be derived from exper ience . It must not be
physical but metaphysical knowledge , namely,
knowledge lying beyond exper ience ."
L. M. Beck, in the introduction to this edition of the
Prol eoomena . explains that the above distinction is intended
to be between, on the one hand, the world of mathematics,
science, and experience, and on the other hand, the world of
speculative metaphysics, where ideas are "mere beings of
thought beyond the world of sense experience".*
a. Truth and objective realitv versus mstaohvsics. Kant
then goes to the heart of his attempt to refute the orthodox
Christian world view by denying the possibility that its
teachings can be confirmed to deal with truth or objective
real ity t
"Metaphysics � has to do � with concepts
�
and nith assertions � whose truth or falsehood
�
=Kant, Prolegomena. 13.
*Beck, "Introduction," Kant's Prolegomena, xviii.
^Kant, Prolegomena. 75.
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and objective reality � cannot be discovered or
con-firmed by any exper ience."
^- Fact versus faith. Finally, as Thomas Green
describes it in his introduction to Kant's Religion Within
the Limits of Reason Alone^ =
"Kant thus distinguishes the ideal of the
Summum Bonum and the postulates of God and
immortal ity from the moral Ian and freedom,
calling the former 'objects of faith', regarding
Mhose specific character we must remain in some
doubt, Mhile the latter are designated as 'facts'
to Mhich Me are entitled to attach the highest
moral certainty."
An Overview of Kant's Dualistic View
If we put all of Kant's dualisms together into a single
view, we develop the -following picture. On one side of the
dualism (corresponding with the left side of the brain) we
find science; the world of phenomena and objective reality;
and of things which can be confirmed to be true and factual
because they deal with the physical, empirical world of
space-time and the natural laws of causality, things which
can be observed, sensed, mathematically described, and
experienced.
On the other side of the dualism (corresponding with
the right side of the brain) we find religion and
metaphysics; the transccMident world of the noumenal beyond
sense experience; and the world of ideas and concepts about
whose reality one can never know. For Kant, there may
actually be certain spirits, or a God, or some other Ding an
Sich ("Thing in Itself), but man can never know or confirm
that they objectively exist by any use of the senses,
intuition, understanding, intellect, or reason. Thus, for
Kant, the objective existence of such "hypothetical
�(3reene, "Introduction," Kant's Religion. Iviii.
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entities" in the transcendent world may only be inferred,
asserted, and accepted on faith.
THE DESTRUCTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF KANTIAN DUALISM
Kant's expansive dualism has had many disastrous
consequences for the modern way of thinking, partly because
of the other doctrines it spawned, but primarily because of
the radical split it seemed itself to concrete within
reality and knowledge.
Doctrines Following From Kant's Dualisms
Kant became the intellectual father of a number of
subsequent philosophical schools, each of which buys into
his dualisms to some extent. These include, for example, the
fol lowing:
1. Phenomenal i sm . This is the philosophical theory that
real knowledge is limited to the realm of phenomena, either
because there is no reality beyond phenomena, or because any
such reality is necessarily unknowable. It may be contrasted
with "noumenal ism" , which asserts that the nounenal world
actually has objective existence (whether or not a
particular person believes he can know about it).
2. Ideal ism. This is really a whole group of
philosophical theories which postulate that the various
objects of perception are actually only objects of the
perceiving mind, and that it is impossible to know whether
reality exists apart from the mind. It may be contrasted
with "materialism", which asserts that matter is the only
reality and that all things, including thought, will, and
feelings can be explained only in terms of matter.
3. Et^iricism. This is the philosophical theory that
sensory experience is the only reliable source of knowledge.
Only those things which can be touched, tasted, heard,
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smelled, observed, measured, or manipulated are considered
to be "real",
^� Positivism- This is the philosophical theory that
true knowledge comes not only -from the empirical, but more
specifically, that it comes only through scienti-fic study o-f
observable phenomena.
The Consequences o-f Kantian Dualism
Barbour believes that Kant's original intention was to
reconcile science and rel igion,'' and Greene agrees. They
see Kant hoping that, by assigning each to its own realm, he
would give each a separate dignity and thus eliminate the
need -for them to compete with each other.
The result, however, was just the opposite. Kant's
dualism, anchored as it was to those which extended
backwards in time -from Descartes to Zoroaster, made such a
radical distinction that science and religion were
dichotomized, with a rigid barrier between them. This has
had a number o-f disastrous consequences which the modern age
is just beginning to understand:
!� The inculcation o-f philosophical apartheid. First o-f
all, Kantian Dualism has established, by a process of
inculcation, a powerful and pervasive feeling of
philosophical apartheid in the modern mindset.
I recognize that the word "apartheid" is a strong and
emotionally tinged word, but I believe it is entirely
appropriate. In South Africa, apartheid is a policy of
strict segregation of the races. It is a policy which is
^lan G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Relioion. (New
York: Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row Publishers, 1966),
74, 77.
* "^Greene, introduction to Kant's Religion, xli.
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strictly enforced, by the power of the state, on the grounds
that allowing the "mixture" of the races will result in
troubles and conflicts of all sorts. It became, in the hands
of the white race, a means of treating the black race as
inferior. South Africa's policy of racial apartheid is
similar to America's earlier policy of "separate but ec|ual "
treatment for black and white races; it was argued then that
enforced separateness was a means of granting equality and a
separate dignity to each race.
A strikingly similar thing appears to be widespread
within modern culture world-wide, except that science and
religion are the new "races" being segregated. A policy
somewhat like that appears now to be followed by some within
the scientific community who use their powers of peer review
to control the scientific literature, and their powers over
academic tenure to control membership in the academic
institutions. Something like this policy appears even to
have been adopted at the highest levels of government,
through such ideologies as the "separation of Church and
state". In both cases it is argued that allowing science and
religion to "mix" would be to invite troubles and conflicts
of every sort, and that an enforced segregation would grant
each a "separate but equal dignity". Moreover, as in both
present South African and past American racial policies,
this power has been too often wielded to treat one
philosophical "race" as an inferior. Religion shows every
sign of becoming a philosophical "black race" under the
growing policy of philosophical apartheid.
It is a policy reinforced by inculcation. Webster says
that to inculcate is to impress upon the mind by frequent
repetition, admonition, or insistent urging. We seldom hear
a scientist or government official openly arguing for
Kantian Dualism, by name. But we see in the press, almost
every day, the apartheid-like arguments which uphold itx
that science and religion ought to be segregated into
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separate rooms o-f the Mind, or even separate parts o-f town,
such as home and school or church and courthouse.
Kantian Dualism has become the philosophical apartheid
o-f the modern age. Janus stands also at the bridges o-f our
culture, and one o-f his faces is the state, and the other is
rel igion.
2- Denvino connection and interaction. Kantian Dualism
necessarily denies that there is any natural connection
between the "two realms" and therefore there ought not to be
any interaction between thems
"Thanks to the thoroughgoing separation nhich
Kant has effected between the intelligible and
sensible nor Ids and betneen man's rational and
sensible nature, it is inevitable that he should
find no essential harmony between them".^^
The policy of racial apartheid also argues that black
and white ought not to be allowed to "mix" because there is
no natural connection between them. Some simply argue from
surface appearances, without looking below the skin to the
united humanity beneath. Others are more pointed in their
ideology, and consider the whits race more advanced, and the
black racs more "primitive".
And so it is with science and religion. Kantian Dualism
denies any natural connection or harmony between "rational"
science and "primitive" religion, and thus argues that they
should be so segregated that one cannot influence the other.
Sometimes it is argued that it is acceptable for science to
influence religion ("rationality ought to influence that
which is more primitive") but not the other way around.
3. Denvinq realitv to the noumenal. One effect of
consigning all that is noumenal into a realm of pure
subjectivity is that this effectively denies the objective
**Greene, "Introduction," Kant's Rel iqion . Ix.
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reality o-f anything in that realm. Like the nominalists and
others before them, Kantian Dualists are compelled by their
philosophy to at least strongly question the reality o-f
anything perceived to exist by the right brain, and that
includes God and all His acts within human and natural
history.
^- Sgparatino moral itv and rationality. Kant's dualism
so separates morality and rationality that we are left with
an irrational morality and an immoral rationality.
"The root of the difficulty lies in (Kant's)
dualistic vien of man's nature. In order to secure
freedom he has analyzed man into two
irreconci lable natures, the one abstractly
rational and noumenal , the other phenomenal and
purely sentient . The former is completely severed
from the empir ical nor Id � the latter is empty of
all moral reasonableness and is concerned mith
irrational sensuous satisfaction . Man thus
bifurcated is a thoroughly unreal creature of
Kant's ottn imagination" .
Jerry Gill has made the same point regarding Kant's
influence on the philosophies popular within intellectual
circles today. For him, the Kantian and Cartesian dualisms
lead modern society inevitably to either logical positivism,
which accepts as real only that which can be measured and
logically manipulated, or existentialism, which rebels
against the resulting "impersonal view" of science and
technology and seeks values in the subjective. Each simply
upholds a different half of the dualism, and neither accepts
their unity; therefore neither can find a rational and
objective basis for the values we want to uphold.*^
*=*Greene, "Introduction," Kant's Religion Within the
Limits of Reason Alone, op. cit. , p. Ixii.
*^Jerry H. Gill, The Possibilitv of Religious Knowledge
<Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, Jr., 1971).
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^- B^"Y*nq�unity to man and nature. By bifurcating man
and nature, Kant denied any basis for unity in much the same
way as did Descartes. In the words of Cassireri
"
as (Hanry) Mora objacts, Descartas has not
only distinguished between the two substances , but
he has separated them one from another f and he has
gone so far mith his logical distinction that he
had rendered any real connection between them
impossible. And yet the unity and life of nature
are based on the connection bettteen mind and
matter, in the unity of their interaction."^-*
"In the development beyond Descartes all
immediate connect ion between reality and the human
mind, between thinking substance and extended
substance is denied and completely broken off.
There is no union betmeen soul and body, between
our ideas and reality �".xa
6. Undermining the basis for science. The rebellion
against the unified view is also a rebellion against the
very presuppositions which made scientific knowledge
possible. As noted by Cassi rer : �*�
"
�Nemton and his disciples and followers saw
(no) cleavage between exper ience and thinking,
that is, between the realm of hard fact and pure
thought. Ho such conflicting modes of validity, no
such dualism between 'relations of ideas' and
matters of fact' as ne find in Hume's Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding ^ is to be found
among Hentonian thinkers . For the goal and basic
presuppositions of Hentonian research is un iversal
order and Ian in the mater ial norld."
7. Undermining the discursive unity in all
understanding. It is paradoxical, but true, that the 17th
and 18th Century scientist's view of the unity of knowledge
(epi stemol ogi cal monism) came from Descartes, the very one
^-^Ernst Cassi rer. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment
(Princeton, N. Ji Princeton University Press, 1968), 81.
^'�Cassirer, 95.
^^�Cassirer, 8.
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B metaphysical and ontological dualism was adopted by
� Cassi rer is worth quoting at length on this point i
"The rationalistic postulate of unity
dominates the mind of this age. The concept of
unity and that of science are mutually dependent
- The Seventeenth Century oned its inner
sol idar ity � to the cons istency and vigor nith
Mhich it clung to this postulate of unity and
extended its appl ication to all the spheres of
knowledge and living. This postulate prevailed
not only in science , but in religion , politics ,
and literature as nell. � To 'knom' a manifold of
exper ience is to place its component parts in such
a relationship to one another that, starting from
a given point, uie can run through them according
to a consistent and general rule. This form of
discursive understanding had been establ ished by
Descartes as the fundamental norm of mathematical
knowledge . Every mathematical operation , according
to Descartes , aims in the last analysis to
determine the proportion between an unknonn
quant ity and other knonn quant it ies , And this
proportion can only be str ict ly determined mhen
the unknown and the knonn participate in a 'common
nature ' " ~
"Both elements , the unknonn and the knonn ,
must be reducible to quantity and as such they
must be der ivable from the repetition of one and
the same numer ical unit. Thus the discursive form
of knowledge resembles a reduction; it proceeds
from the complex to the simple, from apparent
diversity to its basic identity. Eighteenth
Century thought holds firmly to this fundamental
method and attempts to apply it to broader and
broader fields of knowledge , The very concept of
'calculus' thus loses its exclusive mathematical
meaning �from the realm of quantities it invades
the realm of pure qualities. For qualities too may
be placed in such a relationship to one another
that they are der ivable from one another in strict
order ."*^^
Thus, the 17th-18th Century "discursive" understanding
o-f all knowledge sees the "known" scienti-fic aspects o-f
i-:^Cassi rer , 22. Cassi rer is using the term "discursive"
here in its philosophical sense, i.e., to designate a
process o-f going -from premise to conclusion in a series
o-f
logical steps, -following some heuristic.
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reality sharing a "common nature" with the "unknown" aspects
of reality, such as those in the realm of the religious or
metaphysical. This unified view of knowledge seems to
anticipate the work of Torrance, Polanyi, Bill, and others
who see knowledge in these areas on a continuum with each
other, rather than as a dualism.
Descartes and his Eighteenth Century followers were
straddling a fence. They tried to maintain an ontological
dualism but an epi stemologi cal unity. Epistemological ly ,
they were like classical theisms man can know in either of
two ways, with the left brain (logically, discursively, in
linear steps) or with the right brain (intuitively,
hoi istical ly, seeing the overall pattern) because they are
unified by their participation in both nature and
supranature.
Modern man should by ncsw have seen the need to match
this epistemological unity with an ontological one, where
knowledge and ontological reality share in a common nature.
But instead, modern man brought his epistemology and
ontology into congruence by adopting dualism in his
epistemology to match the dualism in his ontology. They
changed the Cartesian epistemology (unity of knowledge) into
a Kantian one (dichotomy of fact and value, objective and
subjective) .
The modern "Kantian" view of knowledge and reality has
thus given us not only a thoroughly fractured view of
reality, but also a fractured way of knowing that reality.
8. Denial of objective basis for the transcendent. Kant
tried to fashion a purely moral, subjective, ethical
religion whereas classical theology affirms that man's faith
resides in a concrete objective reality. Kant tries to
separate faith from history (he subscribes to the "double
truth" theory; for him Genesis is philosophically true but
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historically false) ^� nhereas classical theology insists
that Bod acted with mighty signs in natural and human
history, even becoming flesh within the history of man, and
thus mans faith is rooted in objective, factual, historic
truth.
^- Denial of knowledge of the transcendent. Kant denies
that we can know transcendent truth, in the face of Biblical
revelation which claims to reveal Bod's own truth to us, of
Christ's own words in claiming to reveal Bod's truth to us
directly, and in the face of legions who have experienced it
personally in their own lives. Indeed, Kant himself said he
had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.
The Bnostics made the same denial ages before Kant, and
also did so on the basis of philosophical dualism. Kant is
thus no less guilty than they of clear error and thus
heresy.
10. Separation of sacred and secular, church and state.
When Kantian Dualism is adopted by a person as a basic
premise of all thinking, it necessarily affects the way he
conducts his affairs in business, government, education, and
religion. At the very least, it compels him to insist upon
an enforced separation of the two realms in every avenue of
life (secular�sacred, church-state, religion-education,
etc.), and to assert that the only true knowledge for
governing human affairs comes to us from science and the
secular.
This is the same philosophical position which wants to
define every concern of the brain's left hemisphere as a
"secular matter", and "protect" society against
"interference" from all right-hemisphere concerns (labeled
"religious", "subjective", or a "matter of taste".)
�^�Kant, Rel igion . 73.
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11- Confusion o-f mcience and philosophy. Science is a
collection of facts and information about the natural half
o-f reality, coupled with a particularly powerful method for
gaining news facts and information. By contrast, philosophy,
and in particular metaphysics, is a way of interpreting
those facts and bits of information into a meaningful whole.
Scientists gather facts. Philosophers interpret facts.
Most properly, scientists can not interpret facts
unless they do so in accordance with philosophical or
metaphysical principles. Unfortunately, most scientists are
not content with merely gathering facts; they also desire to
interpret them. But they seldom acknowledge either that
they follow a philosophy in doing so, or what that
philosophy is. Thus, when a scientist makes an interpretive
assessment about origins or some other metaphysical issue,
he implies by the absence of a philosophical statement that
what he says is science. This is a metaphysical slight-of-
hand which results in a sort of "convolution of science with
phi losophy" .
Dualism forces the one who wishes to interpret to
classify this right-brained function as a left-brained one,
calling it science instead of philosophy. At best, it is a
confusion of intellectual function; at worst, it is a
deliberate manipulation for strategic reasons.
12. Stimulation of a reasoned alternative. We saw
earlier how the threat of Gnostic Dualism stimulated the
early Church to develop a reasoned answer which could
recover the lost unity. Perhaps one positive benefit of
Kantian Dualism is the careful response it must surely
generate in a modern upholding of the united view.
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THE STRANGE MODERN APPEAL OF KANT'S DUALISMS
For a number of reasons, the dualistic nor Id view
fashioned by Kant and his intellectual predecessors has been
enormously appealing to a number of influential people,
particularly within the scientific community. Let us now
consider some of the reasons for his appeal, and consider an
example of the way it has influenced a modern scientist:
Roger Sperry,
Reasons for Kant's Aooeal
I can point to at least 4 reasons for Kant's enormous
appeal to the modern mind, and I am sure there are others.
The four are as followsi
1 . Kant's dazzlino brilliance. Li ke a moth attracted to
the flame which will devour it, many people are attracted to
a view, even to a fatal view, by the brilliance of its
primary advocate. And no one can deny that Kant was among
the most brilliant of the lights in his or any age. The
clear power of his intellect, coupled with his brilliant
imagination, are undoubtedly irresistible to those who seek
brilliance of form over truth of content.
2. Fragmentation counterfeited. Part of the success of
Kantian Dualism is perhaps that is so cleverly counterfeits
a very real fragmentation from which we all seek resolution
in our lives: the fragmentation resulting from sin and the
Fall. We are all too aware, with Paul, that what we do not
want to do, that is the very thing we do, and that the very
thing we ought to do is the thing we do not do. We see
rampant evidence in the world that "what is" is not at all
"what ought to be". Man loves and longs for the goodness of
God, and yet feels a clear and demoralizing separation from
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Him. Faith and -fact cxight not to be separated, but in the
tragedies o-f everyday life, they often seem to be just so.
Kant, too, felt this rent in the fabric of the
universe, this chasm between a Holy God and sinful man for
which God provided only one Mediator, but he did not believe
in the Fall. He was therefore compelled to account for the
separation in some other way, and for some other way of
overcoming it as well. He made the chasm a natural one, and
resorted to ethical religion and the power of the will as a
way to overcome the dichotomy between "is" and "ought".
Today's scientist, if he shares Kant's disdain for the
supranatural and yet feels the need for a "natural" bridge
across the chasm, is likely to opt for the same sort of
philosophical dualism. It explains the chasm he senses is
there, but does not violate his revulsion against the
supranatural as the only means of bridging the gap.
3. Unitv without the personal. Kantian Dualism may be
attractive to those who feel the need for a unity of head
and heart, but do not want the personal aspect which goes
with either. For those who distrust personal intimacy with
either males or females, for example, or who simply prefer
to live in an objective, impersonal world in which they are
a subject, Kantian Dualism may offer an attractive
alternative to the kind of unity provided by a supranatural
person.
Some scholars conclude that Kant may have developed his
radical dualism at least in part because of the tension he
felt between the intellectual satisfaction of his father's
rationalism and the emotional satisfaction of his mother's
pietism. He wanted the warmth and goodness of true piety,
but that required the personal intimacy of both mother-son
and father�son relationships. His uneasy and distant
personal relationship with his father caused him to seek the
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piety o-f theism without buying into its personal and
spiritually-based truth system. He pre-ferred instead to make
pietism intellectually acceptable by trans-ferring it over
into a separate intellectual realm.
Kant loved God like Churchill loved his mother � at a
distance. Perhaps this is why he claimed to be a deist, -for
the deist wants there to be a God, but also wants Him
removed a safe distance away where He will not "interfere"
by invoking an intimate personal relationship which commands
both love and obedience, i.e., both motherly and fathiwly
affections. Erecting a dualistic barrier between man and God
insures that he remains at that distance. Kant hoped this
approach would get his head and heart together, but it
resulted in separating them all the more.
4. Unitv without the supranatural. Kantian Dualism may
also be attractive to those who feel the need for unity of
head and heart, but do not want the supranatural dimension
which goes with the heart. Like Kant, they want the feeling
of goodness provided by theism, but without buying into the
supranatural basis for its truth system.
The Kantian Basis for Roger Soerrvs Views
Roger Sperry provides an excellent example of the
Kantian view in the modern scientific age. The acknowledged
father of "split-brain" research, he won a Nobel prize for
his efforts. His book. Science and Moral Priority.**' gives
us his highly interesting attempt to "merge mind, brain, and
human values" and "overturn dualisms". Because of the
reputation he holds, he may raise hope in the casual reader
that he will do so. Unfortunately, he does an eloquent job
* ''Roger Sperry, Science and Moral Priority: Merging
Mind. Brain, and Human Values (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1983).
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of maintaining the very dualisms I trust I have shown to be
so damaging.
Sperry almost escapes our criticism of contradiction,
however, by simply using the term "dualism" in the non-
philosophical, layman's sense; for him, dualism is simply a
belief that both natural and supranatural exist. He claims
to unify head and heart, but does so by moving matters of
the heart into the head where they can be separated from all
ties to the supranatural. Sperry thus uses Kantian Dualism
to argue for unity, a highly attractive but deadly maneuver.
Sperry begins by claiming to provide a "long sought
unifying view", that is a "singly unified system extending
from sub�nuclear forces near the bottom up through ideas at
the top."^^ To do so, he proposes to do away with dualisms,
by which he means "dualistic beliefs in the supernatural",^*
and wants to rule the supernatural out of existence.
Having done this, he then wishes to coronate science as the
prime authority in matters of values, claiming that the
"truths of science" arc the "best key for valid moral
guidel ines" . Being a thoroughgoing evolutionist, he
proposes (with Julian Huxley) to make evolution the standard
of all that is good=*�, and makes it clear that he means
naturalistic (not theistic) evolution by insisting that our
values be based purely upon "naturalistic" rather than
"other�worldly" perspectives.^** Finally (with Comte), he
^''Sperry , 38.
^*Sperry , 84.
===*Sperry , 21.
Sperry, 48.
^^'^Sperry , 104.
==�Sperry , 50.
^^^Sperry , 75.
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would accompli Bh his "unity" by ermcting a nmw theology or
philosophy acceptable to all the world's religions, based
upon science, rational-empiricism, humanism, evolution, and
religious syncretism.
Sperry would do what Kant would have said he wanted to
do, i-f he had possessed Sperry 's knowledge of split-brain
physiology: moved all right-brain valuing into the left
hemisphere where it could be generated by sensory perception
and controlled by the digital and law-bound processes of
rational -logical reasoning.
We are now, perhaps, at the proper juncture to step
back and take an overview of Janusian thinking, and the
striking correlations it reveals between Philosophical
Dualism, divided brain hemispheres, divided minds, and
divided understanding.
DUALISM, SPLIT BRAINS, AND DIVIDED MINDS
The content of the study to this point leads me to
conclude that the philosophical concept that science and
religion belong in two, unconnected realms is anchored in
the philosophical apartheid of dualism; mediated by the
physiological apartheid of divided brain hemispheres and
perhaps also by the moral and theological apartheid of
divided minds; and that these result in an apartheid of the
understanding regarding natural and spiritual realities. I
have proposed the image of Janus at the bridge of our Corpus
Callosum as an appropriate metaphor for visually
representing both the "two-faced" aspect of this apartheid,
and the power invoked to maintain it.
I conclude with a brief review of the nature of each
kind of apartheid, and a series of charts to illustrate the
range of things which each divides. The striking
correspondence between these various types of dualistic
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thought, �nd the logical ties we have found to connect them,
constitute the twin reasons for affirming that they may be
related in a cause-and-ef feet relationships that Kantian
dualism, philosophical dualism, split brains, and divided
perception, knowledge, and understanding are all
manifestations of the same intellectual diseases the
Janusian Syndrome.
Arguments. Dualism. Split Brains, and Divided Understanding
Figure 6.1, at the end of the chapter, summarizes the
things which are divided in the minds of those who affirm
philosophical dualism. This division constitutes an
apartheid in the world view of dualists. It might also be
described, more metaphorically than psychologically, as a
kind of intellectual "schizophrenia".
Figure 6-2, which follows it, summarizes the things
which are divided by our brain hemispheres, and may thus
constitute a physiological basis for apartheid in all our
thinking. Note the striking correspondences with the
dichotomies of Figures 3-1 and 5-1, as well as 6-1.
We need, here, to advance a note of caution in
proclaiming this "split-brain" physiology to be the complete
answer to dualistic or other related thinking. As Sperry
himself cautioned in his speech upon receiving the Nobel
Prizes
"The growing nave o-f semi-popular
extrapolation and speculation concerning 'left-
brained' versus
'
r ight-brained
' functions call for
a fiord of caution. The left-right dichotomy in
cognitive modes is an idea with mhich it is very
easy to run mild."^^
^^Roger Sperry, "Some Effects of Disconnecting
the
Cerebral Hemispheres", Science. 217 (24 September
1982) : 1223-1225. This is the text of Sperry s lecture
in
Stockholm upon receiving the Nobel Prize in medicine
on
December 8, 1981.
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I completely agree. Nevertheless, the correspondence
between hemisphere -functions, especially those in the intact
brain, and the dualistic ideas expressed by so many people,
make for a possible connection which is far too appealing
for our right-brain powers of pattern recognition to
overlook. I propose that, rather than making split-brain
thinking the total answer, a broader interpretation is in
order, one in which our hemispherical specialization, along
with our personalities and other aspects of our biological
temperament, constitute one major factor which may
predispose us to think and believe in certain ways, and that
this factor works in concert with our culture, education,
and environment to shape the way we perceive and interpret
real ity.
Figure 6-3 reviews the things which are divided by our
two channels of understanding. When these are divided by
philosophy and split-brain physiology, they constitute an
apartheid in our understanding of the natural and spiritual
dimensions of reality. Note again the remarkable
correspondence between this chart and the dichotomies of
Figures 6-1 and 6-2.
CONCLUSIONS
Carl Sagen attempts to provide a philosophical
explanation of split-brain thinking in his book The Dragons
of Eden.^� He believes that the split in the hemispheres
came about as an evolutionary development, and that the left
hemisphere, being rational and logical, is more advanced
than the more "primitive" right hemisphere.
��Carl Sagen, The Dragons of Edeni Speculations on the
Evolution of Human Intelligence <New York, Ball ant ine Books,
1977) , 57-83.
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For thm advocate o-f classical Christian theism, this
may be seen as an interesting type o-f circular reasoning.
Our split-brain physiology and its natural correlates in
dualistic philosophy helps to lead some to explain all
things -from left hemisphere perception and reasoning
Pf"ocesses, which lean naturally to the evolutionary view.
This, in turn, may cause such a thinker to propose evolution
as the cause of the thinking processes which led him to
believe in evolution in the first place.
When, however, the advocate of classical Christian
theology attempts to use both halves of his brain, opening
himself to both sensory-rational and intuitive-rational
understanding, he may propose a more "whole-brained"
philosophical understanding. The Bible speaks much of the
fact that sin and the Fall of man and nature brought with it
a fall in human reason. Thus, from the Biblical perspective,
there is now a cloud over our reason, or scales over our
spiritual eyes. We see through a glass darkly. We are
afflicted with divided hearts and divided minds. We do not
love God and our fellow man, as we are commanded to do, with
all of our heart and with all of our mind. We are double
minded, a kingdom divided, and in need of a new heart.
When such Biblical revelations are considered
intuitively, along with our rational understanding of split
brains and divided understanding, we may speculate in one of
two ways concerning our split brains. First, we might
speculate that we were created with two radically different
brain hemispheres because (like the parallel -processing
computer) it is a superior way to achieve integrated
thinking; but the Fall created some abnormality, some Janus
at the Corpus Callosum, which prevents them from working
well together. Or alternately, we might speculate that we
were created with a whole brain which was "very good" in all
its functions, like the rest of Creation, but the Fall
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brought a basic division to our bodies, manifested by
divided hemispheres, causing our rebellious minds to be also
divided unless we submit both hemispheres to the unifying
influence of Bod. Whichever alternative we choose, it is
only when each self decides, as a matter of the will, to
stand between the hemispheres and, with spiritual help, to
compel them to work together that we can we achieve the
submittal required for whole-brain thinking and thus a
unified view of reality and our ways of knowing it.
This view allows us to account also for the moral and
theological apartheid we find so characteristic of dualistic
thinkings man in charge of his own affairs, following his
own self�will and rational thinking processes, and Bod
consigned to a domain of the imaginary and subjective.
The dualisms summarized by Figures 6-1 through 6�3
constitute, I believe, a serious problem for the
intellectual life of our nation. They are not fashioned to
deal only with the origins issue; they affect the way any
dualist sees all of reality, and any of our ways of knowing
that reality. I am therefore convinced that they shape
thought not only in the origins debate, but in political,
economic, social, educational, and other arenas as well. And
they cry out to replace the counterfeit unification which
tries, in Kantian fashion, to ignore the right-hemisphere,
and generate all values within the rational left-hemisphere.
They cry out for a reconciliation which is whole-brained,
one which will see science and religion, faith and reason,
and facts and values as complementary aspects of a real
union between all of ultimate reality and man, its knower.
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Science
Man
Nature, Natural
Particular*
Form
Senses
Body
Materi al
Phenomenal
Hi story
Facts
Impersonal Principle
Object, What is Known
Reason
Knowledge
Deduction
Objective
Being
Real ity
Experience
Certainty
Good
Male, Father
Light
Yang
Rel igion
God
Grace, Supranatural
Universals
Content
Intuition
Mind, Ideas
Spiritual
Noumenal
Poetry, Mythology
Opinions, Values
Personal Relationship
Subject, Knowing Person
Faith, Emotion
Belie-f
Induction
Subjective
Non -being
Superstition, Imagination
Authority
Uncertainty
Evil
Female, Mother
Darkness
Yin
Figure 6.1. The Apartheid in Philosophical Dualism.
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Science
Sensory Perception
Phenomenal, Material
Observe, Predict
Laws, Rules, E-ffects
Impersonal Principles
Word, Number, Speech
Language, Math
Digital, De-fined
Detailed
Concrete Details
Facts
Data
Analyze, Classi-fy
Time and the Static
Order, Stability
Construction
Thinking
Judgment, Proposition
Formal -Deductive Logic
Control o-f Emotion
Reaching Closure
Rel igion
Intuitive Perception
Noumenal, Spiritual
Inference
Causes, Agency
Personal Character, Acts
Vision, Picture, Space
Art, Music
Analogous, Metaphorical
Global, Holistic
Abstract, Interpretation
Values, Meaning, Purpose
Reality the data Signify
Synthesize, Unite
The Timeless and Change
Beauty, Freedom
Imagination, Creativity
Feel ing
Proportionality
Material -Inductive Logic
Expression of Emotion
Openness to New Data
Figure 6.2. The Apartheid of the Brain Hemispheres.
Material Reality (
Natural Reality :
Phenomenal Reality :
Sensory Perception ;
Mediated Knowledge i
Specifics i
Verbal , Numerical s
Ideas, Concepts :
Analysis t
Manipulation t
Deductive Reason :
Sensory World View :
Facts s
Certain Knowledge :
Figure 6.3. The Resulting
Spiritual Reality
Supranatural Reality
Noumenal Reality
Intuitive Perception
Direct Knowledge
General i ties
Visual, Pictorial
Symbol , Model , Metaphor
Synthesi s
Imagination
Induction, Pattern Rec.
Intuitive World View
Faith, Values, Emotion
Uncertain Belief
Apartheid in Understanding.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSIONSx DUALISM AS A BASIS FOR JANUSIAN THOUGHT
I have hypothesized, in this -foundational work on the
Janusian Syndrome, that the human mindset is established
upon an interrelated network o-f biological, epistemological,
and philosophical dualisms, and that these predispose us to
think about the big issues in dichotomized ways. This will
set the stage, I trust, -for later volumes which will provide
empirical demonstrations o-f such dichotomized thinking;
explore the many ways in which human bias toward one side o-f
each dualism produces a whole Janusian Syndrome o-f "half-
brained" thought; and argue the merits of willful effort to
overcome these dualisms by a unified view of reality, of
ourselves, and of our ways of knowing.
This concluding chapter of the foundational volume is
an apt vantage point from which to survey the territory over
which we have passed, and to look ahead toward the
destination we hope to reach. I want, therefore, to try now
to weave together the many strands of thought I have
attempted to develop.
The Three Interrelated Splits
The most basic thought I have sought to develop, in a
gradual but I trust whole-brained manner, is that each
person tends "naturally" to be afflicted with three
fundamentally different but interrelated kinds of split or
dichotomy when he approaches the task of knowing and
understanding reality: a biological and perhaps spiritual
split in each person who seeks to know or understand,
an
epistemological split in his ways of knowing and
understanding, and a consequent metaphysical split these
predispose him to perceive in the reality
he examines.
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The interrelate "9 I should eaphasize that I believe
these three splits are probably interrelated, perhaps even
at a "cause and effect" level, and I feel relatively certain
that I have not committed the logical fallacy of confusing
antecedent with cause. I have the growing conviction that
the split in our brain hemispheres somehow predisposes us to
�t one and the same time, t*�o independent views of
reality. This gives us a sort of "cognitive dissonance"
which blurs our perceptual vision and makes us want to
select either the sensory and scientific view or intuitive
and religious view as the standard, if not the "real" view
of reality, and to reject the other as "undependable" if not
"unreal" or even "harmful".
Thus we develop a dominance of one brain hemisphere
over the other; or, alternately, perhaps our hemispherical
dominance is genetically endowed and this causes us to
prefer one view over the other. For whatever reason, the way
our brains are wired, and the ways in which we use it,
appear to predispose us to a dualistic view of reality, and
this in turn seems to lead us to see our sensory�scientific
and intuitive-religious modes of knowing and understanding
as being dichotomized, and that dichotomy leads us to see
reality itself as divided. We may therefore possess a
biological predisposition to see science and religion as
belonging in separate realms which are, or ought to be, kept
separate.
While there appear to be clear splits in human
biological, epistemological, and philosophical function,
there also appear to be clear continuities within the sides
so dichotomized. This may be important for our ability to
predict patterns of human thought and belief- For example,
if one's thought on an issue seems dominated by a drive
toward detail, deductive logic, technical language, and
empirical facts, we ought to be able to predict that his
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thought will also be strongly oriented toward other
"connected" characteristics of left-brained thought, for
example toward the view that reality is law-abiding and
predictable, or that the world "ought" to be be highly
organized and controlled. By contrast, when someone's ideas
are dominated by strongly expressed allegiance toward
synthetic thought, inductive logic, metaphorical or
expressive language, and interpretive values, we ought to be
able to predict that his thought will also be strongly
oriented toward other "connected" characteristics of "right-
brained" thought, for example a strong affection for freedom
and novelty and a distaste for organized control over his
affairs.
Its "natural" basis. I use the modifier "natural" in
describing these dichotomies because I believe we are
presently inclined, by our "nature", to follow these split
ways of thinking. But I have placed it in quotation marks
because I have questioned whether these splits were
intended, in the original design of the human psyche, and
are therefore something to be judged "good", or whether
perhaps they are a perversion of the original design for
man, and are therefore something to be overcome. In short, I
am not sure whether these tendencies are in accordance with
our "original good nature" or our "present fallen nature".
The word "natural", unless qualified, could mean either.
Regardless of our view on the original intention for
the split, it seems clear that it it now functioning so as
to incline us toward dichotomized views of ourselves, our
knowledge, and indeed all of reality. I am spiritually and
philosophically inclined toward what I take to be the higher
view that man, knowledge, and reality are or ought to be
united things. I therefore argue that these three splits are
producing perversions of some sort in the way we were
intended to think, and that they are therefore to be
overcome. Since we are <now) "naturally" inclined to think
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in split ways, and since I take these ways to be imper-fect,
I thc�refor� believe that we nust, -first, intellectually and
spiritually understand them and their harmful effects, and
secondly, we must develop our intellectual and spiritual
strength to overcome them.
ThP Tie With Dualistic Philosophv
Our philosophies are a collage of the ways in which we
see, or prefer to see, the reality which surrounds us. They
reflect the preferences of the "personal self" which stands
between the brain hemispheres and uses them as it sees fit.
If indeed it is our "natural" predisposition to see, or at
least prefer to see, in a dualistic manner, then we might be
expected to show some "natural" preference for adopting a
basic philosophy of dualism, and thereafter for other
philosophies which fit naturally into a dualistic scheme.
I believe that is indeed the case. Furthermore, I
suspect that the extent to which we become philosophical
dualists is in direct proportion to the effort each personal
self exerts to integrate the processes of its brain
hemispheres against the "natural" tendency toward
segregation.
According to this view, if we follow our present
"natural" inclinations, we have a good chance of becoming
philosophical dualists because that is the "natural"
direction in which our brain structure leads us; we need
only to relax our intellectual grip a little, and one of our
"minds" will exert itself and try to take over and cause us
to see how things "are". This will lead us to practice a
sort of "philosophical apartheid", one symptom of which is
the attempt to keep science and religion, faith and reason,
or church and state in their separate realms. If, on the
other hand, we respond to a higher vision of the way things
"ought" to be, we can use our spiritual
and intellectual
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willpower to overcome our "naturally" dualistic tendencies.
personal sel-f can thus choose to integrate the processes
o-f our brain hemispheres, marching against our "natural
tendency" toward philosophical apartheid. By so marshaling
their respective powers in a harmonious fashion, we can
again see the inherent unity within reality, and the need
for continual effort to achieve a "whole-brained' balance
between sensory-scientific and intuitive-religious knowledge
and understanding of that reality.
Only a whole-brained knowledge and understanding can
hope to achieve real truth with certainty.
The Janusian Metaphor
For several reasons, I have found the image of the
Roman god Janus to be a fit metaphor for the particular
intellectual and spiritual problem we are discussing. Like
Janus, there is a personal self standing at the Corpus
Callosum which bridges our brain hemispheres. Like Janus,
that self has the power to open or close the gate, to bring
about integration or segregation, to enforce harmony or
apartheid. And like Janus, the person who sees himself as
relaxed and at peace keeps the door closed, so that no
communication occurs.
We find ourselves, however, in a kind of warfare, a
time when there are many philosophies clamoring for our
attention. A battle of sorts is raging for the minds and
hearts of men. Like the Romans' view of their Janus, this of
all times is a time when we ought to open the gate, to allow
our left and right hemispheres to communicate, so they may
be a check and balance on each other, and thus bring about
a unity among the hostile camps.
But we find, instead, that the Janus between many brain
hemispheres is working ever harder to keep the bridge
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closed. They are the strong dualists. Moreover, the persons
who are so motivated seek not only to erect a barrier
between science and religion, -faith and reason, and church
and state, but also to elevate the authority of one over the
other. Theirs is thus a biased dualism. Some would elevate
the authority of the left hemisphere, and others would
elevate the authority of the right; but both work with equal
diligence to keep the two apart, and neither can see the
wisdom of harmonizing the two.
The Work Yet to be Done
So far I have argued, but with very little empirical
basis, that many people are dualists on the big issues of
our time. And I have asserted, again with little empirical
basis, that many dualists are biased, favoring one brain
hemisphere over the other. Now I wish to alert the reader to
the work which is yet to come.
Arauments as empirical. I will present, in later
volumes of this continuing study on the Janusian Syndrome,
the empirical basis for my conclusion that these dualisms
are alive and well in our time, as is a bias toward one or
the other side of the dualism.
We will see that both the basic dualism and the bias
are apparent in the public arguments of those who oppose the
concept of a scientifically valid view of Creation. The
basic dualism is apparent in their argument that creation is
religion and evolution is science, and that the two ought
not to be mixed. Their bias toward the left side of the
dualism is apparent in their arguments from the perspectives
of rationalism, positivism, naturalism, modernism, and a
higher critical and demythologized view of the Bible. Their
bias toward the right side of the dualism is apparent in
their arguments from the perspectives of idealism,
romanticism, process thought, theistic evolution, liberal-
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emotional pietism, mysticism, and a purely metaphorical view 
of the Bible. 
DevelOPing a unified viWW. 
Janusian Syndrome will conclude 
for the unified view. It will 
This continuinQ study of the 
with a volume which argues 
build upon the model. of 
reality already described, for example the elastic net 
model, and 
which help 
will introduce additional models or concepts 
us to see all of reality as a unified whole. It 
will build upon the models of knOWing already de.cribed, for 
example science and reliQion as complementary windows on the 
same world, and will introduce additional models or concepts 
to help us integrate and harmonize our ways of knowing. And 
it will build upon the view already presented of the knowing 
person as utilizing two brain hemispheres in dichotomized or 
unified ways, and introduce additional models or concepts of 
man as a unified biological, intellectual, and spiritual 
whole. 
The only source of unity. I began this introductory 
volume with a consideration of the concept of truth. I will 
later move toward a concept of goodness. In the end, I hope 
to show that truth and Qoodness are not divided from one 
another. They are rather two sides of the same coin. 
If we are to contend successfully with the great issues 
of our time, we must no longer seek a truth which is 
unconnected to the good, and a good which is unconnected to 
the truth. In the final analysis, the good and the true are 
one because they have the same Author. And it is only when 
we are submitted to that Author that we can be united as 
whole persons; that we can therefore identify with the real 
universe in which He and all His creation are united; and 
that we can accordingly know that which is both good and 
true with the certainty which flows from a united knowing 
and understanding. 
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